ERRATUM

to

MCWP 3-33.5

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

1. For administrative purposes, the publication short title has been reidentified. Change *FMFM 8-2* to read *MCWP 3-33.5* wherever it appears in the Manual. Also change the Publication Control Number (PCN) from 13900070000 to 14300012400.
FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

This publication, FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations, presents the doctrine, tactics, and techniques used by Marine Corps landing forces in counterinsurgency operations, including counterguerrilla operations.

2. SCOPE

This manual is written in two parts. Part I provides essential background information concerning the origin and general objectives of counterinsurgency operations as well as the tactics and techniques employed by insurgent forces. Part II sets forth Marine Corps doctrine, tactics, and techniques for counterinsurgency operations, with emphasis on the planning and conduct of internal defense assistance operations by Marine Corps forces.

3. SUPERSESSION


4. CHANGES

Recommendations for improving this manual are invited from commands as well as directly from individuals. The attached User Suggestion Form should be utilized by individuals and forwarded to the

Commanding General
Doctrine Division (C 42)
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
2042 Broadway Street Suite 210
Quantico, VA 22134-5021

5. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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User Suggestion Form

From:

To: Commanding General, Doctrine Division (C 42), Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2042 Broadway Street Suite 210 Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021

Subj: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING FMFM 8-2, COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

1. In accordance with the foreword to FMFM 8-2, which invites individuals to submit suggestions concerning this FMFM directly to the above addressee, the following unclassified recommendation is forwarded:

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Nature of Change: □ Add
□ Delete
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2. Proposed new verbatim text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on additional pages as necessary.)

3. Justification/source: (Need not be double-spaced.)

Note: Only one recommendation per page.
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PART I. BACKGROUND

SECTION I

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

101. GENERAL

This section addresses the characteristics of developing nations and the problems inherent within transitional societies. It describes environmental factors which must be considered during the conduct of internal defense and internal development operations. In addition, the effect of these factors on U.S., host country (HC), and insurgent forces is considered. It is not the intent of this section to ignore the urbanized nations, and that Marines may be employed in counterinsurgency operations in those environments. Many of the contributing conditions to insurgency in developing and transitional nations will also foster insurgency in developed societies.

102. DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

A developing nation is one which has advanced beyond a traditional society and is struggling toward becoming an economically and socially advanced nation with an efficient, popularly supported government. In order to achieve these goals, a nation must overcome the handicaps which are characteristic of an underdeveloped society. These are: a static economy, limited technology, immobile social structure, and rule by custom and traditional process.

103. PROBLEMS OF TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES

a. Impatience for Progress.—The early stages toward development are expensive and do not always result in benefits which are tangible to the people. The "revolution of rising expectations" resulting from the
knowledge and ideas spread by mass media may also cause the people to be impatient for immediate, visible evidence of progress. Popular leaders seeking to gain additional recognition as spokesmen for the people intensify this impatience by demanding recognizable benefits for the people. The pressure of popular demand presents a dilemma to the government. Should it surrender to expediency and postpone or delay expenditures for the basics of development, or should it continue an unpopular course of action which could lead to a form of popular revolution?

b. Hesitation to Leave the Past.--New ideas may not be accepted easily by many members of the government or the population. The reluctance to leave the past will be based initially upon an attachment to and confidence in traditional methods, coupled with a lack of knowledge and appreciation of the benefits of modernization. This attitude may impede programs aimed at developing the country politically, economically, and socially.

c. Disagreement on Programs.--There will be disagreement on the types of programs which should be initiated and on how much change is desirable. The disagreement will also extend to how much government participation is necessary in order to accomplish these programs. In addition, the intelligentsia may differ as to the extent of development that should be undertaken, particularly where development may affect adversely their own position or vested interest in the society.

d. Population Support.--Although the people may lack political maturity or a knowledge of their own best interests and how to make their desires known, they possess a great deal of political power. Political forces in opposition to the government may discover the means of mobilizing the attitudes and opinions of various minority groups within the population. They may be able to pressure the government into meeting their demands.

e. Dissident Factions.--When the government is intolerant of opposition, dissident factions will be forced either to forego any activity or to adopt covert means. As the government pursues the task of progressive reform, it must ensure assimilation of minority groups into the national structure and create within these groups a sense of national identity and responsibility. Minority groups which differ in race and language, or are located in remote areas, will be more difficult to assimilate than those which live in proximity to the predominate group. If progressive programs do not bring hope and the promise of a better life to the minorities, they will lack faith in the government and may provide an exploitable base for the insurgent movement.

f. Military.--Military groups possess considerable political and social influence and have a capability to play a significant role in the political, social, and economic development of the country. The military role will vary with the efficiency of the government, the existence and intensity of insurgency, the presence or absence of an external threat, and the strength, efficiency, disposition, and leadership of the armed forces.

(1) The military often plays a political role, particularly when it is entrusted with the enforcement of law and order. Since it controls the power to dominate most other agencies of government, the military is likely to develop a political position of its own to perpetuate its strength and prerogatives. In this respect, the military may block, permit, or promote some of the activities of the civil government. Military involvement in politics may be beneficial when it provides the
stability, which may be lacking under civil government, for political, social, and economic improvement; however, care must be taken to ensure that it does not inhibit the political development of the government or the people.

(2) The military is often the first to be exposed to modern ideas and concepts. This exposure may cause it to be among the earliest segments of society to seek progressive reforms and modernization.

(3) Recruits with little or no formal education may leave the service as literate citizens possessing skills in electronics, engineering, medicine, meteorology, shipbuilding, communications, and automotive repair. These skills will be useful in speeding industrialization and overcoming traditional resistance to progressive developments.

104. CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTIVE TO INSURGENCY

a. Unsatisfactory Conditions.--Insurgency is a product of unsatisfactory conditions, social change, and a broad belief in the prospects for improvement. Characteristically, the aspirations of the people are not being met by the government or ruling elite and there is an organized effort to discredit and/or dispossess the existing leadership. Conditions that encourage popular revolt are:

(1) Social injustice. A demand for social justice by the mass of the people is one of the most common factors leading to popular revolt.

(2) Feudalism.
(3) Poverty.
(4) Disease.
(5) Low productivity.
(6) Unemployment.
(7) Overpopulation.
(8) Official corruption.
(9) Ethnic or religious discrimination.
(10) Unstable monetary system.
(11) Illiteracy.
(12) Government inefficiency.
(13) Absentee ownership or inequities in the distribution of arable land.
(14) Colonialism and foreign exploitation also contribute to revolt, but are less common in the present period.

b. Aggravation By the Government.--The insurgent condition is aggravated by failure of a government to contribute to the correction of social ills or grievances of the people. Lack of economic perspective,
failure to recognize the magnitude of the grievances of its people, poor coordination of activities, lack of funds, or excessive military burdens all serve to inhibit the social progress demanded by the people.

c. Weakness of the Government.--Armed insurgency is encouraged by administrative weakness of the government and failure to maintain law and order. A geographic environment favorable to the insurgents and support from outside the country further serve to encourage armed insurgency.

d. Exterior Support.--Exterior support is commonly the means by which a popular revolt is converted into a conflict involving international issues. Ethnic, religious, or geographical association with the insurgents are advantages to exterior participation in the revolt. Political or ideological association can also be used to cultivate extra-national influence over the insurgents.

105. ECONOMIC FACTORS

a. Economic Characteristics.--The economics of developing countries have many common characteristics:

(1) There is a lack of large-scale application of modern science and technology to agriculture and industry.

(2) Markets are limited.

(3) Transportation and communication facilities are inadequate.

(4) Contribution of modern manufacturing industry to the gross national income is comparatively small.

b. Economic Differences.--Despite the technical backwardness which developing countries share in common, prominent differences exist between them. The dissimilarities in terms of primary economic activities are immediately apparent. For example, among nomadic people the economy generally centers upon animal husbandry. In parts of Africa, activities such as hunting and fishing are crucial factors. In the economics of other cultural groups as in most of Southeast Asia and Latin America, farming is the predominant means of livelihood. Moreover, the economics of these countries contrast strikingly in terms of rate of development. There are differences in the rate of growth of both total real income and income per individual, in the accumulation of capital, and in the application of modern techniques to agriculture and industry. To further complicate the economic differences of the developing countries, there are glaring variances in wealth, economic progress, and technical developments within each country.

c. Uneven Economic Development.--An uneven rate of economic development has produced even more noticeable contrasts within developing countries. Cities and towns with higher standards of living and levels of technological achievement exist alongside regions with economies which are barely subsistent. To a great extent, the uneven rate of development is a result of the archaic transportation and communication facilities, which hinder satisfactory economic and cultural relationships between proximate geographical regions.

d. Effect of Economic Diversity.--The vast range of economic diversity which exists within and between developing countries precludes
the development of an overall plan which embraces the entire spectrum of
human economic activity and the resulting socio-political effects. Con-
sequentially, primary attention should be focused on those economic activities
and problems of development which are most widespread throughout the coun-
try. Secondly, factors such as economic stagnation, growing poverty, slow
economic progress, the breakdown of the traditional structure, and foreign
economic domination must receive extensive consideration.

e. **Alternate Power Structure.**--While social, political, and economic
abuses are major causes for discontent, the greatest single contributive
factor to insurgency is the existence of a clandestine power structure which
seeks to depose the existing socio-political, economic structure. Highly
organized and tightly disciplined, this "shadow government" exploits popular
discontent as a means of gaining the support of the populace. However, since
the insurgents' ultimate means of insuring popular support is through in-
timidation and terror, reforms leading to the alleviation of injustices,
while desirable and necessary, are not in themselves enough. They must be
accompanied by an active campaign to identify and neutralize the clandestine
power structure. Any counterinsurgency campaign which does not include
specific actions to destroy the clandestine organization will be unsucces-
ful.

106. **SOCIAL FACTORS**

a. **Diverse Elements.**--In their attempt to modernize, developing
countries face the problem of integrating many diverse elements. It is
dangerous to ignore the forces resulting from the tenacity with which the
loyalties and sense of identity of the people remain bound by ties of blood,
race, language, locality, religion, or tradition. With the onset of the
modernizing process, these people are asked to give up much of their tradici-
tional identification and to become absorbed into a culturally integrated
mass. This demand reinforces and reaccentuates the reality and security of
traditional loyalties. Thus, a conflict ensues as the population is torn
between desire for progress and fear of the accompanying social change.

b. **History.**--The part of a history which is most meaningful to a
tradition-conscious people is that part which underscores and supports
their feeling of uniqueness. More often than not, this history consists
primarily of conflicts with alien groups. Events which should be considered
significant are those that have resulted in latent antagonisms and hatred
which are exploitable by a subversive element.

c. **Observable Factors.**--There are innumerable factors which underlie
the society of a developing nation. Investigation and analysis of the fol-
lowing will provide some insight into the attitudes and behavioral responses
of a people progressing from a traditional social structure toward an ad-
vanced modern society.

1. What taboos and beliefs, both religious and nonreligious,
have a pronounced influence among these people?

2. What contact occurs with other cultures?

3. Are there taboos or strong traditions against marrying
outside the clan or ethnic unit?

4. What evidence is there of in-group antagonism such as
feuding between families and clans?
(5) What are the attitudes toward social mobility? For example, is there a strong desire evidenced for children to improve themselves through education?

(6) What are the attitudes toward the government? Is there tangible evidence of the government's interest in the people such as road and school building?

d. Rural Population in the Cities.—A result of the growing expectations of radically improved standards is the drift of unabsorbable numbers of rural people into metropolitan areas expecting to find jobs and easy affluence. They are frequently disillusioned by lack of employment and poor living conditions. The accompanying breakdown of protective traditional and family ties as a result of physical estrangement and contact with other cultures makes these individuals a highly vulnerable target for the agents of political dissent.

107. POLITICAL FACTORS

a. Political and Economic Culture.—Shortly after the end of World War II, decolonization took place throughout the world. With this newly acquired independence, new nations faced serious economic problems. To bolster their economy and ensure their own survival, young countries sought aid from all available sources regardless of political ideology, while maintaining their own national ideology. By obtaining aid from both free world and Communist-bloc nations, tremendous progress could be achieved in a relatively short period. To do this, nations attempted to maintain a neutral political posture. The Marine commander should be aware of the subtle differences between nationalism and communism. Regardless of its stage of development, each country has a political culture which reflects the society's concepts of authority and purpose and its basic political beliefs. This political culture properly can be called the "real" constitution. This "real" constitution should be distinguished from the formal written document which has been declared the supreme law of the land. Often this written document reflects an attempt to absorb alien political experiences, practices, and ideals which have little applicability in the society; however, the written constitution must be analyzed to determine the aspirations of its framers and the gap between those aspirations and reality.

b. Observation and Evaluation.—Observation and evaluation of the executive, legislative, judicial, and electoral functions are necessary to the study of any political structure. Such observation and evaluation should provide the information necessary to determine whether a government actually exists, and whether that government is adequate to satisfy the actual requirements of the nation in the international environment.

c. New States and New Socio-Political Orders.—Where socio-political development has resulted in the emergence of new states and new socio-political orders, the regional or provincial government may have been destroyed or, in fact, never have existed; however, in rural or agrarian nations, leadership and government at the local level will tend to be well-defined and traditional in orientation. A major problem for national governments in developing countries is the strengthening of the middle class structure to bridge the gap between the upper and lower classes, thus enabling proper representation and interpretation of national policy at the local level.
d. Administrative and Civil Service Systems.--Administrative and civil service systems generally reflect the cultural heritage and political experience of the nation. In the older developing countries, the bureaucracy tends to be tightly stratified along traditional class and educational lines which limit the development of a technically competent administration.

e. Political Parties.--A political party serves as an institution for developing leaders to represent various segments of the "popular" will and as a tool through which those leaders can guide the population into common thought and action. Since "popular" means little more than the membership of the party, it is necessary to determine the actual power position of political parties in relation to the population as a whole. The political party system will vary with the nation. A new nation often has an official party which does not permit opposition, the purpose being to protect the thin fabric of the new political society from the many divergent interests which remain with it. The older nations often evidence a two-party system ostensibly divided along liberal and conservative lines; however, in most cases, these parties represent members of the same class --the elite.

f. Associational Groups.--Within every country there are associational groups, consciously organized, which lie outside the formal structure of government but which include political functions among their stated objectives. These groups serve to articulate demands in society, seek support for these demands among other power groups, and attempt to transform these demands into public policy. Often in developing nations, these groups exercise functions which might best be performed by political parties. In addition, within each nation there are groups which are not formally organized and which are latent and potential rather than actually functioning political groups. These groups usually reflect interests based on class, ethnic kinship, religion, or regional factors.

108. SUMMARY

Each developing country is unique with its own history, culture, preferences, and goals which result in a combination of problems different from those which exist for any other nation. When the problems of one of these nations become so great that the accepted government can no longer cope with them, an unstable situation is created. In the event that the recognized government requests and is granted assistance from the United States, a U.S. Marine Corps force may be assigned the mission. Officers commanding Marine Corps units assigned this mission must understand the factors described in the foregoing section. These economic, social, and political factors are the basic causes of the problems which must be dealt with. We cannot hope to carry out successfully any mission which requires the establishment or reestablishment of law and order within a nation without a proper understanding of the characteristics which make that nation unique.
SECTION 2

NATURE OF INSURGENCY

201. GENERAL

This section delineates those characteristics of subversive insurgency which distinguish it from other types of revolution. It describes the evolutionary nature of subversive insurgency as set forth in Communist doctrine and portrays the organizational structure which the Communist Party strives to establish in an insurgency movement. However, this is not to imply that all rebellions or attempts to overthrow established governments are inspired by communism.

202. DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS

A revolution in which a small group of men within a national government or its armed forces seize control is viewed as a coup d'etat. The use of open, organized, and armed resistance in which the inhabitants of an area seek to obtain independence but make no attempt to alter or overthrow the central government is a rebellion. The initial stage of a revolution which is still localized and limited to seeking modifications of government policy and does not yet pose a serious threat to the government in power is normally referred to as an insurrection. Any attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite the population of a country into forcibly overthrowing its existing government is called subversive insurgency.

203. REVOLUTION FROM THE TOP AND FROM THE BOTTOM

The illegal acquisition of governmental power may be considered to be of two types: revolution from the top and revolution from the bottom. In a revolution from the top (coup d'etat), a small group tries to obtain control of or neutralize the armed forces and other government agencies, usually with little or no violence and rarely seeking popular support.
until after the coup has succeeded. The instigators of the coup, normally men in top echelons of government or the armed forces, seize the instruments of power such as mass-communication media, military materiel, transportation facilities, power stations, and finally, the symbols of power such as administrative and legislatice buildings in the capital city. Revolution from the bottom (subversive insurgency) involves a more violent seizure of power and largely results from social dissatisfaction and government failure to meet the aspirations of the people. A mass movement, encouraged or directed by a hard insurgent core, develops slowly in a long evolutionary process until armed fighting occurs through a precipitant event. Since mobilization, organization, and manipulation of a sizeable segment of the population are prerequisites for successful revolution from the bottom, it is known as subversive insurgency. The Communists refer to such revolutions as "wars of national liberation."

204. INSURGENT STRATEGIES

a. General.—Although the insurgency strategy described in paragraph 203 is insurgency in the most complex and most commonly thought of form, it is only one of three widely recognized strategies or doctrines for insurgency. It is important to recognize that the insurgent is extremely flexible and each insurgency will have its own characteristics and objectives. Based upon the assets available, the conditions that exist and the philosophies of its leaders, insurgent strategies can vary from one which is based primarily upon a nonviolent overthrow of a regime to one which emphasizes violence as the basic tactic.

b. Left Strategy.—The essential elements of the left strategy are:

(1) That the conditions necessary for revolution can be created by violence.

(2) That the correct spark will create a spontaneous uprising against the government.

(3) That it can be achieved in a short term and requires the least amount of organization.

c. Right Strategy.—The right strategy is basically a political strategy which can be used when:

(1) The insurgent organization can achieve legal status either on its own or through a front.

(2) There is a chance to initially establish a coalition government.

(3) Violence can be used to discredit the government or members of it.

(4) There is a lot of time to achieve the insurgents' objectives.

d. Mass Strategy.—The mass strategy is the one which is the basis for the so-called "wars of national liberation" as described in paragraph 203. Because it is the strategy most often employed in some form or other, it is the one which the remainder of this section and subsequent sections of the manual will be using to exemplify the facets of and the measures necessary to counter an insurgency.
205. STAGES OF INSURGENCY

Mao Tse-tung's doctrine on protracted war in its militarization phase has been used by the Communist insurgent leaders in developing specific doctrine which provides that protracted military war has three stages. (Note: The term "stage" is used herein only to retain the accuracy of the translation of Mao's writings. The word stage is interchangeable with the term "phase" used hereafter.)

a. Passive Stage (Strategic Defense Stage)

1. The passive stage is that initial period of the conflict during which insurgent elements must be on the defensive to ensure completion of the necessary political and military preparations for the succeeding stages. This stage is the most difficult and protracted of the three stages of the insurgent campaign. During the passive stage, specific conditions must exist and specific objectives should be achieved before the insurgency can enter the active stage. These conditions are as follows:

   a. The Communist Party must be strong in selected base areas.
   
   b. A popular cause or reason for the revolution must exist or have been created.
   
   c. Class warfare must be at an advanced stage. This will be linked with (b) above.
   
   d. A population base must have been created to provide manpower, materiel, and political support for insurgent forces.

2. To achieve the above objectives, party doctrine stresses both constructive and destructive measures. These include:

   a. The expansion of the active party organization and the creation of a covert Communist-controlled revolutionary committee system at all organizational levels of the legal administration.
   
   b. The penetration of government offices, other political parties, trade unions, and movements for the purpose of obtaining intelligence, fostering popular support, or ensuring the elimination of political rivals.
   
   c. The creation of military forces for the purpose of organizing and controlling mass civil organizations; carrying out intimidation, terrorism, and sabotage; and engaging in minor military operations; e.g., "hit-and-run" ambushes and attacks on isolated posts.
   
   d. The promulgation of propaganda for both internal and external consumption to obtain material and psychological support for the revolutionary forces and to demoralize legal government supporters.
   
   e. The identification of the aspirations of the masses with Communist aims.

3. A study of the above objectives and the measures necessary to achieve them will show that none are likely to be attained within a short
space of time; hence the prolonged duration of the passive stage. No Communist insurgency contemplates anything other than complete success, which means that all potential dangers to the party have to be eliminated; thus, time is no object.

b. Active Stage (Strategic Stalemate Stage)

(1) The active stage is initiated for the purpose of extending political control and increasing military action in armed resistance against government forces. The principal goal during the active stage is to further the Communist cause and reputation within the country and, thereby, expedite the buildup of military capabilities. This goal is achieved through the accomplishment of specific political and military tasks. Although in practice, Communist political and military activity are integrated, the objectives of each are cited separately for clarity. Political objectives in the active stage are:

(a) Extensive use of political control and influence over the masses and establishment of Communist government and administration in "liberated" areas.

(b) Further demoralization of the legal government and its organs and supporters, and the penetration and subversion of police, military, and paramilitary forces.

(c) Conversion or elimination of neutral or opposition groups.

(2) The measures employed in the early passive stage will be continued and amplified to include:

(a) The creation or reestablishment of bases.

(b) The employment of insurgent forces in activities such as farming, fishing, and lumbering in order to win population support.

(c) Intimidation through the use of systematic terror, selective sabotage, and guerrilla action.

(d) Demoralization through the negation of government successes, political or military; exaggeration of government failures; creation of doubt concerning the justice and efficiency of government countermeasures; and attacks on the character, good faith, and morals of government leaders at all levels.

(3) Military objectives during the active stage are:

(a) Tying down the maximum number of government troops in static defensive tasks and destroying lines of communication, supplies, and other government resources.

(b) Expanding existing base areas and "liberating" new territory.

(c) Forming cadres to recruit for Communist military forces by means of intimidation, persuasion, and terror.
(4) Military measures employed during the active stage include ambushes against military and police convoys and columns, attacks on pro-government population centers, and sabotage of all forms of communication. Increased Communist influence and military strength will enlarge the number of insurgent dominated population centers. Government reaction will be to attack these with consequent loss of men and equipment. Population centers controlled by government forces will require dispersal of host country military personnel and equipment in order to prevent capture by insurgents. Should host country forces succeed in defending villages, ambushes will be organized to cut off government supplies and reinforcements and prevent the withdrawal of troops. Insurgent doctrine requires the control of such villages after they have been vacated by government troops.

(5) "Preparation of the battlefield," or of those areas where insurgent regular forces are expected to be deployed against government troops in future conventional battles, is supervised by the central committee of the Communist Party at national level during the active stage. Preparation of such areas will include:

(a) The acquisition and storage of arms, ammunition, combat materiel, and food.

(b) Conduct of intelligence surveys of government force capabilities.

(c) Establishment of local population controls.

c. Counteroffensive Stage.--This is the final stage in the insurgency process and is initiated when the Communists believe they have gained sufficient military strength and population support to meet and defeat the government forces in decisive combat. It is difficult to define the end of the active stage and the beginning of the counteroffensive. The active stage ensures that the conditions for decisive battle in strategically selected areas all favor the insurgents, and the concentration of their forces must be handled in such a manner that the outcome cannot be in doubt once the battles begin. Terrain itself will continue to be of little strategic importance to the Communists and will be used primarily to gain a tactical advantage over government forces. On the other hand, terrain temporarily occupied must be of sufficient tactical or strategic importance to the government to compel the commitment of principal government forces. When the counteroffensive stage is ready to begin, the following conditions should have been met:

(1) The government will have reached a stage at which it can react only in the manner desired by the Communist insurgent forces.

(2) The concentration of government forces in the battle areas will be such that their destruction will ensure the collapse of the entire military control of the country.

(3) Government forces outside the battle areas will be absorbed completely in controlling the areas in which they are stationed.

(4) Civil administration will have collapsed or will collapse as soon as military control is removed.
(5) Insurgent forces will be strong enough to overwhelm their enemy in the battle areas and sufficient forces will be available to conduct subsidiary operations.

(6) The intelligence organization of the government will be ineffective and will receive only the information fed to it by the insurgents. The Communist intelligence organization will be so efficient that no move or decision will be made by the government without insurgent forces being quickly aware of it.

(7) The bulk of the population will be politically immobilized and completely obedient to the insurgent forces.

(8) Plans will be available to prevent government reserves from influencing the outcome of the battle.

206. INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

The insurgent organization falls into three principal elements: infrastructure, guerrilla organization, and military forces. These elements are named in their order of relative importance in achieving stated insurgent goals as defined by current revolutionary doctrine (i.e., Communist).

a. Insurgent Infrastructure.--The population's desire for change facilitates the effective organizing of an insurgent infrastructure. This infrastructure usually evolves from a small group that agitates for reform into a large, well-organized group. All revolutionary functions usually are performed by the infrastructure and include:

(1) Organization of the insurgent movement.

(2) Control and coordination of all insurgent activities.

(3) Internal administration of the insurgent movement, to include recruitment, training, financing, indoctrination, logistics, security, and communications.

(4) Subversion of the existing government's personnel and institutions.

(5) Psychological operations among the uncommitted people of the nation and among important foreign nations.

(6) Establishment of a "shadow" government which is to assume power if the insurgency is successful.

(7) Collection and dissemination of intelligence.

(8) Conducting sabotage of government authorities and institutions including assassinations of political leaders, disruption of economic institutions and processes, communications, transportation, armed forces, police, and militia.

(9) Organization of escape and evasion networks for members of the movement.
b. Functions During Militarization.--When guerrilla operations are conducted, the infrastructure functions in all of the above ways to conceal the identity of its members operating in areas in which the government has a continuing "presence" (i.e., military forces, militia, political officials, or police). In this situation, roving guerrilla units may conduct their own internal command, organization, and training functions; however, the infrastructure usually performs all other essential functions in support of the guerrilla units. Only in areas where the government's "presence" is sporadic can the revolutionary movement operate overtly, forming provisional governments and controlling the people. The concept of a covert infrastructure is inappropriate where the government is not present, because the people can openly provide food, clothing, shelter, and supplies to the insurgents.

c. Insurgent Political Organizations.--While insurgent political organizations are not rigidly structured, but rather are adapted to a particular situation, certain principles are adhered to. The organization is strictly compartmented, with individual members having access only to the minimum information and identity of other tasks. The activities of subordinate elements are controlled by the next senior element; subordinate elements do not conduct independent operations, nor do they communicate directly with other subordinate elements at their level unless specifically authorized. An example of a type insurgent political organization is shown in figure 1. Depending upon the size of the area to be controlled, districts may be further grouped into sectors, which in turn, are combined to form a zone. The political organization may well include some armed units which are separate and distinct from the guerrilla organization. These elements constitute the "police" arm of the political organization, and are used to enforce the decisions of their political jurisdiction.

d. Guerrilla Organization

(1) Three distinct paramilitary elements exist in the guerrilla organization--self-defense force, combat guerrilla unit, and secret guerrilla unit. The elements are employed as follows:

(a) The self-defense force is normally organized, trained, and employed for the defense of population centers and other insurgent facilities. It constitutes the local instrument to inflict damage on the enemy and to gain and maintain population control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Cell</th>
<th>Cell</th>
<th>Sub-Group</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-Dist</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2 Sub-Cells Plus a Cell Leader</td>
<td>2 Cells Plus a Sub-Group Leader</td>
<td>2 Sub-Groups Plus a Group Leader</td>
<td>2 Groups Plus a Sub-District Leader</td>
<td>2 Sub-Districts Plus a District Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7 Men</td>
<td>15 Men</td>
<td>31 Men</td>
<td>63 Men</td>
<td>127 Men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 1.--Insurgent Political Organization.
(b) The combat guerrilla unit is employed by the party in support of regular military forces or is used independently to conduct small operations.

(c) The secret guerrilla unit is used primarily to enforce the will of the party in a given area, and it is composed to a large degree of party members.

(2) Although young men are sometimes coerced into service, the individual enrolled in a local guerrilla unit is normally a volunteer. In most areas, the identity of the members of the guerrilla units is known to most of the inhabitants, but fear of brutal reprisal deters disclosure. Consequently, the guerrilla is not readily identifiable to government forces. He operates in or close to his home, sometimes in conjunction with insurgent military forces. By day, he works at his normal job; at night, or during emergencies, he is available for assignment by his party superiors. The insurgent leadership prefers at least five to 10 guerrillas in each village or urban canton/barrio type area. In those villages under insurgent control, a full squad of 10 to 17 personnel or a platoon of from three to four such squads is normal. A type insurgent guerrilla platoon is shown in figure 2.

e. Military Forces

(1) Of the three principal organizational elements of the Communist insurgent organization, the military forces are considered to be the lowest in organizational importance. Communist planning provides for military reverses and the possible necessity for retrenchment, restructur- ing, or even temporary disbanding of its military forces should enemy strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy is based realistically upon the assumption that as long as the infrastructure and the guerrilla organize remain intact, the military arm of the insurgent movement can be reactivated or replenished; however, without the party nucleus and popular support, the movement cannot succeed.

![Diagram of Platoon Command Committee and Structure](image)

Figure 2.--Type Insurgent Guerrilla Platoon.
(2) Communist insurgent military forces fall into two classes --main forces and regional forces. These two elements are distinguished from the guerrilla units which, although paramilitary, do not fall within the military chain of command. These forces are generally as follows:

(a) Main Force.--This force is normally a body of well-trained soldiers, many of whom may have been infiltrated into the country. It is a highly motivated, elite fighting group, many of its personnel being full or candidate members of the Communist Party. Although deployable where needed, the main force usually is controlled at the interprovincial level.

(b) Regional Force.--The regional force is made up predominantly of indigenous personnel recruited directly from the local areas or promoted from the ranks of the guerrilla units. Units of this type operate in specific areas of no more than provincial size.

f. Political-Guerrilla-Military Coordination

(1) A clandestine power structure of significant size and complexity requires both time and specific techniques for its creation and subsequent employment. In combining the activities of the political and armed elements, certain principles are adhered to.

(a) All armed operations are undertaken in support of a political goal.

(b) Armed and political elements are integrated into the same geographic structure, but will remain highly compartmented, with unity only at the higher regional and zonal levels.

(c) All armed units will include a political as well as a military leader. In certain instances, the political leader may overrule the military leader.

207. LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENTS AND INSURGENCIES

a. Law of Land Warfare.--The law of land warfare is a body of treaties and unwritten laws firmly established by the custom of nations and well-defined by recognized authorities in international law. This law of land warfare states that members of organized resistance movements opposing military forces are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war if they meet the following requirements:

(1) They are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

(2) They wear a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.

(3) They bear arms openly.

(4) They conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. Geneva Conventions of 1949

(1) Article 3.--If both sides in a civil war or revolt request and receive military support from foreign powers, the opposing foreign
powers may not be at war with each other. In such a situation and when the belligerents have not been recognized as such, only Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies. Article 3 states:

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

(2) Parties to Conflict.--The parties to such a conflict are the legally constituted government and the challenging insurgent force. Customs of war give other states the right to intervene in a civil war if cruelties not permitted by international codes are practiced by either party.

(3) Application.--Although the Geneva Conventions are binding only on the territories of the contracting nations, the provisions of Article 3 should be applied whenever adhered to by the opposing forces or when they can be carried out without jeopardy to the military mission.
SECTION 3

HOST COUNTRY INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

301. GENERAL

Internal defense and internal development strategy entail the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, sociological, psychological, and military resources of a nation in order to secure national objectives. In the past, the strategy to defeat insurgencies has been viewed mainly, if not entirely, as a counterguerrilla problem and has been handled largely by military and police actions. Viewed as part of the larger problem of internal development, the prevention of subversive insurgency includes measures for internal political, economic, and social development. Military support of internal development programs is a major preventive measure. A nation or region afflicted with subversive insurgency cannot be brought under effective government control until it has been purged of insurgent organizations and activities, and the causes of the insurgency removed. Should the insurgent movement be supported by a sponsoring power or powers, measures must be taken to control the flow of personnel and material support across land and water frontiers. Basically, national strategy of internal defense and internal development will be directed toward two main considerations—the insurgent and the population.

302. INTENSITY OF INSURGENCY

a. General.--The countermeasures taken by a country to purge its government of insurgents and to eliminate their influence over the populace are a coordinated, mutual supporting program of internal defense and internal development activities. The degree of emphasis placed on defense by the host government and its allies is in direct proportion to the level of intensity of the insurgent tactical operations and the degree of influence the insurgents exercise over the population. However, it is doubtful that sufficient host country forces will be available to
simultaneously execute the full range of internal defense actions in all areas of the nation. Therefore, it is necessary to establish area priorities. Considering that the people are the fundamental target of both the host country government and the insurgent, an area classification may be established based upon population density in the following priority:

(1) Urban population centers.
(2) Heavily populated rural areas.
(3) Sparsely populated rural areas.
(4) Relatively uninhabited remote areas.

b. Levels of Intensity.--An in-depth study of previous insurgencies, both Communist inspired and others, revealed a program of insurgent activities ranging from a tactically passive to a large-scale combat posture. For convenience of discussion, the levels of intensity of an insurgency will be delineated in three phases--phase I, the nonviolent phase; phase II, the active invasion or guerrilla phase; and phase III, the war of movement phase. Although the phases bear considerable similarity to the Communist view of revolution in progressive stages, the phase delineation applies to all insurgencies regardless of their origin and are described as follows:

(1) Phase I.--The initial phase of insurgency is characterized by nonviolent actions. The insurgent infrastructure is established and their operations are aimed at dominating and controlling the population. Population and resources control operations are emphasized by the host government to isolate the insurgent from his base of popular support, thus depriving the insurgents of personnel, material, and intelligence. These operations are only as restrictive as absolutely necessary to achieve objectives, since repressive actions tend to spread discontent and further insurgent aims. Action is taken to expose, discredit, and destroy the insurgent infrastructure, while appreciable national resources are applied to internal development projects aimed at gaining population support. However, if the insurgency escalates, resources must be diverted to defense programs with a resultant decrease in the amount of support which can be applied to internal development.

(2) Phase II.--The advent of this phase is indicated when it becomes necessary for the government to conduct tactical military operations against armed insurgents while continuing countersubversion programs. This requires a reorientation of emphasis toward internal defense. Greater amounts of the host country's assets must be diverted from popular support programs to active defense programs. This enables the government to conduct tactical operations directly against armed insurgent forces while maintaining pressure on the insurgent infrastructure. At the same time, populace and resources control operations are expanded to prevent or sever relationships between the people and the insurgents and to minimize external and internal support of the insurgents.

(3) Phase III.--This phase is characterized by the massive employment of insurgent combat forces and poses the immediate danger of the government being defeated militarily. Though other insurgent activities continue, the imminence of military defeat must be averted if the government is to survive. During this phase, the combat requirements of the military take priority, and other activities continue only after military defense has been assured.
303. INTERNAL DEFENSE

a. General.--Internal defense is intended to create an atmosphere of internal security and relative peace within which internal development can assure national growth through controlled political, economic, and political change. Both internal defense and internal development must be coordinated and mutually supporting at all levels. Together, they constitute the overall strategy for preventing or defeating insurgency.

b. Objective.--Internal defense embraces the full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The objective of internal defense is internal security or a state of law and order within the nation. The emphasis placed on internal defense will necessarily vary according to the intensity of insurgent tactical operations, the degree of influence and control exercised over the population by the insurgents, the forces and resources the government has available, and the priorities which are established through coordinated efforts of all government agencies.

304. HOST COUNTRY FORCES

Host country forces which normally are employed in preserving or re-establishing internal security may be categorized as security forces, armed forces, paramilitary forces, and irregular forces. In addition to their primary internal defense mission, these forces may also contribute to internal development through the application of their special skills and resources.

a. Security Forces

(1) Mission.--Security forces include police, national intelligence agencies, border guards, customs and census agencies, and special investigative organizations such as internal revenue and treasury services. Their mission is to maintain a state of law and order by effectively coping with violence, subversion, and lawlessness within a nation.

(2) Concept.--During peacetime, most nations depend primarily on the police to conduct law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence activities. During an insurgency, the problem of maintaining security becomes much greater and the police may find themselves unable to cope with the situation without assistance.

(a) Phase I Insurgency.--Police units, particularly at the lower levels of government, are normally augmented and fully integrated into the internal defense system to counter insurgent activities. They attempt to penetrate the insurgent movement, prevent insurgent support across international borders, and deny insurgents internal support. To accomplish these tasks, the police may require assistance from the armed forces.

(b) Phase II Insurgency.--Security organizations normally must be enlarged, and all or part of the security tasks may be accomplished by police organizations augmented by paramilitary forces; however, police responsibility for border denial operations may be transferred to the armed forces.

(c) Phase III Insurgency.--Security forces, particularly the police, may be curtailed territorially and their employment confined
largely to consolidated areas. The responsibility for populace and resource control operations in contested areas may be transferred to the armed forces.

(3) Organization.--The host country police force may consist of national, municipal, and rural police. Special police may be mobilized and trained for such tasks as guarding factories, plantations, mines, railroads, and other facilities. In addition, combat police may be organized to man outposts, secure ports and airstrips, and conduct limited tactical operations such as patrols, raids, ambushes, and searches.

(a) National Police.--National police contain both uniformed and civilian-clothed personnel who enforce populace and resource control measures. They may be organized along military lines and their authority may transcend political boundaries. Early action should be taken to enable national police to move without political boundary restrictions. Inability to cross political boundaries could cause failure of national police missions, which may include:

1. Securing national government installations and lines of communication.
2. Assisting provincial police in the execution of populace and resource control operations.

(b) Rural Police.--In some nations, rural police may be organized to perform law enforcement functions under the control of a political subdivision such as a province or district.

(c) Municipal Police.--In urban areas, security is maintained or reestablished by municipal police. They are normally under control of city authorities and their jurisdiction usually extends only to the city boundaries.

(4) Operations.--The operations of security forces include the full range of police and intelligence activities necessary to preserve law and order within a nation. These operations range from combating common crime to riot control and countering subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

b. Armed Forces

(1) Mission.--The armed forces referred to in this manual are the regular and reserve units of the standing military establishment, to include Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Their primary mission in internal defense and internal development is to seek out and destroy insurgent combat forces. Armed forces also provide support to other governmental agencies through populace and resource control, psychological operations, intelligence, civil affairs, and advisory assistance.

(2) Concept.--In addition to defending the nation against internal and external attack, the flexible organization, multiple skills, and varied resources of the armed forces are required to support internal economic, social, and political growth.
(a) **Phase I Insurgency.**—The armed forces may engage in:

1. Training for internal defense operations.
2. Expanding intelligence operations.
3. Developing and refining internal defense contingency plans.
4. Conducting drills and parades as a part of a systematic plan of show-of-force psychological operations.
5. Assisting in the training of paramilitary forces.
6. Conducting military civic action.
7. Conducting psychological operations.

(b) **Phase II Insurgency.**—The dispatch of armed forces to insurgent infested areas may mark the beginning of phase II activity. In addition to those activities performed in phase I, armed forces may support police and paramilitary forces in the conduct of populace and resource control operations. In areas which are reestablishing government authority, armed forces may be employed to conduct the security and development phases of operations. In provinces, states, or other government divisions that contain insurgent-dominated areas which are not programmed for early development, armed forces may conduct offensive operations against insurgent forces and bases.

(c) **Phase III Insurgency.**—In this phase, the threat is so critical that armed forces will be engaged primarily in defending critical population centers and key installations. The major effort of the armed forces in this phase will be directed to tactical operations against insurgent forces.

(3) **Operations.**—The operations of host country forces are oriented toward carrying out their strategic, tactical, training, and administrative missions. In an internal defense/internal development environment, the operations of host country forces are expanded to include activities designed to strengthen the government politically, economically, and socially and make more viable its national life.

(a) Training advisory assistance may be provided to local commanders of paramilitary and irregular forces. This may be accomplished through the establishment of training centers which provide basic individual training, advanced individual training for selected personnel, and unit training. Individual instructors or units may be detached from command headquarters.

(b) Civic action projects may be performed by any armed forces unit. Units with the requisite skills may be employed in such projects as road and bridge construction, disease control, sanitation improvement, flood control, or facilities construction. Other regular armed or paramilitary forces may be employed to carry out projects which require less technical skills and equipment.

(c) Psychological operations programs will receive support from both armed forces and civilian agencies. When armed forces units are
committed to relatively long-term operations, they should be provided with a psychological operations capability.

(d) Intelligence operations conducted by armed forces support both internal defense and internal development programs. These operations are intended to collect information which will assist in the establishment of a data base in the areas of political, economic, sociological, geographic, insurgent military, and insurgent infrastructure intelligence. Intelligence information collected and collated at all levels should be channeled to a central body having responsibility for producing a composite intelligence picture for the country as a whole.

(e) Populace and resource control measures usually are established by civil authority, and armed forces participation in these operations should be in accordance with prescribed laws and regulations. The responsibility for populace and resource control normally is vested in the national and local police and in paramilitary forces organized for this express purpose. The role of the armed forces in populace and resource control operations within urban areas normally is a supporting one. In rural and border areas, the armed forces must be prepared to conduct the full range of populace and resources control operations.

(f) Tactical operations are conducted by the armed forces to seek out and neutralize or destroy insurgent forces.

1 The Army performs the primary mission of seeking out and destroying insurgent land tactical formations, provides units to serve under local commands, and provides training, combat support, and combat service support to other forces, as required.

2 The Air Force provides air defense in coordination with the Army and close air support to Army, Navy, Marine, police, paramilitary, and irregular force operations; air reconnaissance; and troop and cargo lift.

3 Navy and Marine forces provide coastal, navigable inland waterway, harbor, port, and border defense. In addition, they provide training, combat support, and combat service support to other forces, as required.

c. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Missions.--Paramilitary forces are distinct from the armed forces of a nation, but they are similar in organization, equipment, training, and mission. They normally are employed in times of national crisis to augment the armed forces or to assume responsibilities which otherwise would divert the armed forces from their primary mission. The missions of paramilitary forces are tactical operations and the support of civil police forces in rural areas and population centers. Specific roles which they may perform in carrying out these missions include advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological operations, intelligence, populace and resource control, and tactical operations. These forces may well be the most effective force applicable in phase I insurgency. By efficient and expedient operations, these forces could delay or prevent the growth of an insurgent movement. Commanders at all levels should make maximum use of these forces.
(2) Concept.--In an insurgency, it may be necessary to employ paramilitary forces in populace and resource control operations in order to allow the armed forces to concentrate on offensive operations.

(3) Operations.--The operational roles and responsibilities of paramilitary forces are basically the same as those of the armed forces. Paramilitary force training programs should stress basic military skills and those tactics and techniques most applicable to the particular mission of the force and its area of operations.

(a) Advisory Assistance.--Although their state of training is lower than that of the armed forces, paramilitary forces have the capability to render advisory assistance to less proficient paramilitary and irregular forces.

(b) Civil Affairs.--Paramilitary forces often are in contact with the population in the same area over long periods and are excellently suited to conduct military civic action operations. For large-scale projects, they will require augmentation from civilian agencies or the armed forces.

(c) Psychological Operations.--Paramilitary forces normally operate in close association with the civilian population. In order to establish rapport with the populace and to gain its support for the government, paramilitary forces should be provided a psychological operation capability.

(d) Intelligence.--Intelligence operations conducted by paramilitary forces normally involve the collection of information for which there may be a tactical response.

(e) Populace and Resource Control.--The primary mission of local paramilitary forces is conducting populace and resource control operations. These operations, which are normally in support of the police, include:

1. Securing villages and hamlets.
2. Securing vital installations, lines of communication, and communication centers.
3. Protecting persons working or residing outside of hamlets and villages.
4. Enforcing populace and resource control measures.

(d) Irregular Forces

(1) Mission.--In this manual, irregular forces are considered to be any individual or group or part of the armed or paramilitary forces which are armed for the purpose of defense. Examples of groups which may constitute irregular forces are political parties, trade unions, fraternal organizations, and isolated ethnic minority groups. The primary mission of irregular forces is the defense of their own area. They also may conduct psychological, intelligence, populace, and resource control operations, and perform limited civic action.
(2) Concept.--Irregular forces usually are volunteer groups organized and trained to provide local defense and security for their own area. Tribal groups may be organized as irregular forces and trained for limited tactical operations, such as patrolling, trail watching, border surveillance, and to a lesser extent, ambushing and raiding insurgent forces and bases. Other irregular organizations, such as female auxiliaries and youth organizations, may perform specific tasks such as political education, economic improvement, and civic development.

(3) Operations.--The operational capabilities of irregular forces approximate, on a reduced scale, those of paramilitary forces. In conducting their operations, irregular forces must be particularly security conscious. Since many of these forces are organized around social groups which have been targets for insurgent penetration, they are particularly susceptible to subversion and espionage by secret agents within their ranks. On the other hand, since members of irregular forces usually are more closely united through common group interests, they can more effectively detect and prevent subversion and espionage than can armed or paramilitary forces. For the same reason, they are in an excellent position to collect information regarding local insurgent activities.

305. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

The conduct of host government internal development includes any direct operation undertaken by a host government or its allies to strengthen the local government politically, economically, socially, militarily, or make more viable its national life. The host country's capacity to perform internal development is assisted by the United States and other allies through internal development assistance operations, which include any action taken by government or nongovernment agencies of another nation to support host government's internal development efforts.

a. Concept.--The political, economic, and sociological advances will not necessarily be balanced since advances in one field may force imbalances in others. The concept of development calls for a maximum effort with priority to internal security and law and order, the shield which protects and allows development. The end objective is improvement of individual attitudes, status, and standards of living. The intensity of the insurgency and resources available will dictate priorities and intermediate objectives. Active insurgency requires immediate and large-scale action; latent or incipient insurgency permits more detailed planning, but quick corrective actions will achieve greater success with fewer resources.

b. Conduct.--The conduct of internal development on the national level goes beyond the traditional activities of military units. It requires exercise of sociological, economic, and psychological skills and the employment of all the resources of the command in coordination with similar activities of the host government, U.S. government departments and agencies, and private organizations. The spectrum of development tasks would normally be conducted by agencies of the country which have incorporated required skills other than military. However, Marines must be able to advise and assist host country military personnel who have political and economic responsibilities as well as military. Where confronted with a situation in which the political and military structure of the host government has been rendered ineffective, Marine Corps forces may anticipate pioneering, in their assigned area of operations, the
political, economic, and social effort within such U.S./host country agreements.

c. Objective.--Although the basic objective of internal development is to contribute to internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency, its immediate practical goal is gaining population support. Economic, political, and social development programs are aimed at establishing rapport between the people and the government which will result in support of the government to the detriment of the insurgency. Normally, internal development cannot take place effectively without the assistance of internal defense forces. The military has the capability to augment civilian agencies with critical skills and the manpower necessary to engage in large projects. Further, the military has the responsibility to provide a secure atmosphere free from insurgent domination and terrorism, in which internal development programs can be conducted. Through carefully planned and implemented programs, properly publicized, the people can be convinced that their interests are being served by the government, thus depriving the insurgency of a base for popular support.

(1) Phase I Insurgency.--Internal development offers the best promise of eventual long-term peace in a nation, but its short-term impact may involve an increase of internal pressures. Progress in one field may affect progress in another; therefore, a requirement exists for an overall, integrated, balanced program of political, economic, and social action. Failure to initiate positive action in this phase may result in escalation of the insurgency.

(2) Phase II Insurgency.--The requirement for personnel and resources to combat the insurgent threat will normally require a reduction in development operations. The threat will require that development programs at all levels be reoriented to support internal defense operations. Internal development should be given priority in government-controlled areas and be maintained to the maximum in other areas. Political development will increase because of the effort to extend governmental presence where it may not have existed before. Economic development may be reduced because of the need to direct resources to internal defense and because it is difficult to expand into areas where security cannot be assured. The resulting problems of displaced persons, relocated communities, militant factions, and former insurgents will add to the basic social problems.

(3) Phase III Insurgency.--As resources are committed to the defeat of the insurgent guerrilla forces, political, social, and economic development programs through necessity will become militarily or emergency oriented. Some important internal development actions can be completed; however, many of these will be by-products of the overall operation and would not be required except for the emergency threat. On the other hand, the eventual impact on the internal development program must be considered in the planning for all military operations.

306. U.S. STRATEGY

U.S. foreign military assistance programs are designed to make the host country's response to the internal defense threat as rapid and aggressive as possible. Parallel internal development assistance is directed at eliminating the conditions contributing to the insurgency and promoting the general welfare of the population.
a. Planning.--A total and well balanced program is required for preventing and defeating subversive insurgency. Success depends on accurate, carefully evaluated information and a unified concept of operations tailored to the situation in which civil and military measures interact and reinforce each other.

b. U.S. Policy.--The U.S. should induce host country leaders to take the required remedial action before a crisis limits the alternatives and necessitates the use of force. The U.S. country team is designated as the primary organization for assisting developments within a nation to permit the U.S. government to determine its best course of action.

307. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Foreign economic assistance is the primary means through which the U.S. directs support to host country development. While the nature of this portion of support is primarily economic, it is also designed to support host country social and political internal development objectives. In addition, private agencies and charitable organizations may participate significantly in the development process. See section 4 for a discussion of U.S. agencies and private organizations concerned with development assistance.

a. Objectives.--The immediate objective of U.S. assistance is to aid the host country to reach the point where their own increased human and material resources are adequate to sustain development. U.S. assistance is intended to help the nation preserve its political independence and achieve economic self-support as rapidly as possible. However, care must be exercised to ensure that materiel and monetary developmental aid is so administered that it cannot be diverted through theft, sabotage, and/or corruption into the supply apparatus of the insurgent organization.

b. Concept.--Economic assistance programs are classified according to the nature of U.S. objectives and the extent of U.S. participation. In a nation where active insurgency is present, it is necessary that the U.S. help establish internal security prior to undertaking long-term economic and social development programs. The general objective of assistance in such circumstances is to establish degrees of security within which economic, political, and social development can thrive. A mixture of military and supporting economic assistance usually is provided in the early stages of this sequence, and as the environment improves, a gradual shift in emphasis is made toward economic development.

308. DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

a. Political Development.--Training and education of host country personnel are two of the most significant factors in establishing a political program loyal to the government. Trained personnel provide a continuous flow of knowledgeable people into the various branches of the government administration system. As the government places qualified individuals within its governmental system, the insurgent infrastructure will eventually lose its political influence on the people. Success of a development program depends on the effectiveness of the public administrative system which develops plans and provides leadership at all levels of government; therefore, continuous attention has to be paid to the selection and training of those personnel who are qualified for civil service.
(1) **Phase I Insurgency.**—At all levels of government, administrative responsibilities must be delineated and procedures established to provide for proper coordination of all programs prior to initiation. The lines of authority from the top to the bottom or from national level, through regional level, to the local level, must be clearly established. If this is done, national programs can be carried out properly and efficiently at the local levels, while the reactions, attitudes, and the demands of the people can be ascertained quickly at the national level. At the same time, the judicial system must be improved, modified, or reestablished in order to support new economic, social, and political developments, to accommodate changing social values, and to cope with the insurgent threat. Procedures to permit the people to address their problems to the government should be established as soon as possible.

(2) **Phase II Insurgency.**—The requirements for improved government organization to deal with the insurgency—to extend government presence downward and to determine and redress the grievances of the people—contribute directly to internal defense and development. Increasing government activities, particularly where the expansion of government-controlled areas is concerned, will bring the government and the people into closer harmony and provide an opportunity to foster a sense of national unity. In addition, the increase in government activities and overall cohesiveness between the people and the government will accelerate the elimination of the insurgent political infrastructure.

(3) **Phase III Insurgency.**—Under the threat of increased insurgent action, simplified, clear lines of authority should be developed within the governmental structure to facilitate military action and clearly delineate areas of responsibility. Governmental control is extended primarily through the expansion of government-controlled areas. More military headquarters with liaison officers at corresponding governmental levels will be necessary. In addition, more military training, advisory or assistance teams, and military personnel to perform what are normally civilian functions also will be required. Provincial or district governmental leaders may be military personnel or may be assisted by military deputies and staffs which operate together with civilian governmental officials.

b. **Economic Development.**—The government must create an environment which will encourage economic growth, attract foreign capital, and enable the establishment of a stable currency.

(1) **Phase I Insurgency.**—Economic development requires basic efforts in many related fields. Appropriate skills and experience must be acquired; a modern fiscal and monetary system must be established; agriculture must be expanded to create a degree of self-sufficiency and freedom, particularly from the one-crop economies; and the preconditions for economic growth must be achieved (e.g., the establishment of power and communication systems, transportation networks, a workable credit and marketing system, and other elements of the economic infrastructure).

(2) **Phase II Insurgency.**—In economic development, emphasis is shifted to projects which support the internal defense effort, including those which are involved directly in achieving internal security and those which demonstrate government concern and ability to benefit the people. For example, transportation facilities constructed to support troop movement should be located, where possible, to contribute to the
support and development of the economy. There should be a shift toward short or mid-range economic development projects which are immediately apparent and beneficial to the people. Some long-range projects should be continued in government-controlled areas. When government-controlled areas are being extended, emphasis should be on projects which will satisfy the people's immediate needs, be completed in a relatively short time, show tangible results, teach the people "self-help" techniques, and be maintained with locally available resources. Continuous study is required in order to ascertain which short-range projects can be extended to mid-range or long-range undertakings, thereby enhancing the government's image in the eyes of the people. Military civic action projects should be undertaken wherever armed forces or paramilitary units are stationed.

3. Phase III Insurgency.--Short-range and mid-range economic development projects are continued whenever and wherever possible. Long-range projects are continued in government-controlled areas. The scope of such projects may be curtailed to divert resources to short-range projects in areas where a critical need exists.

c. Social Development.--Major areas of social development that require attention are health, education, urbanization, population, leadership, status, citizen groups, land reforms, and housing. The main objectives of social development are to improve health standards, to increase the range and quality of human skills, and to instill a personal sense of participation in a larger local and national effort.

1. Phase I Insurgency.--Once the progress of social development has begun, an action in one area affects other areas and the cycle continues, thereby establishing its own momentum and acceleration. In this process, it is difficult to determine which social changes were required to permit progress and which ones were the result of progress. The conflicts and stresses between traditional and modern ways offer possibilities of new grievances which could increase the strength of the insurgent movement. The social development problem involves changing the basic attitudes and values of the people to conform to those required in a new nation.

2. Phases II and III Insurgency.--In addition to the social problems which are part of the internal development process, problems evolving from disruption of the social system due to threats of violence must be dealt with. The added disruption of the social organization due to insurgency is not entirely negative, since it provides an initial shock which tends to displace fundamental traditional relationships. Disruption may permit the reordering of the social structure with relatively little resistance. The government must provide practical programs for dealing with displaced persons, the relocation of communities, and the demands of militant factions or antagonistic minorities. In addition, it must rehabilitate former insurgents or insurgent supporters who have come under governmental control.
SECTION 4

U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

401. GENERAL

The President, as Chief Executive, has overall responsibility for the direction of the foreign policy of the United States. The Secretary of State, as principal advisor to the President on foreign policy matters, directs the Department of State in the initiation and implementation of foreign policy. The President has representation in over 100 countries to keep him informed of international developments and to act for him in carrying out United States policy.

402. U.S. GOALS

The U.S. Mission in host countries is concerned with all matters that affect the interests of the United States. Tasks range from aiding United States citizens in a country to an advisory effort aimed at strengthening a government. U.S. goals in aiding host nations include the following:

a. Promote and maintain a stable international environment.

b. Protect and further U.S. interests.

c. Assist future development. The primary responsibility for preventing or combating insurgency rests with the host country. The United States, when requested, can assist nations threatened with insurgency by aiding them in preventing or defeating externally supported or directed insurgency.

403. U.S. MISSION

a. Country Team.--The term "country team" is an informal title which describes the in-country interdepartmental cooperation and coordination among
the members of the U.S. mission in a host country. Its composition and role is determined by the Chief of the U.S. Mission (usually an ambassador to that country. Generally, a country team's composition and duties will be as delineated below:

b. **Composition and Duties.--**The size of a country team can range from a few members to over 100. The membership and duties of a typical large post are indicated as follows:

1. **Ambassador.**--The Ambassador is appointed by the President, subject to approval by the Senate. He receives policy direction from the Secretary of State and is the President's representative in the foreign country.

2. **Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).**--The MAAG is a joint Service group normally under a unified command. The chief, MAAG is normally the senior military representative on the U.S. country team. Each chief, MAAG has the following duties:

   a. Represents the Secretary of Defense in the country to which he is posted.

   b. Is responsible for ensuring that the military aspects of the U.S. effort are coordinated with other U.S. departmental representatives in the foreign country.

   c. Provides advice and assistance to the foreign country on military matters whenever such assistance is approved by the United States and is sought by a government.

3. **United States Agency for International Development (USAID).**--USAID has the responsibility for carrying out nonmilitary U.S. foreign assistance programs and for the continuous supervision of all assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. USAID performs its functions as an agency within the Department of State. Normally, the USAID representatives are responsible for:

   a. Directing, coordinating, supporting, and supervising the implementation of programs and projects of the host country for economic development.

   b. Monitoring, reviewing, and reporting on the conduct and performance of authorized programs and projects and taking or recommending any remedial action.

   c. When U.S. military forces are committed, USAID may be capable of aiding militarily sponsored projects by providing food, construction materials, and agricultural supplies for the population.

4. **United States Information Agency (USIA).**--The purpose of the USIA is to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives by influencing attitudes in other nations. It also advises the President on the implications of foreign opinion with respect to U.S. policies, programs, and official statements. Its capabilities include:

   a. Publicizing U.S. policies.

   b. Planning and conducting informative programs in support of U.S. or host government agencies.
(c) Countering propaganda hostile to U.S. interests.

(d) Coordinating U.S. overt psychological operations with guidance from the Department of State.

(5) Peace Corps

(a) In 1961, the Peace Corps was established by Congress as a separately-funded organization within the government whose director reports directly to the President. The purpose is to promote world peace and friendship by making available to interested countries men and women of the United States, qualified and willing to serve abroad under conditions of hardship, to help the peoples of such countries and areas in meeting their needs for trained manpower, and to help promote a better understanding of the American people. Peace Corps volunteers serve for periods of 2 years teaching, building, or working in the communities to which they are sent.

(b) As policy, members of the Peace Corps would rarely be associated with U.S. military endeavors overseas; however, the Ambassador is responsible for all U.S. operations (less military) in a foreign country, and could require all U.S. agencies within that particular country to be represented on the country team.

(c) Marine forces committed to a country in which Peace Corps volunteers are working can benefit from the knowledge and experience of these volunteers with respect to the local situation and terrain.

404. PRIVATE BUSINESS AND WELFARE AGENCIES

a. Private Businesses.—There are many private businesses which have agencies located in foreign countries. These groups are not part of the country team, but Marine forces may be able to obtain information on the population, situation, and terrain from them.

b. Welfare Agencies.—More than 400 welfare agencies are represented overseas. These include:

(1) Voluntary agencies which are nonprofit organizations established by private citizens for philanthropic purposes and supported by voluntary contributions.

(2) Foundations which are nonprofit organizations having a single fund managed by trustees or a director and are established to maintain or aid social, educational, charitable, religious, or other activities for the common welfare.

405. SUMMARY

Many U.S. government and private agencies are involved in assisting developing nations in internal defense and internal development. The U.S. Mission and independent U.S. agencies within a country may provide the Marine commander with valuable information and guidance regarding the conduct of operations within the country. If a U.S. Mission is not present, the Marine commander may find that some or all mission functions will have to be fulfilled by Marines.
U.S. FORCE COMMITMENT

501. GENERAL

Commitment of U.S. forces to a country involved in an insurgency can range in scope from protection or evacuation of American citizens to supporting the host country government in defeating the insurgency. The decision to commit forces to assist in defeating the insurgency is a political one in which the basic consideration is protecting or furthering the interests of the United States.

502. ASSIGNED TASKS

The size of the force to be committed and its mission will be determined by political decisions. Examples of tasks which may be assigned include:

a. An advisory effort intended to strengthen the military capability of the host country to combat insurgency.

b. A show of force to deter insurgency and bolster the strength and influence of the host country government.

c. The landing of forces to protect U.S. personnel and property or to evacuate U.S. personnel.

d. The destruction of property and installations owned by the United States in order to prevent their use by insurgents.

e. The conduct of combat operations.
503. BASIS FOR COMMITMENT

a. Basic Guidance.--The "Foreign Internal Defense Policy Paper" (classified) issued by the National Security Council sets forth the approved interdepartmental concept for the implementation of plans and programs for revolutionary war. It deals specifically with the responsibilities of the major departments of the United States government and the overseas representatives.

b. Commitment of Forces.--Commitment of forces will be to fulfill one or more of the following basic requirements:

   (1) To satisfy a political interest.

   (2) To fulfill a treaty agreement.

   (2) At the invitation of a host government.

504. POLITICAL INTERESTS

a. The political interests of the U.S. government with respect to developing nations have been stated as:

   (1) The preservation of the security of the United States.

   (2) The creation of a stable international environment.

   (3) The preservation of the right of an independent country to determine its own future.

b. Furthering the political interests of the United States is the primary factor in arriving at the decision to commit U.S. forces. The foreign policy of our government determines the missions and tasks assigned the military and is binding. The commander in the field, in the absence of more specific instructions, must use U.S. policy as guidance.

505. TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

a. Treaties.--The United States is a member of four multilateral treaty organizations: Organization of American States (OAS), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and ANZUS. Further, the United States has bilateral and security pacts with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

   (1) OAS.--The OAS is the organizational machinery to implement the inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance between the United States and 25 nations of the Western Hemisphere. The key provision of this treaty is that an armed attack against any American state is considered as an attack against all American states, and the countries will meet to decide measures which should be taken for the common defense and maintenance of the peace and security of the treaty area.

   (2) NATO.--NATO is the United States' most important treaty obligation and the keystone of its defense system. It is an organization of 15 countries which are tied together by the explicit obligation to aid another if attacked. Like the inter-American treaty, an attack on one is considered at attack upon all, and the members are expected to take collective action to defend themselves.
(4) ANZUS.--The ANZUS treaty is one of mutual security between
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Each member recognizes that
an armed attack in the Pacific area on any one of the members would create
a danger to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

b. Agreements.--The U.S. has bilateral agreements with many countries
around the world, with hundreds of them relating to mutual defense. They
range in scope and complexity from the 34 different agreements with West
Germany to a simple military assistance agreement with the Republic of Mali.
Treaties and agreements have the same status in both constitutional and in-
ternational law. Agreements play their chief role in our collective defense
system in implementing the military assistance program (MAP). Some of the
principal types of agreements involved in MAP are grants, vessel loan, cost-
sharing, and mutual weapon development program agreements. Others that are
related to mutual defense are base rights and status of forces agreements
which the 200 military installations the U.S. maintains overseas.

506. INVITATION FROM A COUNTRY

When the United States is asked to support a country faced with an
insurgency, the country should ideally reflect a desire to:

a. Maintain its independence from powers hostile or potentially
hostile to the United States.

b. Maintain a peaceful relationship with its neighbors.

c. Progressively meet the aspirations of a majority of its people
without resorting to totalitarian controls.

d. Cooperate in international undertakings of an economic, political,
and social nature.

e. Move toward encouraging all its citizens to exercise responsible
participation in political, social, and economic processes under stable
rules of law.

507. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

a. Commander.--The military commander and his entire command will
be required to assume a diplomatic as well as military role. His ability
to deal tactfully with the civilian population will materially affect the
outcome of his mission. A knowledge of the political, social, and economic
situation is equally important. The commander has a responsibility to
ensure that personnel of his command are thoroughly instructed in the
existing political, social, and economic situation. The commander leads
by example and attitude and takes positive steps to ensure that his exam-
ple and attitude are reflected in the actions of his subordinates.

b. Orientation for Commanders.--Responsibility for the orientation
of military commanders committed to an insurgency belongs to the country
team when present. The political, economic, and psychological situations
are presented and explained in terms of the current political aims of the
United States. A status of forces agreement is executed between the
United States and the host country.
508. SUMMARY

United States objectives and respect for treaties and agreements are considered prior to committing U.S. forces to assist developing nations in defeating insurgency. The desires and capabilities of the host country are also considered. In the event United States forces are committed, they are instructed and informed as to the objectives of the program as well as the political, social, and economic conditions which exist in the host country.
PART II. COUNTERINSURGENCY TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

SECTION 6

MILITARY TASKS

601. GENERAL

Counterinsurgency situations may occur during any stage of national development and will normally involve concurrent and coordinated military and diplomatic actions. Accordingly, the political authorities participate in planning and exercise considerable influence on military operations. Marine Corps forces may anticipate a requirement to participate in political, social, and economic developmental activities as well as conducting tactical military operations.

602. MILITARY FUNCTIONS

a. Primary Function.--The primary function of Marine forces within a host country is to restore law and order and reestablish security in coordination with the host country.

b. Secondary Function.--An ancillary function of Marine forces is to promote, in coordination with the civil agencies of the host country and the foreign service departments of our own government, the political, social, and economic welfare of the host country.

603. STATUS OF MARINE CORPS FORCES

Marine Corps forces may be called upon to conduct operations unilaterally or as part of a larger force in countries with which the United States may or may not have diplomatic relations. If the United States has a diplomatic mission, it should negotiate a status of forces agreement. If
there is no diplomatic representation, the commander should advise his next senior commander and request that action be initiated to negotiate such an agreement.

a. Status of Forces Agreement.--An agreement between two or more nations defining the legal position of a military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state is a status of forces agreement. It establishes the military rules and regulations governing visiting forces and describes how the local laws and the authority of local officials will be applied to members of the force. Some of the particulars which may be included in a status of forces agreement are:

(1) Channels of official liaison.

(2) Relationships with third party governments.

(3) Emergency military authority.

(4) Provisions for freedom of movement, wearing of arms, jurisdiction of courts, taxes, licensing, customs payment, postal services, and similar regulations.

(5) Settlement of claims.

(6) Currency arrangements.

(7) Health and sanitation matters.

(8) Civilian services and supplies.

b. Relationships With Other U.S. Agencies.--(See par. 403.)

604. MILITARY OPERATIONS

a. General.--The combat power of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), its expeditionary nature, training, and organization are sufficiently flexible for effective conduct of military operations in a counter-insurgency environment.

b. Mission.--The mission assigned to the MAGTF within a host country will be to assist the host country in attaining its internal defense and internal development objectives. This mission will normally reflect the following functions:

(1) The primary function of the MAGTF in a host country is to establish or restore security in conjunction with the host country.

(2) An ancillary function of the MAGTF in a host country is to promote (in conjunction with the civil agencies of the host government, U.S. Government agencies, and private U.S. agencies within the host country) the political, social, and economic welfare of the host country.

605. OBJECTIVES

In performing the foregoing functions to accomplish the assigned mission, it is necessary to establish priorities as follows:
a. Ensure the security of the population and resources in order to deny these assets to the insurgents.

b. Defeat the guerrilla forces and destroy the insurgent infrastructure.

c. Defeat the organized military forces of the enemy.

d. Conduct civil affairs operations which include civic action and psychological operations.

606. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. Need for Constant Pressure.--Guerrilla forces react to pressure by moving to another area, mingling with the populace, or remaining inactive. Commanders must be extremely cautious not to consider the guerrilla force eliminated because it is no longer active. When contact with the guerrilla is lost, aggressive efforts, which include maximum use of covert agents, aerial surveillance, ground patrols, and helicopterborne combat patrols, are employed in order to retain contact and maintain pressure. Periods of reduced pressure allow the guerrilla time to rest, reorganize, and resume operations at a time of his choosing.

b. Secrecy and Surprise.--The excellent intelligence system of the insurgent makes it extremely difficult to deny him information concerning future operations. The following are some of the measures which will improve security and improve the chances of achieving surprise:

(1) Constant indoctrination of the individual Marine on the importance of security.

(2) Effective and secure communications.

(3) Employing imaginative tactics and techniques to avoid establishing patterns in operations.

c. Mobility.--Superior mobility is a significant advantage; it is a responsibility of commanders to ensure that it is employed to the maximum. All means are used--fixed-wing air, helicopters, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, railroads, and pack animals.

d. Intelligence.--The key to success in counterinsurgency operations is information. Planning must provide for collection and rapid communication of all intelligence information. It is the commander's responsibility to ensure that this highly perishable information is acted on quickly.

e. Popular Support.--A basic problem is one of protecting the civilian population and at the same time ferreting out guerrillas who hide among them and operate from that base of support. Although the guerrilla may be supported by a segment of the population that is loyal and sympathetic to his ideological cause, it must be remembered that he also sustains support by intimidation and enforced taxation. Support is rendered when the populace lacks confidence in the government's ability to protect them. Confidence can be restored by a strong government, and fears overcome through the protection by local security forces. Guerrilla support can be sharply curtailed by effective population control measures, achievement of area security, and development of a sound intelligence program.
607. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The senior Marine commander should seek political guidance from the U.S. Department of State representative or other appropriate authority. He should then promulgate appropriate instructions to subordinate commanders in order that each individual of the command understands the political objectives of the United States and those of the host country.

a. Actions and Activities.--The actions of Marine Corps forces reflect the policies and attitudes of the U.S. Government--what we do is more important than what we say.

b. Respect, Confidence, and Loyalty.--It is important to indoctrinate individual Marines on the need to promote the respect, confidence, and loyalty of the population toward the host government.

c. Restoration of Political Machinery.--Marine forces may be required to assist in the reestablishment of the machinery of government where it has been destroyed.

d. Assess the Political Effect.--Political considerations are often more important than military ones in a counterinsurgent environment. Commanders must continually assess the possible effects of operations and ensure their compatibility with political objectives.

608. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Operations must be conducted so as not to upset the economy of the host country, but only to a point where the accomplishment of the mission is not endangered.

a. Economic Impact of Military Forces.--A significant part of the overall mission is to assist in maintaining the economy of the host country. It may be necessary to impose economic and financial controls to ensure that the impact of Marine forces is not disruptive.

b. Local Resources.--Local resources, both human and material, should be employed to the maximum, but the sponsoring of new enterprises designed solely to support Marine Corps needs should be avoided.

c. Control of Materials.--Planning should cover controls over the flow of materials in order to prevent support of insurgents and entry of the material into black market channels.

d. Rationing.--It may become necessary for the host government to establish controls over exports, imports, currency, wages, and prices. Marine Corps forces should be aware of the implementation of such controls and take such measures as necessary to ensure compliance with them.

e. Employment of Indigenous Labor.--Maximum employment of indigenous labor should be promoted under host government labor policies; however, care should be taken in the employment of these people. Security is of paramount importance in the selection of indigenous laborers.

f. Protect Low-Income Groups From Exploitation.--Exploitation of low-income groups by creditors is frequently a source of discontent which can be used by dissidents. It may often be necessary to provide physical
security for cooperatives, support of credit systems, or programming the purchase of commodities in order to combat this capability. There are additional areas where this same principle applies and where corrective action may be necessary. The following are examples:

(1) Elimination of tax abuses.

(2) Furtherance of honest government by elimination of corruption, graft, and bribery.

g. Technical Assistance and Supplies.--Marine Corps forces should apply such skills and resources as are within their capability and without degrading their assigned military tasks toward:

(1) Improving agricultural output.

(2) Rehabilitation of markets.

(3) Reestablishment of lines of communication.

h. Denial of Skills and Resources to the Enemy.--Measures should be taken to acquire skills and resources for use by the host government and to deny their use to the insurgents. These measures should be coordinated with the host country's populace and resource control program.

i. Public Works.--Public works should be undertaken only on request of local leaders and designed where possible for short term completion with readily visible results.

j. Guidance and Assistance.--Economic guidance and assistance may be obtained from the local representative of USAID or other U.S. representation.

609. SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITIES

Guidance is provided by the senior USAID official or the representative of the Ambassador. If these officials are not available, assistance may be requested from the responsible military commander. Social welfare activities include the following:

a. Reconstruction and improvement of educational facilities.

b. Provision of medical care and medical civic action program.

(1) Be compatible with the host government's health program.

(2) Not exceed the capacity of the host government to continue:

(a) Training local health workers.

(b) Maintaining control over medicines.

c. Assistance in public health programs through instruction and community work projects.

d. Control, evacuation, feeding, clothing, and sheltering of refugees.
e. Support of orphanages, child care centers, and children's hospitals.

610. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

Two major groups provide the target for Marine Corps psychological operations—the insurgents and the civilian population. Guidance in the formulation and conduct of the program can be obtained from the senior U.S. Information Agency representative.

a. Directed at the Insurgent.--Operations will be designed to lower morale and to encourage surrender. Emphasis should be placed on known enemy weaknesses and should be designed to take advantage of social or religious vulnerabilities.

b. Directed at the Population.--Operations should be designed to discredit the insurgent, to explain the U.S. presence, to gain popular support for the host government, and to reduce civilian casualties from military operations.

611. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

There are two primary types of counterguerrilla tactical operations—strike operations (see par. 612) and consolidation operations (see par. 613). The primary objective of these operations is to establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible by finding, fixing, and destroying insurgent forces.

a. Concepts.--Tactical operations are not independent sporadic actions; they are a part of a large campaign employing other internal defense and development forces intended to achieve a broad objective.

(1) Phase I Insurgency.--Insurgent activities range from threats of violence to subversive incidents occurring in an organized pattern. These are countered with control by civil security and counterintelligence forces while armed and paramilitary forces are trained or deployed in show-of-force operations.

(2) Phases II and III Insurgency.--Guerrilla warfare is initiated (phase II); in phase III, mobile warfare is conducted. Subversion, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare may be conducted simultaneously. U.S. and host country forces must be prepared to counter all forms of insurgent activity in phases II and III.

b. Organization of Forces.--Emphasis is placed on firepower and mobility. Organization should stress tactical self-sufficiency. Adequate intelligence, communications, and transportation are essential. The necessity for dealing with the civilian population requires the inclusion of civil affairs and PSYOP personnel in the staff organization.

(1) Size and Composition.--The force committed initially must be large enough to defeat the insurgents speedily; insufficient force at the start can result in lengthy, inconclusive, and costly operations. The situation and terrain determine organization, but consideration is given to the fact that guerrillas operate in difficult terrain without air, heavy weapons, or armor.
(2) Organization.--Within the battalion task force and/or its component companies, elements are organized into the following:

(a) Patrols.--Patrols are extensively used and vary in size from a fire team to a reinforced company, and they may be employed for extended periods. Organization may include appropriate civilian augmentation to include local guides, trackers, and members of the civilian police. See section 8 for a discussion of patrolling.

(b) Reaction Force.--A mobile reaction force is located at each combat base and is organized and equipped to engage rapidly reported guerrilla forces or to reinforce friendly forces. This reaction team ranges in size from a reinforced platoon to a reinforced company and is capable of rapid movement by surface vehicle or helicopter.

c. Tactical Operations.--Saturation patrolling to locate and fix insurgent forces followed by offensive operations to destroy them is the essence of tactical operations. Saturation patrolling requires the deployment of squad and platoon size patrols over a selected area of operations so that insurgents cannot move without being detected. The following refinements to the basic tactics are employed:

(1) Patrol by foot, tracked vehicle, wheeled vehicle, aircraft, and boat. Establish checkpoints on routes of communication; search villages, hamlets, and individual homes.

(2) Organize ambushes in depth which are supported by adequate reserves.

(3) Conduct raids against hamlets known or suspected of harboring insurgent personnel or supplies.

(4) Man outposts with minimum forces; rely on fire support and mobile reserves to relieve beleaguered posts.

(5) Make maximum use of civilian police to maintain security.

(6) Make maximum use of fire support for defense and support of operations.

(7) Immediately attack located guerrilla forces.

d. Mobile Warfare.--The tactics outlined above must be modified significantly to meet the threat of mobile warfare which is not positional or guerrilla warfare. The overall objectives are the same, but larger reserves are maintained. Operational forces are larger, artillery fires are massed, and larger security forces are required. The initiative is the objective, not terrain; and tactics such as envelopment and penetration will not be fully effective. Insurgents rely on caches, safe areas, and population support which is widely dispersed; they are not dependent on critical logistic bases which they must protect.

e. Principles of Operation.--Continuous pressure must be maintained, and commanders must not assume the enemy to be destroyed when he ceases to resist. When contact is lost, aggressive effort must be initiated to resume it. Long periods of inactivity favor the enemy.
(1) Concentrate on destruction or neutralization of the enemy force, not on terrain.

(2) Front and rear lines do not exist—external vigilance is a must.

(3) Tactical areas of responsibility should not be defined by straight linear boundaries. Complete political subdivisions should be included in order to facilitate coordination with civil agencies.

(4) Defensive tasks should be allocated to paramilitary and irregular forces.

(5) Defensive measures permit the enemy to gather strength. Only continuous pressure will prevent his gathering supplies, resting, recruiting, and massing for offensive operations.

(6) Informant nets should be established within the population.

(7) Plan fire support for outposts; maintain adequate reserves and a reinforcement capability.

(8) Large forces should not be committed until the enemy has been found and fixed.

(9) Large forces should not be garrisoned in the hope that their presence will deter guerrilla operations.

f. Offensive Operations.--The purpose of offensive operations is to destroy insurgent forces and their base areas.

(1) Once located, enemy forces are attacked as soon as possible. Friendly forces should be larger, and encirclement is the preferred tactic.

(2) Harassment prevents the enemy from resting, reorganizing, and massing personnel and supplies for large-scale attacks. Harassment may also be used as an economy-of-force measure in low priority areas.

g. Defensive Operations.--Normally, defensive operations are conducted as coordinated military and civilian programs. The purpose is to:

(1) Reduce guerrilla capacity for offensive action.

(2) Deny entry to an area.

(3) Destroy or capture the guerrilla force.

(4) Develop more favorable conditions for offensive action.

(5) Apply economy of force in one area in order to apply decisive force in another.

h. Retrograde Movements.--Except during phase III, guerrilla forces will seldom force a retreat; however, for economy of force or other reasons, retrograde movements may be required.

i. Combat Bases.--Combat bases are secure locations from which operations are projected and supported. They may be permanent or semipermanent,
and they contain essential command and control communications plus combat support and combat service support elements. See section 9 for fire support base details.

(1) Location.--Combat bases are established within or immediately adjacent to their area of responsibility. If the battalion tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) is large, companies may establish combat bases within their sectors. The base is moved as often as is necessary for security and to remain within striking range of the guerrillas. Patrols operating from battalion or company bases may establish temporary patrol bases from which to extend their operations. Extensive use of ground vehicles and helicopters can reduce the need for bases.

(2) Size.--Combat bases may be required to accommodate elements conducting nontactical missions in the area. Bases will vary in size with the size of the unit or units occupying it and in accordance with security requirements. An additional factor which must be considered is communication requirements.

(3) Security.--Defense is a major consideration and combat bases will normally be selected with an eye toward security. The most easily defended terrain is selected and natural obstacles are desirable. Outposts and listening posts are established as required.

612. STRIKE OPERATIONS

Sometimes known as "search and clear" or "search and destroy," the purpose of strike operations is to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective, either terrain or hostile forces. Other operations such as consolidation, intelligence, psychological, populace and resource control, civic action, and advisory assistance are minimized during the period of a strike operation. Strike operations are of relatively short duration (1 day to several weeks). Other activities are pursued only to the extent they assist the strike operation in progress.

a. Concept.--Generally, strike operations are conducted against located guerrilla forces in areas outside of those undergoing consolidation operations or those under friendly control. The purpose is to destroy or harass and not to capture terrain or remain permanently in the area. Ground or water means of entry may be used, but the most favored means is by helicopter. A combination of means is usually required. Strike operations include raids, reconnaissance in force, or a combination of these tactics.

b. Operations.--A thorough search of suspected areas is necessary in order to defeat the guerrilla's capability to hide weapons and blend with the population. Plans must allow sufficient time for a thorough search. When small reconnaissance forces uncover large guerrilla forces, reaction forces must be available to exploit the contact. Deliberate attack after thorough reconnaissance, methodical evaluation of relative combat power, and development of target analysis are not possible in counter-guerrilla operations. If intelligence is reasonably reliable or the guerrilla force has been fixed, an attack is feasible. If an area is only suspected of harboring insurgents, a reconnaissance in force, followed by a raid or coordinated attack is the accepted procedure.

c. Raid.--Raids are usually small scale and require swift penetration of hostile territory. They are employed to gain information, harass
the enemy, or destroy him. A planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission is normal. Surprise and accurate intelligence are basic requirements. See FMFM 8-1, Special Operations, for additional information.

(1) The size of the force may vary from a squad to a reinforced battalion, depending on the mission.

(2) Transport helicopters with armed helicopter escort offer the preferred means of mobility. Night raids are feasible but require readily identifiable terrain features for quick troop orientation and accurate delivery.

d. Reconnaissance in Force.--A limited objective operation, characterized by a thorough search of an area and conducted by a considerable force to discover the hostile guerrilla force dispositions and to develop other intelligence, is called a reconnaissance in force. It is followed immediately by a coordinated attack on located forces and installations. In areas where guerrillas are known to be operating at less than platoon strength, platoons may conduct reconnaissance in force operations supported by artillery. If larger guerrilla forces are encountered, small units should attempt to fix them and maintain contact.

e. Movement to Contact.--Movement to contact is basically the same as in conventional war. Emphasis is on night movement, clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions. Lead elements move by bounds. When lead elements gain contact, the guerrilla will most probably withdraw. Every effort must be made to maintain contact and pressure. Helicopters provide the best means of movement. Their employment enhances surprise and lessens the likelihood of an ambush.

f. Pursuit.--Pursuit may consist of direct pressure forces in frontal attack or a combination direct pressure/encircling force as in an envelopment. The purpose is to destroy the adversary who is in the process of disengaging. Terrain objectives may be assigned to facilitate control, but the primary objective remains the guerrilla force.

g. Encirclement.--A battalion is normally the smallest unit capable of conducting an encirclement; companies do not possess sufficient personnel, communications, and command and control capability except against small concentrated guerrilla forces.

(1) Troop Requirement.--Troop density dictates the destruction tactics to be used. Encirclement requires a high preponderance of friendly troops; however, fire power, aerial surveillance, and use of helicopter-borne reserves can reduce the requirement.

(2) Timing.--The goal is a complete surprise encirclement. One method is to move to the area of encirclement during darkness, thereby leaving daylight for completion of destruction operations.

(3) Occupation of Line of Encirclement.--Speed is emphasized in the early phases, and helicopters provide maximum speed. The critical period is the occupation of the line, since the guerrilla force will react immediately once they discover their predicament. They will probe for gaps, or attack weak points to force a gap, or attempt exfiltration individually or in small groups. The best tactic is occupation of the line simultaneously. The next best tactic is to cover all likely escape routes
613. CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

Consolidation operations, sometimes identified as "clear and hold operations," are the application of all aspects of national internal defense and development programs to specific regions or other political subdivisions in order to maintain or restore internal security of those areas.

a. Methods of Operation.--Marine Corps forces committed to consolidation operations support the internal defense and development effort by employing their resources in the following methods:

(1) In the offensive phase, strike operations are stressed.

(2) In the defensive phase, extensive patrolling and defense of the area are primary missions. Marine forces provide advisory services in training paramilitary forces. Civic action programs will be initiated. The overall aim is to permit host country agencies to take over the defense in order to permit Marine forces to resume offensive counterguerrilla operations in other areas.

b. Concept.--Regular armed forces, paramilitary, economic, social, psychological, and civic elements are integrated under the direction of government officials. Activities are designed to prevent resurgence of the insurgent movement; the ministry of defense and the armed forces accept supporting roles. They may be required to provide communication and transportation assistance when commercial facilities are ineffective. Operations of U.S. forces normally parallel rear-area security activities in conventional warfare. Some of the features are:

(1) Combined, joint, and interdepartmental civil and military operations at the lowest levels.

(2) Subordination of military to civilian activities.

(3) Dispersion of small units over extremely wide areas.

(4) Mission diversity between the military and civilian operations.

(5) The establishment at all levels of a coordinative body whose membership shall be composed of representatives of all agencies (military, paramilitary, police, intelligence, political, and civil administrative) which operate in a given area of the host country. The function of this body is to coordinate the allocation of material and personnel resources, methods of policy implementation, and evaluation of intelligence in the
area within which it is organized. (See FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development - U.S. Army Doctrine.)

c. Organization.--Political subdivisions plan and execute their own consolidation operations. Marine Corps units organize small independent task forces to correspond with them. Care must be exercised to ensure that Marine forces are not assigned greater areas than they can control or given missions which they cannot accomplish.

d. Operations.--Clearing guerrilla forces from the area is the first task in order to establish a controlled area; the controlled areas can subsequently be expanded and linked. Once the area has been cleared, regular armed forces and paramilitary forces establish defenses to prevent infiltration. Defense measures include resource control and screening of civilians. Concurrently, government authority is reestablished and civil activities are restored to operational status.

e. Phase of Operations.--Consolidation operations consist of a planning phase followed by the operational phases of offense and defense.

f. Planning Phase.--In the planning phase, military and civilian resource requirements are determined and the activities of all agencies both military and civilian are coordinated. The required resources, personnel, and material must be available for commitment prior to the initiation of the offensive phase.

g. Offensive Phase.--This phase includes the movement of the civil-military task force into the area; destroying or clearing guerrilla forces; replacement of insurgent political, economic, social, civic, and psychological functionaries; and identifying and destroying underground elements and sympathizers. Strike operations establish counterguerrilla bases from which operations are coordinated in order to destroy guerrilla bases and eliminate guerrilla units. Offensive patrolling, area surveillance, ambushes, and other small unit operations will culminate in the establishment of friendly controlled areas. Patrolling operations cover the entire area with the task of locating guerrillas and blocking approaches. Some patrols will be of long range and long duration. These will require air support. Strike operations will be conducted in order to:

(1) Find the guerrilla and the routes he uses.

(2) Block escape routes with ambushes and reaction forces.

(3) Contain guerrilla forces with small fixing forces.

(4) Destroy guerrillas and their bases with fire and maneuver.

(5) Commit reserve forces as required.

h. Defensive Phase

(1) The goal is the holding of an area against guerrilla attack in order to permit civilian agencies to conduct development programs. Programs include training local irregular and paramilitary to assume defensive and security missions. Offensive action is required for the elimination of guerrilla forces. Defensive operations accomplish the following:
(a) Deter guerrilla offensive action.
(b) Reduce guerrilla capacity for offensive actions.
(c) Deny guerrillas entry into an area.
(d) Deny guerrillas internal and external support.
(e) Destroy or trap guerrilla forces.
(f) Develop favorable conditions for other counterguerrilla operations.
(g) Economize forces in one area in order to apply decisive force in another.

(2) The normal form of defense in consolidation operations is a variation of the area and mobile defense described in FMFM 6-1, Marine Division, and FMFM 6-2, Marine Infantry Regiment. Emphasis is placed on the use of obstacles and fire planning.

(3) The bulk of the defensive force is assigned to the security echelon in order to conduct extensive patrolling.

(4) Large areas require extended distances between elements of the defense echelon. It may be desirable to assign the reserve echelon the mission of reaction force for several installations in the area.

(5) Fragmentation of fire support units might be required to a greater degree than in conventional warfare. Registration of indirect fire on likely assembly areas and avenues of approach will aid in the defense.

(6) Maximum use is made of host country agencies in securing and defending.

(7) Security measures must be emphasized. These include training all personnel in defensive tactics, use of guard and patrol dogs, screening and checking of local laborers, and active measures to prevent sabotage.

(8) Area and strong point defenses include the use of combat bases and static defense posts.

(a) Installation and population center defense is based on mutual fire support; a basic requirement is support from artillery and mortars within range of several installations. Adequate communications are essential to mutual defense.

(b) Once the area is cleared, defense of communities is the responsibility of the paramilitary, police, or irregular forces. Defensive measures stress population and resource control, with emphasis on the following:

1 Boundaries, coordination points, and the configuration of the operations area are dependent primarily on the political boundaries of the community rather than terrain considerations.
2 Surveillance and security measures encompass day and night operations.

3 Defensive positions require auxiliary exits and covered entrances. Shelters should have walls reinforced for protection against small arms. Consideration should be given to connecting trenches and the storing of supplies in dispersed and protected caches.

4 Fire planning should emphasize coordinated close protective fires to repel attacks since guerrillas usually attack from close-in assembly areas.

5 Intensive intelligence coverage inside and around communities.

6 Extensive patrolling outside the defensive perimeter.

7 Mobile reaction forces to counter guerrilla attacks.

8 Communications which make coordination possible.

(c) Security of food, arms, and ammunition must receive special attention. These items are highly valued by guerrillas.

(d) Maximum use is made of camouflage and dummy positions, natural and manmade obstacles, alarms, illumination, electronic surveillance devices, and restricted areas. Fields of fire are cleared and field fortifications constructed. Patrolling is intensive, and routines are changed frequently to avoid patterns.

(e) Installations and communities are organized for all-round defense, and artillery support may be provided from units located in the area. Guards and patrols are used to prevent surprise. Concealed approaches are mined and covered by automatic weapons and flame field expedients. Areas which are suitable for placing short-range fire by guerrillas are mined and cleared.

(f) Personnel, other than defense forces, are not allowed within defensive positions. Friendly civilians and domestic animals may be helpful in warning of the approach of guerrilla forces.

(g) Illuminating grenades, air and ground flares, artillery and mortar illuminating shells, searchlights, and illuminating devices provide means for countering guerrilla night attacks.

(h) Surveillance patrols and a system of static security posts may be used to secure lines of communication. Static security posts protect critical points such as terminals, tunnels, bridges, roads, and railroad junctions.

614. IDENTIFICATION AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES

a. Guerrilla offensive tactics are basically the raid and the ambush, and success depends on good intelligence, detailed planning, surprise, speed of execution, and determination. The guerrilla strikes and disperses in order to avoid the reaction. After disengaging, he attempts to blend into the populace until ready for future commitment. In order
to counter these tactics effectively, it is basic that the guerrilla force is the target, not the terrain. The guerrilla force must be destroyed or captured through coordinated activities of strike and consolidation operations.

b. Locating the guerrillas in order to fix and destroy them is extremely difficult. The guerrilla is operating in familiar terrain among ethnically similar people, which further complicates the problem. In order to locate, identify, and destroy enemy units, Marine Corps elements will require effective liaison with all host country and U.S. elements in the area.

615. IDENTIFICATION AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY INFRASTRUCTURE

Effective government control cannot be restored until the causes of the insurgency are removed and insurgent organizations purged. These goals are uppermost in national strategy. A small, hard core leadership faction exists at the heart of every insurgent movement. Elimination of this hard core will cause the disintegration of the entire insurgent organization.

a. Identification.--Intelligence must be directed toward identifying the insurgent infrastructure. Analysis of data collected in this effort will enable a determination of the degree of insurgent control in the different areas of the country. This information is vital in the development of programs based on logical assumptions.

b. Population and Resource Control.--The primary goal is to separate the population from the insurgents and deprive them of support. A secondary goal is to protect the population from insurgent exploitation and domination. Restrictive measures are kept to the minimum to prevent popular discontent.

c. Gaining Population Support.--Exposing, discrediting, and destroying the insurgent infrastructure will permit a reduction of the defense effort and increased use of resources to further internal development.

d. Psychological Support.--Insurgent objectives and methods must be discredited and subversive propaganda countered. Government efforts on behalf of the people are widely publicized and the duties of responsible citizens to assist in establishing a stable government are stressed. During phase II, the presence of insurgent tactical forces will require the host country to pursue tactical operations at the expense of internal development programs. This reduction serves to alienate the population. Psychological operations must place the blame for this reduction on the insurgents.

e. Concentration of Effort.--The government must decide the amount of effort which may be devoted to internal development at the expense of the effort to defeat the insurgent tactical effort. Concentration on either one will result in an imbalance which can be exploited by the insurgents.

f. Police Control.--Police efforts involve the use of repressive measures aimed at destroying the insurgent infrastructure and protective actions which isolate loyal citizens from the insurgents. Paramilitary units may be trained and used to assist.
616. POPULATION ALLEGIANCE

a. General

(1) Insurgents require popular or coerced support from the people; conversely, a prerequisite to counterinsurgency success is the separation of the dissidents from the populace. The separation may be accomplished by physical or psychological means or a combination of both depending on the circumstances. Regardless of means, the target is always the same—the people.

(2) Operations require a delicate balance between the force applied and the measures taken to relieve the sources of unrest. The basic requirement is the alignment of the people with the aims of the host country. These aims may often be realized with the presence of the military acting as a catalyst in programs of economic development, social adjustment, and welfare activities. A vigorous public relations and propaganda campaign is necessary to promote armed forces identity with civilian well-being and protection for the civilians from guerrilla depredation and atrocities.

(3) Marines should be thoroughly indoctrinated on the customs and behavioral standards of the culture(s) of the country and of the influence their behavior can have upon mission success. They should respect local customs and rights of property and person. A cross-cultural information and relations program planned and initiated prior to entry into the host country, and continued as long as Marine personnel remain there, will provide this indoctrination. Language training is desirable.

(4) In order to avoid alienating the civilian populace, population and resource control measures such as credentials, curfews, suspension of civil rights, evacuation, or relocation are kept to the minimum. When absolutely required, they are applied with fairness as well as requisite firmness. In any case, only those measures should be applied as can be enforced. Control measures which cannot be enforced will generate additional disrespect for all government activities. Buffer zones are established between the civilian population and havens such as might exist in adjoining countries.

b. Civil Affairs.--In limited and conventional warfare, civil affairs occupy a supporting role. In counterinsurgency, because of the necessity to separate the people from the dissidents, the role of civil affairs takes on increased importance. All operation plans are based on an integrated civil-military approach. The area of civil affairs is a command responsibility, and if specialist personnel are not provided, the commander must discharge his responsibilities with the resources available. (See FMFM 8-6, Joint Manual For Civil Affairs.)

c. Civil Affairs Operations.--Any project or activity of U.S. forces involving contact with civilians outside the military or designed to influence or control civilian activities can be classified as a civil affairs operation. Activities intended for the collection of intelligence are exceptions. These operations encompass everything from one Marine assisting a civilian to an entire unit providing security for crop harvest.
701. GENERAL

Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential for successful operations against insurgent forces. To conduct counterguerrilla operations without a sound intelligence basis is to invite disaster. Effective intelligence operations must exploit all host country or allied intelligence assets. The basic inventory of intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from area and country studies supplemented with recent operational intelligence collected on the scene. This body of data forms the basis of the commander's estimate of the guerrilla situation and the subsequent intelligence plans. Of particular importance are those aspects of intelligence activities which are devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure and protecting the host country against espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

a. Popular Support.—Internal defense and development operations are dependent on intelligence because subversive insurgency depends on popular support. The population is both the target of the insurgent and a principal source of his intelligence, cover, personnel, and logistic support; therefore, the attitude of the people must be considered in addition to enemy, weather, and terrain.

b. Infrastructure.—The manner in which the insurgent forces are organized and that internal structure itself is referred to as the "infrastructure." The interlocking nature of the insurgent infrastructure presents a complex and difficult target for intelligence operations. The party control apparatus normally will have been engaged for years in the subversion of the population and is securely imbedded within the population. A thorough understanding of the insurgent infrastructure and environmental situation is essential for intelligence planning and operations at all levels.
c. Identification.—Guerrilla forces employ intelligence and counterintelligence measures which depend upon a sympathetic or, at the very best, an apathetic (i.e., Cuban Revolution in early stages) indigenous environment, and they are difficult to identify, locate, and fix. The guerrilla, by virtue of his attempts to enlist both active and passive support from segments of the local populace, presents special problems to host country and Marine intelligence and counterintelligence efforts not encountered in "conventional" operations. Before he can be separated from the civil populace, fixed, and destroyed, the guerrilla must be positively identified; all members of every combat and support echelon must be motivated and trained to participate in this fundamental task.

d. Doctrine.—The general doctrine, methods, and procedures for direction, collection, processing, dissemination, and use of intelligence are covered in FMFM 2-1, Intelligence; FMFM 2-3, Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations (U); and FMFM 2-4, Counterintelligence. Special considerations in the production of intelligence for the conduct of counterguerrilla operations are as follows:

(1) Success in counterguerrilla operations almost invariably goes to the force which receives timely, accurate information from the local population.

(2) Political, economic, psychological, and sociological factors are of more importance at a lower level in the production of intelligence in counterguerrilla operations than in the production of intelligence in conventional operations.

(3) Collection and dissemination must be controlled closely to ensure that all agencies or forces, military and civilian, contribute to the collection effort and have access to the resulting intelligence.

(4) Countermeasures must be taken against intelligence collecting elements of the insurgents.

(5) Deception and secrecy must be emphasized to avoid compromise of plans and operations.

(6) Counterguerrilla operations will require modification or adaption of basic combat intelligence collection procedures.

(7) Surveillance may be accomplished through the use of host country and Marine Corps forces in a coordinated program employing static surveillance sites, extensive ground reconnaissance, patrolling, aerial observation, signal intelligence, and sensor/radar surveillance. Sensor/radar surveillance devices are of particular value in covering avenues of approach from remote base areas into populated areas. They are of less value in heavily populated areas.

(8) Rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence are essential. The elusiveness and mobility of small guerrilla forces quickly outdates information concerning their location. Reaction time for the conduct of combat operations is a critical factor, and reactions must be based on reliable intelligence. A concerted effort must be made by every intelligence section to rapidly develop accurate order of battle information applicable to the projected area of operations. It is absolutely essential that intelligence gathered be widely disseminated and evaluated by all commands. Furthermore, the nature of counterguerrilla warfare dictates frequent and comprehensive intelligence briefings of all personnel.
(9) Normally, a larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel are required for counterguerrilla operations. Attention must be given to obtaining adequate interrogator-translators and qualified interpreters. In addition, officers and enlisted intelligence personnel must be provided to the MAGTF to permit continuous operation of the combat operations center and to staff subordinate task groupings.

702. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The insurgent force, the civil population, and the terrain are virtually inseparable factors in guerrilla warfare. To destroy the insurgent movement and prevent its resurgence, detailed intelligence is required on all three elements. Acquisition and dissemination of weather information is normally a matter of standing operating procedure.

a. Insurgent Force.--The following intelligence is sought concerning the insurgent force:

   (1) Identification, composition, organization, and disposition.

   (2) Location of guerrilla camps, assembly areas, rendezvous points, and trails.

   (3) Strength and combat efficiency of guerrilla forces, to include status of training, effectiveness of communications, and morale.

   (4) Insurgent methods of operations, to include politics, economics, proselytizing, propaganda, and guerrilla tactics.

   (5) Guerrilla force arms and equipment.

   (6) Supply sources of food, commodities, weapons, ammunition, and means of providing logistic support.

   (7) Factors which caused or contributed to the development and continuing motivation of the insurgent.

   (8) Relationship between the insurgent and civil population.

   (9) Relationship with and degree of support from any external forces or sponsoring power.

   (10) Psychological vulnerabilities.

b. Civil Population.--Because of the inseparable nature of the guerrilla force and the civil populace which usually exists, much of the intelligence developed concerning one is applicable to the other. Intelligence required concerning the civilian population is as follows:

   (1) Identification of hostile, uncommitted, and friendly elements.

   (2) Motivation and loyalties of various population segments.

   (3) Size and proportion of civil population likely to engage in or support guerrilla activities.
(4) Effect of local authorities and police on civil population.

(5) Capability of the local populace to furnish food to guerrillas and/or friendly forces.

(6) Availability of water and fuel.

(7) Vulnerability of friendly civil populace to terrorism.

(8) Potential effect on the civil population of resource control measures such as relocation, search and seizures, movement restrictions, curfews, food and commodity controls, pass and log systems, and suspension of certain civil liberties.

(9) Psychological vulnerabilities.

(10) Relationship of local authorities and police with the guerrilla force operating in the local area.

c. Terrain.--An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary for the conduct of counterguerrilla operations. The collection of terrain information is a continuous process. Area maps are quite often inaccurate, out of date, or a combination of both. All elements of the counterinsurgency forces should note terrain features, distances, and any other distinguishable features that can be used in upgrading terrain information. The resulting intelligence is promptly disseminated usually via special photo studies, reports, and overlays contained in intelligence estimates, special reports, or annexes to operations plans and orders. Particular attention is directed toward collecting information concerning the following:

(1) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla bases or secure areas. Such areas usually have the following characteristics:

(a) Difficulty of access, as in mountains, jungles, or swamps.

(b) Concealment from aerial reconnaissance.

(c) Covered withdrawal routes.

(d) Located within one day's fast movement from small civilian settlements that could provide food, information, and warning.

(e) Adequate water supply.

(2) Roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas.

(3) Roads and trails in the vicinity of friendly installations and lines of communication.

(4) Location of critical fords, bridges, and ferries; information on seasons when the streams are at flood stage.
(5) Areas where drinking water is not available.

(6) Areas where foot travel is difficult.

(7) Availability and suitability of potential helicopter landing sites.

(8) Location of likely guerrilla or counterguerrilla ambush sites.

(9) Location of small settlements and farms in and near suspected guerrilla areas.

(10) Location of areas suitable for airdrops, boat or submarine rendezvous, and roads and trails leading into external area of sponsoring power or neutral country friendly to the guerrillas when guerrillas are known or suspected to have contact with an external sponsoring power.

(11) Location of all known or suspected harboring sites for the guerrilla force.

(12) Location of all known or suspected guerrilla strongpoints, field fortifications, weapons emplacements, and antiaircraft positions.

(13) Availability and suitability of potential fire support base sites (see sec. 9).

703. FUNCTIONS IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT

a. Modifications.--The nature of the enemy, the tactical deployment of friendly units, the presence of both friendly and hostile citizens, and the presence of indigenous military and paramilitary units dictate modification of normal intelligence procedure. Intelligence section/division organization and functions are modified as required at all levels of command having an intelligence section/division. The criteria is the nature and extent of the intelligence effort required to support the mission, availability of qualified personnel within the landing force as a whole, and the personal preferences of the intelligence officer and the commander. Combat operations normally will require augmentation with interrogators, translators, air observers, counterintelligence personnel, order of battle analysts, interpreters, sensor imagery interpreters, reconnaissance and surveillance specialists, and technical intelligence personnel.

b. Counterguerrilla Intelligence Functions.--The intelligence section at landing force level may be organized by the establishment of special subsections to accommodate a special function. For example, a covert collection unit may be required to supervise agent activities. A records subsection may be created to develop and maintain information concerning the civil population and guerrilla force. The most important counterguerrilla intelligence functions include the following:

(1) Combat Intelligence.--The primary requirement of combat intelligence is to locate the guerrilla force. Emphasis is placed on overt collection of information, and most of the functions of the conventional combat intelligence subsection are applicable. Special attention is given to the rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence. Careful attention to seemingly minor guerrilla preparations and activities is essential to the development of meaningful intelligence on impending guerrilla operations.
2. Clandestine Collection.--Clandestine collection of information is extremely important in counterguerrilla operations. Every effort is made to infiltrate the guerrilla force and hostile civilian elements with reliable agents. Indigenous persons are usually capable of infiltrating the guerrilla force; they have an intimate knowledge of the local population conditions and the terrain. In addition, they often have prior knowledge of, or connections with, members of the guerrilla force. Potential agents must be carefully checked by background investigations and constantly screened after hiring to ensure they are not engaging in double agent practices. The recruiting, training, and handling of agents require highly trained intelligence personnel who have the ability to rapidly establish rapport with the indigenous people. Because of the sensitive nature of agent operations and the emphasis placed on clandestine collection, this function is usually separated from the combat intelligence subsection. Clandestine collection of intelligence must be closely coordinated at the highest level of command having cognizance over the specific area of operations. Normally, clandestine collection responsibilities will be assigned to counterintelligence personnel who have received special training in this function.

3. Aerial Reconnaissance.--Functions of the aerial observer subsection are essentially the same as for conventional operations. Special attention is directed toward preplanned and on-call reconnaissance and observation missions in direct support of widely separated battalions and smaller units. Included will be a continuing requirement to ensure, under various tactical situations, compatibility of communication equipment and frequency assignments between supporting aircraft and the supported ground element, particularly with regard to units smaller than battalions. See section 9 for details on aerial reconnaissance.

4. Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance.--Ground surveillance specialists should be tasked to employ electronic devices (i.e., ground sensors, radar, etc.) on avenues of approach from base areas into the populated areas. Mobile surveillance of enemy base areas should be performed by deep reconnaissance patrols inserted by clandestine means. In all cases, surveillance and reconnaissance personnel must be supported by available fire support elements and be provided with sufficient communication equipment to ensure timely reporting to appropriate commanders.

5. Psychological Operations (PSYOP).--Intelligence is vital to a sound PSYOP program since population attitude and behavior ranges from passiveness to hostility and must be reshaped into genuine acceptance of the host country's effort. The added emphasis of PSYOP requires that all intelligence be evaluated in terms of psychological application. The efforts of the intelligence section and the PSYOP agencies are closely related. In supporting intelligence operations, the PSYOP objective is to convince the entire population that providing intelligence information to the government forces is to their benefit. PSYOP uses all means of communication to inform the people that:

(a) Strangers, suspicious persons, and unusual activities must be reported. Methods of reporting also should be explained.

(b) Rewards are available for specific types of information, to include information leading to the apprehension of insurgents and capture of their equipment and weapons.
(6) **Biographic Data.** Records on guerrilla commanders and key members of the civilian hostile population should be maintained. Frequently, the operations or behavior of these individuals develop a pattern which, if recognized, may aid materially in the conduct of operations against them. The names and locations of families, relatives, and friends of known guerrillas are obtained and recorded. These persons are not only valuable sources of information, but they may be used as a lure for trapping guerrillas. In communities friendly to the insurgent forces, some persons are responsible for collecting food and providing other aid for the guerrillas such as relaying messages and providing temporary security. Determined efforts must be applied in ferreting out these people. Instead of immediate arrest, it is usually advantageous to maintain close surveillance over their activities and seek to apprehend guerrillas contacting them. Establishment and maintenance of records concerning black and gray lists should be restricted to those units having the capability to administer them. Such efforts should be coordinated and supervised by the counterintelligence team assigned to the landing force.

(7) **Interrogator-Translators and Interpreters.** Fleet Marine Force interrogation-translation teams (ITT's) are limited in numbers and language spread. Consequently, commands preparing for operations against guerrilla forces should utilize available personnel that have the appropriate language facility and document-reading capability to assist unit intelligence personnel. Command must have a system that identifies personnel with a language capability and permits their immediate availability for tasks requiring the use of that language. These personnel must be afforded maximum possible combat intelligence training prior to operations. They may be integrated into the intelligence section of tactical units or be assigned as augmentation to, and operate under, interrogation-translation teams. In cases where personnel with language capabilities are not available, landing force commands will normally utilize host country armed forces personnel and/or employ indigenous personnel as interpreters and documents translators for duty with interrogation-translation teams. However, it is essential that these personnel be carefully screened and constantly supervised by qualified intelligence personnel. Because of general lack of military background of indigenous personnel, bilingual dictionaries should be obtained to assist in their training.

(8) **Counterintelligence.** Guerrilla forces depend primarily upon secrecy and surprise to offset the superior combat power of the counter-guerrilla force. Since the degree of surprise achieved will depend largely on the effectiveness of the guerrillas' intelligence agencies, intensive effort must be made to expose, thwart, destroy, or neutralize his intelligence system. Counterintelligence increases the security of all friendly forces and increases the probability of attaining surprise in operations against guerrilla forces. Adequate security measures must be developed and continuously enforced to prevent penetration of the intelligence operation by insurgent elements. Marine Corps commanders, in coordination with host country authorities, will habitually place emphasis on the following counterintelligence denial, detection, and deception measures:

(a) **Denial Measures**

1. Removal of compromised informant sources from the area of operations.

2. Restrictions on physical movements between and within certain areas, and control and restricted use of communication facilities.
3 Thorough briefing of selected U.S., allied, and host country personnel on intelligence practices and techniques.

4 Emphasize the procedures for the secure disposal of waste material.

5 Employment of silent weapons by patrols.

6 Normal activity while preparing for operations to preclude any indications to the insurgent force of a change in normal routine.

7 Maintenance of strict security concerning current or projected logistic movements.

8 Conduct of major troop movements under the cover of darkness or during inclement weather by the most rapid means available.

9 Friendly unit standing operating procedures (SOP's) constitute a potentially valuable source of information for the insurgent. The uncontrolled circulation of these documents presents the insurgent with the opportunity to derive extensive information pertinent to friendly activities in many fields. While most SOP's are not of a classified nature, they should, nevertheless, be closely controlled.

(b) Detection Measures

1 Background investigations and screening of all civilians employed by, or operating with, U.S. and host country forces and in civil positions. Particular attention must be given to indigenous guides or scouts who are familiar with the location and disposition of friendly forces.

2 Constant surveillance of all known or suspected members of the guerrilla force and the infrastructure.

3 Extensive employment of trip flares and boobytraps in areas of suspected guerrilla reconnaissance activity.

4 Employment of dogs in conjunction with other security activities.

5 The clearance of vegetation and the plowing of areas to provide indications of movement across the areas.

6 Monitoring civil communication media.

7 Maximum emphasis on visual and electronic observation; augmentation of organic visual aids and electronic detection.

8 Surprise relocation and counterintelligence screening of the entire population of settlements suspected of intelligence activities in support of the insurgent forces.

9 Wide distribution of photographs of known guerrilla or key infrastructure personnel to assist in their apprehension.

10 Offering rewards for information leading to the capture of informants or other agents in support of the insurgent forces;
special emphasis will be placed on the apprehension of infrastructure personnel.

Identification systems to minimize the possibility of guerrillas or members of the infrastructure gaining access to installations or moving freely.

(c) Deception Measures.--Deception measures are used to mislead the insurgent forces as to the true capabilities, intentions, or locations of counterguerrilla forces. Such measures include feints, ruses, demonstrations, communication deception, and the leaking of false information. Deception measures depend upon complete security for success, and special precautions are taken to ensure that there is no leakage of information.

(9) Signal Intelligence.--The effective employment of signal intelligence (SIGINT) in direct support of the landing force engaged in counterinsurgency operations can provide tactical commanders with information which, when processed and collated with information obtained from other intelligence collection activities, will result in the production of reliable combat information such as the identification and general location of enemy units, terrain and weather conditions, and the extent of possible compromise of friendly plans and intentions. However, successful SIGINT activities depend largely on the proficiency and security consciousness of enemy forces, associated communications and electronics equipment, and the deployment of friendly units with respect to the enemy and his communication transmitters.

704. COLLECTION AGENCIES AND SOURCES

a. Collection Techniques.--Speed is essential in collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence information to concerned tactical units. Standard collection techniques will be employed as well as expedient and improvised techniques. Sources of information and collecting agents include the following:

(1) Trained intelligence agents.
(2) Intelligence specialists.
(3) Host country's government.
(4) Hostile activity.
(5) Captured personnel, documents, and material.
(6) Studies and reports.
(7) Photographs and maps.
(8) Civilians who can be induced to report on the activities of guerrillas in the area.

(9) Guerrilla communications. Radio is normally the primary means used by the guerrilla for command and control. Efforts should be applied to intercept and break insurgent codes. Radio frequencies may be jammed to deny the use of radio frequencies; however, before directing
that a local radio station be jammed or destroyed, consideration should be
given to the resulting loss of a source of information.

(10) Police intelligence network. The daily contact with the
population makes the police an important source of information to newly
arriving counterinsurgency forces. Police records can pinpoint the crim-
inal element and dissidents that provide a fertile recruiting ground for
guerrillas.

b. Unit Collection Effort.--Units and individual Marines play a
prominent part in the collection effort. All personnel must realize the
importance of reporting all information which they obtain about the guer-
 rilla force, civil population, and the topography of the area. Every piece
of information, no matter how insignificant, must be reported as accurately
as possible. Sources from which information is obtained include but are
not limited to the following:

(1) Patrol Reports.--A primary source in the collection effort
is the patrol report regarding food cultivation, food dumps, camps, trails
and roads, arms and ammunition, mines and explosives, and equipment and
tactics. (See FMFM 6-5, Marine Rifle Squad.)

(2) Surrendered and Captured Guerrillas.--A surrendered guerrilla
can be an extremely valuable source of information for both immediate tacti-
cal exploitation or for developing intelligence on a broader scale. They
can be particularly exploitable in the role of returning to guerrilla-held
areas to gain additional information or solicit further surrenders. Care
must be taken in handling surrendered or captured guerrillas in order to
avoid nullifying the psychological advantage gained. The following points
must be considered in each case:

(a) The first condition for a quick and effective interro-
gation is the availability of specialists perfectly versed in the techniques
to be employed, and who fully understand what they can profitably ask the
subject under interrogation. To do this, it is essential to be able to
place the subject precisely within the structure of the organization to
which he belongs. This poses the requirement for interrogators to be thor-
oughly versed in the insurgent organization. Only then can the interrogator
ascertain those areas in which the subject would be knowledgeable. Given the
compartmented nature of insurgent activities, the insurgent ordinarily knows
only his duties, his immediate associates, and his superiors. It would be
pointless to question a captured assassin about the insurgent tax collection
structure in his district, since he would know nothing of it. The initial
interrogation should be confined to areas in which the subject has knowledge
and should be concluded quickly so as to be fully exploited.

(b) Avoid "advertising" the fact that a guerrilla is a
prisoner until authorities vested with the responsibility for using pris-
oners have decided how best to exploit him.

(c) Strictly prohibit abuse, maltreatment, or harassment
of surrendered or captured prisoners.

(d) Restrict interrogation to a minimum number of personnel
and ensure that interrogation is accomplished by trained interrogators
whenever possible.
(e) Expedite transfer of captured guerrillas to the landing force collection point for processing. Immediate exploitation of the captive by the capturing tactical unit should be undertaken only when such exploitation will result directly in saving lives or when a substantial tactical advantage can be expected from such exploitation. Any retention must be reported immediately, and lengthy retention must be approved by the landing force headquarters.

(3) Captured Documents.--All captured documents should be forwarded immediately to the landing force intelligence section for translation. In cases where interrogator-translator subteams are directly supporting widespread tactical units, these personnel may initially screen captured documents prior to forwarding to higher headquarters. To ensure prompt processing of documents, the following considerations must be kept in mind:

(a) Do not separate documents captured together. Documents must be translated and analyzed in context with each other to be meaningful.

(b) Use capture tags and securely attach to the document or package of documents to note identification and capture circumstances. Improper identification or failure to identify such intelligence material may negate the value of an otherwise extremely important find.

(c) Do not deface or write directly on the surface of any captured document.

(d) Make every effort to keep documents dry. If documents are wet when captured, and the situation permits, dry by airing prior to forwarding.

(e) Forward all personal effects such as wallets, letters, diaries, etc., intact, annotating the content on the capture tag.

(4) Enemy Dead

(a) In some cases, the identification of the dead is the only means of identifying the enemy organization or organizations which are operating in the area. Identification can usually best be accomplished by on-site inspection of dead guerrillas and interrogation of prisoners and local inhabitants by intelligence personnel.

1 If on-site inspection is not feasible, or if bodies are believed to be of special significance or require special attention in identification, they should be delivered to a higher echelon intelligence section via the most rapid mode of transportation available.

2 Ground evacuation should not be undertaken if decomposition has set in or will set in prior to delivery.

3 Under no circumstances will identification tags be removed by anyone, including intelligence personnel.

4 Dead guerrillas exhumed and found to offer no special intelligence should be reinterred.

(b) Identification procedures can be conducted on the spot and include the following techniques:
Photographs.--For successful photography of a body with distinguishable flesh, the face should be washed and the hair pushed back from the face. The eyes should be open. Close-range views of the face, front and profile, and of the body should be taken.

Fingerprints.--Fingerprinting is usually of value only when like records have been enforced by the host country. For details on fingerprinting procedures, refer to NAVMC 2509-A, Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operation.

Description.--The following information is required to establish a description:

- Sex.
- Race.
- Apparent age.
- Height, build, and facial features.
- Teeth, scars, and deformities.

Information Obtained From Civilians and Agents.--Exploitation of the civilian sources of information normally requires a sophisticated intelligence organization which is resident within the populace. As the counterguerrilla campaign progresses, the civilian populace can be expected to volunteer increasing amounts of information. Agents are handled as discussed in paragraph 703. Normally, subordinate units of the landing force should not develop their own agents or informers to acquire information. Persons claiming to be agents should be detained and segregated and counterintelligence personnel contacted for disposition. The information derived from civilian or agent sources normally may be expected to encompass the following:

(a) Details of the local terrain.
(b) Ideological motivation and sympathies of local residents.
(c) Logistic support available, or potentially available, to guerrillas operating in the area.
(d) Potential guerrilla targets or objectives, and dates and times pertaining to them.
(e) Identification of members of the guerrilla force and infrastructure.
(f) Sabotage, espionage, and terrorism techniques and objectives of the guerrilla and infrastructure.
(g) Weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the guerrilla force.
(h) Psychological operations of the guerrilla force and the resulting impact on the local population.
(6) Communications

(a) Networks.--The highly compartmented nature of clandestine organizations forces a reliance upon well-run communication networks to ensure coordination of the various elements. The identification and delineation of these networks will serve to reveal the entire structure of the organization they serve. Information that will aid in the identification of communications may be derived from the activities illustrated below:

1. The identification of couriers/commomliaison agents; the controlling agency, routes, stations, and persons contacted.

2. The location of letter drops and the identification of persons who deposit and receive material.

3. The location of land lines and terminals which service them.

4. Net reconstruction of radio transmissions.

(b) Equipment.--All captured communication equipment should be recovered for inspection. Captured equipment is expeditiously reported to the unit intelligence section. Frequency dials and power settings are carefully noted before the equipment is moved and, if possible, locked to prevent change during transit. Units capturing guerrilla equipment should note the following:

1. Type of equipment (i.e., transmitter/receiver, transmitter or receiver).

2. Make, name, and number identifying the equipment.

3. Location at the time of capture.

4. Frequencies and power settings shown on dials at the time of capture.

5. Direction of the antenna (including compass bearing).

(c) Monitoring.--Units receiving a signal of unknown origin should immediately report it to the intelligence section. This report will include frequency and call sign. All information that can be comprehended during the monitoring is sent to the intelligence center.

(d) Documents.--Documents relating to communications and those found in proximity to communication equipment are screened for information that might be of immediate value to the tactical operation then forwarded to the intelligence center.

(7) Food Cultivation

(a) Guerrillas may be forced to cultivate lands to supplement food supplies or to establish a basic source. If such cultivated areas are discovered, the crops are destroyed or used as a lure to trap the guerrilla. In areas settled with civilians, cases will arise where
cultivated land areas may appear excessive to the needs of the dependent civilians. In such cases, expert advice will be sought to determine if the land area under productive cultivation is sufficient only for the local population, or if it is so large that guerrillas may live off of it as well.

(b) Units discovering cultivation will report the following information:

1 Location.
2 Size.
3 Type.
4 Condition; e.g., Stage I: natural vegetation freshly cut; Stage II: cut and cleared; Stage III: prepared and hoed; Stage IV: growing crops tended; Stage V: growing crops untended; Stage VI: harvested; Stage VII: disused and overgrown.

(8) Arms and Ammunition

(a) Most of the weapons and ammunition recovered as a consequence of tactical operations will be a mixture of those of foreign nations to include our own. Statistical data must be maintained on weapons and ammunition that have been captured by the counterguerrilla forces. Technical intelligence plays an important role in the maintenance of such data and in determining its overall significance. However, capturing units must initiate the sequence of intelligence collection by reporting captured items immediately.

(b) The discovery of arms caches may occur frequently. At times, on-the-spot analysis may have to be conducted by technical intelligence functional teams. The entire analysis effort can be materially assisted by proper orientation of Marines in arms of the guerrilla forces, and by placing proper emphasis on the "Items-Wanted List."

(c) All new ordnance items and those encountered in an area for the first time, including mines, explosives, and boobytraps, will be recovered, deactivated by trained personnel, and forwarded to the intelligence section for technical analysis whenever possible; otherwise, technical intelligence personnel should make on-the-spot examination of the items. In any case, a full report should be made by the capturing unit giving circumstances of capture, location, types, quantities, apparent conditions, identification makes/numbers, and any technical data.

(9) Aerial Reconnaissance.--Aerial reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, is discussed in section 9.

(10) Local Military and Civil Authorities.--Close liaison must be maintained at all levels of command with local military and civilian authorities. The use of liaison officers at local military and governmental headquarters is advisable on a continuous basis in order to exploit the information available to those agencies. Their assistance in identifying local loyal elements and guerrilla forces must be solicited. Their knowledge of local terrain must be exploited. The information obtained should be processed through unit intelligence channels.
(11) Ground Reconnaissance.--An aggressive program of ground reconnaissance must be conducted to find guerrillas. Agent and other reports of movement and location of guerrilla elements can be used as a basis for determining the areas to be covered by fixed and moving ground reconnaissance units. Particular attention should be paid to coverage of suspected enemy base areas.

(12) Insurgent Logistics.--Carefully planned intelligence efforts must be directed at identifying the insurgent logistics network. The nature of insurgent warfare dictates that supplies precede the armed forces into the battle area, rather than follow it, as is the case in conventional warfare. This need to "prepare the battlefield" constitutes a potentially crippling setback to the insurgent armed activity. Intelligence which reveals the routes, transportation means, trans-shipment points, storage areas, and other logistic activities of the enemy presents the friendly commander with the opportunity to destroy the insurgents' ability to fight by depriving them of the means to do so.

705. AREA STUDIES

An essential in counterinsurgency operations is a thorough understanding of all aspects of the area and the society augmented by a complete understanding of the prevailing internal and external forces supporting the guerrilla force and its infrastructure. The information obtained in the planning stage will reveal areas in the political, economic, and social structures that need improvement. Area studies performed prior to and during the time Marine forces are in country are most helpful in understanding the makeup of the country. Appendix A is a sample of what should be included in an area study.

706. INSURGENT AS A TARGET

a. Leadership in Insurgencies.--Despite a carefully cultivated public image as a "people's army," insurgent movements require forceful and determined leadership at all levels. It is precisely this leadership which constitutes both the greatest strength and the most serious potential vulnerability of the movement. In a strictly regimented hierarchy, where subordinates are confined to the role of "followers," the leader becomes the driving force which provides impetus and direction to the activities of the unit. He is the only member of the unit privy to the decisions and plans of the next senior element. The activities of his subordinates are dependent upon his directions. Armed or unarmed, whatever its function, the unit depends upon its leader in all operational matters. If the leader can be removed by any means, this function will be severely disrupted, and the unit becomes susceptible to friendly action during the time required for a new leader to emerge. Intelligence activities directed at identifying and removing insurgent leadership can thus be seen as a potentially highly profitable endeavor. While admittedly difficult, such activities have been successfully conducted in the past, and have proven extremely detrimental to the hostile force against which they were directed.

b. Leadership Characteristics in Insurgencies.--Not surprisingly, the same leadership qualities which make a successful Marine officer or NCO, play an important role in the personality of insurgent leaders. Such qualities as moral and physical courage, loyalty, force, initiative, and judgment are universal among leaders in many fields. In addition, the insurgent leader will very likely possess other character traits that will suit the peculiar conditions of his activities.
1. He is a highly motivated and dedicated believer in the cause which he serves.

2. While his education level may vary widely among others of his kind, he is highly intelligent.

3. He is a strong, forceful individual, who can be said to "walk on his hind legs."

4. Within the doctrine of his belief, he is very flexible and persistent, always seeking a means to accomplish his objective.

5. Emotional stability and mental alertness invariably mark his personality.

c. Insurgent Leadership Background.—Just as certain character traits mark the insurgent leader, so do conditions peculiar to the nature of insurgencies mark his background and manifest themselves in his activities.

1. While he is a member of an illegal organization, he almost always maintains a legal identity and status.

2. In many cases, he has a personal grievance against the existing power structure, which quite often may be fully documented in official files.

3. The nature of his position as a leader requires him to be an active recruiter.

4. He has a unique mission and does not function in insurgent areas other than his own. In this respect, his associates are generally those with an identical, or closely related, mission.

5. While he is native to the area, his technical and ideological training is often received outside the area.

6. He faces significant problems in arriving at plausible reasons for his absences from his legal identity occasioned by his illegal activities.
801. GENERAL

a. The primary purpose for employment of Marine Corps forces in a counterinsurgency role is to assist the host country in preserving its internal security by combating subversion, lawlessness, and insurgent forces. Military operations in support of area security are directed to that ultimate end. The procedures, characteristics, and techniques involved in planning conventional operations apply, but consideration must be given to the following:

(1) The concurrent participation of diversified forces, including host country regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, and nonmilitary agencies, requires close and continuous cooperation between all forces involved. A coordinate body whose membership is composed as indicated in paragraph 613b(5) is essential to ensure the necessary degree of cooperation.

(2) The complex nature of counterguerrilla operations requires maximum attention to detail in planning at all levels of command.

(3) The normal guerrilla characteristic of initiating combat, only at a time and place of his choosing, tends to cause unforeseen contingencies. Therefore, plans must be very flexible and responsive to cope with the unexpected and make the most effective use of forces available.

b. This section covers operations and techniques to extend area security, operations against base camps and other sanctuaries, and operations to prevent internal support.
802. PLANNING IN AREA SECURITY

a. General

(1) Normal principles of command and staff action apply in a counterinsurgency situation; however, operations in area security emphasize economic, political, sociological, and psychological considerations to a much greater degree.

(2) The establishment of strict population control within the operating area is required. Positive control is essential in order to isolate guerrilla elements from each other, the local population, and support from external sources.

(3) The establishment of an effective intelligence system is mandatory. In addition to organic landing force intelligence personnel, there will normally be numerous friendly intelligence agents operating within the local area. Examples of agencies which can be expected to furnish intelligence assistance are the host country regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and the United States Country Team. In order to gain a meaningful exchange of information, representatives of all friendly agencies must participate in the formation of a combined operations intelligence center. The nature of the enemy and the requirement for detailed information of the area and its civil population will require additional landing force intelligence and counterintelligence personnel. (See sec. 7.)

(4) Specific strengths and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be determined so that operations will minimize the former and exploit the latter. The strengths of the guerrilla force include motivation, knowledge of the area, irregular tactics characterized by surprise, mobility, and offensive action. Weaknesses include dependence on a crude supply system and support from the civil population, and a lack of rapid communications, air support, and heavy weapons. The lack of sophisticated combat support and service support elements must not result in underrating the guerrilla force. His weaknesses can be offset to a large degree by intense motivation and good leadership.

(5) The traditional principles of war apply equally to counter-guerrilla operations. However, the unique nature of guerrilla warfare creates a condition where several of the principles may work to the enemy's advantage and go to him by default if special precautions are not taken. The most rigidly applied principle is that of the offensive; constant pressure must be maintained on the guerrilla force. The guerrilla attempts to achieve mass, economy of force, and surprise by fighting only when it is to his advantage to do so at a place and time of his choosing. The landing force can offset this tactic by use of the offensive and by practicing the principles of security, mass, and economy of force to its own advantage. The landing force will be required to defend more fixed installations than will the guerrilla. In order to offset this disadvantage, installations must be situated on the best possible defensive terrain for the purpose of economy of force in making combat troops available to participate in offensive operations and reducing the number needed solely for static defense. Unity of command is carefully observed between the landing force, host country armed forces, and civil agencies. A maneuver capability advantage over the guerrilla is largely achieved by helicopter and vehicular movement. However, weather, terrain, and road conditions can quickly reduce this advantage; therefore, infantry must be unburdened and physically
capable of outdistancing the enemy. Although the overall operation is complex, simplicity, particularly in planning, is observed at the lowest echelons. Unlike conventional warfare, objectives are seldom related to geographic features; in counterguerrilla operations, the primary objective is destruction of the guerrilla force.

(6) The organization of the area and the organization of forces are interrelated problems that require particular attention in planning. The area of operations is subdivided into geographic areas or areas coinciding with internal political subdivisions. Specific areas of responsibility are assigned to subordinate forces capable of conducting independent counterguerrilla operations within their area from a base or bases established within or adjacent to the area. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the terrain, the civilian attitude, the guerrilla activity, and the estimated size of the guerrilla force. Organization will usually require the forming of battalion size task forces assigned to an area of responsibility.

(7) The extreme dispersion of units in operations against guerrilla forces places a heavy demand on communication means. Augmentation by communication personnel and equipment is usually required.

(8) Planners for any military operation by the landing force in a host country must consider "rules of engagement." These are defined in JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as "Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered." The impact of the rules of engagement on operations can be considerable. However, none of the rules of engagement shall be construed to inhibit the inherent right of the landing force to defend itself against hostile action from any source. They reflect political considerations of United States commitment in the host country area and are intended to reduce noncombat personnel and property losses which would be counterproductive to the ultimate objective. Therefore, restraints not normally encountered in conventional warfare may be imposed. Examples of restrictions or requirements which could be imposed by rules of engagement are as follows:

(a) Restrictions on fires in populated areas or across political or international boundaries.

(b) Restrictions on crossing political or international boundaries even when in "hot pursuit."

(c) Requirements to warn the civilian populace of impending operations or airstrikes with due regard to security and success of the mission.

(d) Requirement to coordinate operations with host country civil authorities.

(e) Requirement to employ indigenous military, paramilitary, or police in the search of populated areas and private dwellings.

b. Specific Considerations.--Planning for area security operations requires a detailed estimate of the situation in which close attention is given to both the civil (political, economic, and social) and the military
situations. The following specific factors are considered in the commander's estimate:

(1) **Terrain and Weather**

(a) Suitability of terrain and road net for both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

(b) Existence of possible guerrilla bases.

(c) Effect of weather and seasons of the year on both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

(2) **Inhabitants**

(a) Loyalty of various segments of the population to the enemy and their morale, strength or will to resist, and willingness to undergo hardship. Particular attention is given to the following:

1. Farmers and other rural dwellers.
2. Criminals and disorderly elements.
3. Persons known to adhere to the ideologies of the guerrillas.
4. Former members of armed forces.
5. All persons with strong leadership capabilities or tendencies.
6. Neutral groups which, for whatever reason, support neither side in the conflict.

(b) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in guerrilla force and guerrilla support activities.

(c) Size and proportion of population likely to support our forces.

(d) Relative susceptibility of various elements of the population to enemy and/or friendly propaganda.

(e) Knowledge of the attitudes, customs, and traditions of the indigenous population.

(3) **Guerrilla Resources.**—The resources available to the guerrilla force, including the following:

(a) The capability of the area to furnish food.

(b) The capability of insurgent support operations to circumvent government efforts to control the harvest, storage, and distribution of food and material.

(c) The availability of water and fuels.
(d) The availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other supplies.

(4) **Sponsoring Power.**—Guerrilla force relations with any external sponsoring power, including the following:

(a) Direction and coordination of guerrilla activities.
(b) Communications with the guerrilla force.
(c) Capability to send organizers and supplies to the area.

(5) **Guerrilla Organization.**—The organization of existing guerrilla forces and their activities, including the following:

(a) Origin and development.
(b) Strength, morale, and status of training.
(c) Personality of the leaders.
(d) Relations with the civil populace.
(e) Effectiveness of organization and unit of command.
(f) Status of equipment and supplies.
(g) Effectiveness of communications.
(h) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence.

(6) **Friendly Forces.**—The size and composition of friendly forces available for operations against the guerrillas, including the following:

(a) Our forces.
(b) Other military units available in the area if needed.
(c) Civil police, militia, and self-defense units.

**803. RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE**

In a guerrilla environment, measures must be taken to safeguard troops, installations, bases, population, and lines of communication. The scope of guerrilla activity threatens all elements of the military and paramilitary as well as the civil populace. The characteristics, capabilities, and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be constantly studied to determine security requirements. Vigilance and sound security measures will not only minimize interference with operations, but will tend to discourage guerrilla activity. Tactics used against guerrillas are designed to seize the initiative from him and ultimately destroy him. Defensive measures alone result in an ever-increasing commitment, dissipate forces, and give the guerrilla an opportunity to unify, train, and develop his communications and logistic support. A defensive attitude also permits the guerrilla to concentrate superior forces, inflict severe casualties, and lower morale. However, the deliberate use of a defensive attitude in a local area as a deceptive measure may prove effective. Constant pressure
is maintained against guerrilla elements by vigorous combat patrolling and continuing attacks until they are eliminated.

a. **Reconnaissance**

(1) An aggressive program of ground reconnaissance must be conducted in an effort to find guerrilla elements. Agents and other reports of movement and guerrilla location can be used as a basis for determining the areas to be covered by fixed and moving ground reconnaissance units. Particular attention should be paid to coverage of suspected enemy safety zones, supply and ammunition caches, and training areas.

(2) Two general concepts of reconnaissance patrol operations should be considered. The first is the patrol operating within artillery and naval gunfire range; the second is the patrol operating in the far reaches of the area beyond friendly artillery and naval gunfire support. These two types of reconnaissance patrols can accommodate the variety of missions required in the total effort. Although they differ in several ways, the mission of the first within the artillery fan is to strike the enemy, while that of the second outside the fan is to observe him.

(a) **Within Artillery Fan.**—The size of this patrol depends on expected enemy contact. The patrol is armed according to the terrain, size of the patrol, probability of contact, and amount and type of readily available fire support. It consists of a team leader, assistant team leader, medical corpsmen, and any special personnel necessary to accomplish the mission. The patrol is heavily armed and organic arms are supplemented with weapons capable of sustaining heavy enemy contact. Artillery is continuously available and provides constant support, particularly during periods of poor visibility and when other means of support are not available.

(b) **Outside Artillery Fan.**—The concept for this type patrol is one of secrecy and stealth. It is a much smaller patrol than the above type, and it is armed only with essential weapons, ammunition, and equipment. A patrol of this sort should be particularly oriented towards, and consequently equipped for, the maintenance of good radio communications.

b. **Surveillance**

(1) Surveillance is an indispensable part of operations against guerrilla elements. Great care must be exercised, however, in order that surveillance activities do not alert the enemy and warn him of forthcoming operations. Extensive use is made of aerial surveillance using all types of sensors, with means of speedy exploitation of the interpreted results of such coverage.

(2) In populated areas, electronic surveillance devices may be of less value for counterguerrilla operations than against forces in conventional war because of civilian activity. Surveillance may best be accomplished by counterguerrilla forces or civilian-agent surveillance teams using concealed static surveillance sites combined with extensive ground reconnaissance patrolling and aerial observation.

804. SMALL UNIT TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

a. **Applicability.**—Operations against guerrillas are characterized by small unit actions. They are conducted by numerous squads, platoons,
and companies operating continually throughout the guerrilla area. This section contains the tactics and techniques employed by these units. It discusses establishing a patrol base, patrolling, attacking a guerrilla camp, ambush, counterambush action, search procedures, and employment of snipers. See FMFM 1-3B, Sniping; FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon; and FMFM 6-5, Marine Rifle Squad, for additional details on special tactics and techniques.

b. Patrolling.--Operations against guerrillas include patrols by small units widely dispersed to find, fix, and destroy small enemy units. In counterguerrilla operations, the fundamentals of patrolling are generally the same as in conventional operations; however, patrolling will be more extensive and will frequently be the principal combat activity of small units. The following general concepts are employed:

(1) The requirement for extensive and reliable means of communication.

(2) Continuous, extensive patrolling by small, mobile units moving by foot, vehicle, air, or water operating both day and night. The following should be considered:

(a) The common lack of detailed information concerning the guerrilla force and terrain.

(b) The requirement to assign patrol areas rather than precise routes.

(c) The increased time for patrols to cover assigned areas (or routes).

(d) The difficulty and undesirability of controlling patrols by means of a detailed time schedule.

(e) The requirement for assigning patrol missions which provide flexibility to act on information gained during the patrol.

(f) The increased difficulty in reinforcing and supporting patrols.

(g) The need for careful coordination with host country forces to avoid mutual mistaken identity between friendly patrols.

(h) The requirement for extensive training due to the long, arduous nature of patrolling under primitive conditions.

(i) The area of patrol operations must be delineated and plotted at the battalion fire support coordination center (FSCC). Supporting fires requested for the patrol area must have clearance approval of the patrol leader. The foregoing requires positive communications and training on the small unit level in the use of supporting arms.

c. Patrol Bases.--To cover the entire area of operations, it is usually necessary to establish temporary patrol bases some distance from the parent bases. Temporary patrol bases are established by company or smaller units and are occupied for a few days or less. Planning for patrol bases should be detailed, including individual actions to be taken while
the base is being established. FM 21-75, Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling, includes a suggested detailed step-by-step occupation of a platoon sized patrol base. Generally, the procedure is as follows:

(1) The forces to occupy the patrol bases do not enter the site until it has been scouted and the site checked for suitability.

(2) Upon entering the patrol base site, forces immediately form a perimeter defense, dispatch local patrols around the perimeter, establish outpost/listening posts, and dig in.

(3) Security is paramount at all times. Movement within the bases is held to a minimum, silent signals are used to alert personnel, and smoke from cooking fires is strictly controlled. Other passive and active security measures are carried out.

d. Counterambush and Immediate Action Drills.--In planning for defense against ambush, initially the available forces must be considered. The small unit leader responsible for moving a unit independently through areas where ambush is likely plans for the following:

(1) **Formation.**--A dismounted unit employs a formation which provides for all-round security en route. The interval is dependent upon terrain, visibility, unit size, and means of control, and it is great enough to allow each element to deploy when contact is made. Firepower must be evenly distributed. If troops are motorized, tactical unit integrity is maintained.

(2) **March Security.**--Security to the front, rear, and flanks is necessary whether the unit is on foot or motorized. A security element is placed well forward of the main body with adequate radio or pyrotechnical communications. The security element is strong enough to sustain itself until followup units can be deployed to assist in countering the ambush. However, if not detected, the enemy may allow the security element to pass unmolested in order to attack the main body. If this occurs, the security element attacks the ambush position from the flanks or rear in conjunction with the main action. Flank security elements are placed out on terrain features adjacent to the route of march. They move forward either by alternate or successive bounds, if the terrain permits. This is often difficult because of ruggedness of the terrain and the lack of transportation or communications. The alternative is to move adjacent to the column along routes paralleling the direction of march. Rear security is handled like frontal security, and plans are made for the rear guard to assist in countering the ambush, either by envelopment or by supporting fire. Aircraft flying reconnaissance and surveillance missions above the column increase security. If the column is ambushed, attack aircraft can provide support. Communications between these elements is a must.

(3) **Communications and Control.**--All available means of communication are used to assist in control with march objectives and phase lines being employed as required. Communications with security elements is mandatory.

(4) **Special Equipment.**--Additional items of equipment and weapons, such as engineer tools, mine detectors, and demolition equipment, are often necessary. Panel sets or smoke grenades are required for identifying the ambush to aircraft.
(5) Action If Ambushed.—There is no single, generally accepted, immediate action for foot troops when ambushed. Adherence to the principle of security in avoiding an ambush is easier than escape from one. When ambushed, violent and concerted reaction is required to prevent annihilation. Small units must have a prearranged plan, known to every man, that allots a specific immediate action to each individual in accordance with his location and function in the formation. Specific techniques and information concerning immediate action drills are contained in FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon.

(6) Reorganization.—The reorganization after an ambush involves assembly points and plans for security. Care is taken to minimize the possibility of the enemy pressing the attack during this period. All personnel, equipment, and supplies are assembled. If reorganization is impossible because of enemy action, it is accomplished after reinforcements arrive.

e. Ambushes and Layouts

(1) Ambush is highly effective in conventional operations but is even more suitable and effective in counterguerrilla operations because:

(a) It forces the guerrilla to engage in decisive combat at unfavorable times and places.

(b) It denies the guerrilla the freedom of movement on which his success so greatly depends.

(c) It deprives the guerrilla of weapons, ammunition, and equipment that is difficult to replace.

(d) The death or capture of key personnel weakens the guerrilla force.

(2) An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon an enemy who is either moving or temporarily halted. It is normally executed in terrain which restricts movement, such as trails, roads, bridges, stream crossings, and similar areas. The terrain must afford concealment to the ambushing unit. The key to success in the conduct of an ambush is surprise. The ambush is characterized by violent action. Proper intelligence, planning, and coordination are necessary. Planning must first consider if the ambush is a deliberate ambush or an ambush of opportunity. The primary difference between these ambushes is that the deliberate ambush is a specific action planned against a specific target, whereas the ambush of opportunity attacks the first suitable target passing through the planned ambush site. Specific techniques to be employed in the various type ambushes are contained in FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon; FMFM 6-5, Marine Rifle Squad; and FM 21-75, Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling.

f. Attacking Guerrilla Houses and Camps

(1) Attacking Houses.—In planning an attack:

(a) Secrecy is essential. Relatives, sympathizers, or intimidated locals can warn the enemy of the patrol's approach.
(b) The location of the house and the nature of the terrain surrounding it are determined by ground or aerial reconnaissance, sketch, photo, or guide.

(c) The patrol normally approaches and occupies its position during darkness.

(d) The patrol is no larger than required to carry out the mission. A large patrol is hard to control, difficult to conceal, and may make too much noise.

(e) The approach is made quietly and cautiously. Barking dogs and other animals often warn the inhabitants.

(f) All available cover is used.

(g) All avenues of escape are covered either physically or by fire.

(h) If the mission is to capture the occupants and armed resistance is expected, the patrol is located so that every side of the building is covered by fire.

(2) Attacking Camps.--Many of the instructions for attacking houses are applicable to attacking camps.

(a) A guide who knows the exact location of the camp is used.

(b) The guide makes a sketch of the camp and its approaches.

(c) The trail is left as soon as it is convenient, and the camp is approached from an unexpected direction, slowly and cautiously.

(d) Normally, the patrol is split into two or more groups. One group attacks the camp while others cover the main avenues of withdrawal.

(e) After sighting the camp, the leader makes a careful reconnaissance.

(f) When the patrol is in position and prepared to open fire, the leader orders the enemy to surrender. In the event of refusal, the leader opens fire. All men direct their fire into the guerrilla camp.

(g) Search Procedure.--Specific procedures and techniques for conducting searches is contained in FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon. The ability to seize and search a village can result in the capture of guerrillas, reduce their effectiveness, and encourage the cooperation of the local population. However, authority for search operations must be carefully reviewed. There will usually be special laws regulating the search and seizure powers of military forces, both of the landing force and the host country. Abusive or inconsiderate police and search methods may temporarily suppress the guerrilla movement, but at the same time, it may increase the civilian population’s sympathy for and support of the guerrillas. The objective, therefore, is to develop methods of capturing or killing guerrillas in a friendly or neutral village without alienating or harming
residents or damaging their property. The following general information is applicable to search operations:

(1) Operations should be a combination of military, governmental, civil action, and psychological operations designed to reestablish or reaffirm host country control over the people.

(2) Operations are designed to ferret out the guerrilla from his hiding place while refraining from actions which alienate the populace and, at the same time, capitalize on the opportunity to convince the inhabitants of the merits of the host country through vigorous civil affairs and psychological operations.

(3) Operations should stress the role of the local police, civil government, and host country armed forces, and restrict landing force participation to the isolation (cordonning) of the village itself and the combat of organized enemy military opposition, should it develop. The people must be favorably impressed with the sincerity of purpose and efficiency of the forces involved and left with the impression that the host government is concerned for their welfare and can provide protection from the guerrilla.

(4) After screening, procedures should be established for villagers to attend psychological operations presentations which can include newsreels, propaganda movies, news broadcasts, taped messages, newspapers, etc. Effort should be made to present this program as "entertainment" to make the propaganda message more palatable. Inhabitants are given necessary medical treatment and inoculations. Field galley equipment should be provided to prepare meals for those villages dislocated by the operation or who are otherwise unable to prepare or provide food. Supplemental staples such as rice, canned chicken or fish soup, salt, etc., should be available for distribution. Host country officials, both civil and military, should be utilized in all contact with the populace while landing force personnel assist only when required.

(5) Consideration must be given to delaying or terminating operations when it is apparent that uncontrollable factors (weather, strong guerrilla resistance, etc.) will produce an adverse psychological effect on the populace. The most prudent course of action is to recognize that the operation should be terminated while a favorable impression still exists.

h. Employment of Snipers

(1) Sniper teams have a unique ability for employment against guerrillas. Their capability of single-shot kills at long ranges can have adverse psychological effects on guerrillas out of proportion to the effort involved. Specific techniques concerning use and employment of snipers are contained in FMFP 1-3B, Sniping.

(2) Appropriate methods of employment for sniper teams in counter-guerrilla operations are as follows:

(a) As outpost security.

(b) As providers of long-range protection for patrols.

(c) As part of ambushes.
(d) As providers of long-range covering fire for advancing units.
(e) As part of blocking forces.
(f) As part of force covering avenues of approach, particularly on unit boundaries.
(g) As providers of long-range fire on roads and other lines of communication to prevent mining and sapper activity.

(3) Certain of the principal limitations of sniper teams are as follows:

(a) Effectiveness is reduced in heavy jungle growth, high grass, or during adverse weather conditions.
(b) Snipers cannot react swiftly with a high volume of fire. This dictates that sniper teams not be utilized in positions requiring automatic weapons such as on the point of a combat patrol.
(c) Snipers must work in teams in order to observe the results of shots and to quickly adjust subsequent rounds.

(4) Effective use can be made of sniper teams at night by employment of the various available night observation devices. In addition, the sniper weapon and telescope assembly, when used in coordination with the xenon tank-mounted searchlight, can extend ranges to 800 meters. One technique is to position the sniper in the loader's seat in the tank. The turret is traversed with the infrared light turned on, allowing the sniper to keep his weapon aligned with the light. With a properly zeroed rifle, first-round hits are possible at maximum ranges.

(5) Sniper weapons must be periodically rotated back to an appropriate maintenance facility to check the zero and make any required repairs. In adverse temperature and humidity conditions, it may be necessary to do this every 2 weeks.

805. POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL

Any populace and resource control program has the basic objective of isolating the guerrilla force from the resources and the population of the assigned area. It must be designed to complement and support other counter-guerrilla operations and to contribute to the overall stability of the host country. To the maximum extent possible, control of the population and resources should be performed by host country agencies. Landing force participation could range from very minor support in the countryside to complete control within the confines of U.S. bases. In any event, the program must be coordinated with host country civil and military authorities.

a. Control Measures.--Control measures are established as a joint civil/military effort and may include the following tasks:

(1) Checkpoint and patrol operations.
(2) Search operations.
(3) Surveillance.
(4) Apprehension of guerrilla sympathizers.
(5) Prevention of illegal political meetings and rallies.
(6) Registration and documentation of all civilians.
(7) Inspection of individual identification documents, permits, and passes.
(8) Restrictions on public and private transportation and communication means.
(9) Curfew.
(10) Censorship.
(11) Control of production, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs, and protection of food producing areas.
(12) Control of the possession of arms, ammunition, demolitions, drugs, medicine, and money.
(13) Evacuation of areas, as required.

b. Extent of Control.—The extent of control imposed upon the civilian populace depends on the degree of cooperation by the population within the assigned area. Rigid control will often be required if the populace is collaborating with guerrilla forces. Under certain conditions, the rural population may be concentrated by relocation in protected villages. The potential loss in good will should be balanced carefully against the probable increase in security before deciding to relocate villagers.

806. SECURITY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION

a. General.—In counterguerrilla operations, the security of lines of communication is of paramount importance. Adequate security is not simply a matter of the number of personnel involved, but results from special training, sound movement procedures, and a general awareness of the magnitude of the problem. The following paragraphs describe procedures for improving the security of communication means, air, land, and inland water movement:

(1) Security of Information.—Maximum precautions are taken to prevent guerrillas from gaining advance information of movements. It should be remembered that:
   (a) Telephone systems are seldom secure.
   (b) Radio messages in the clear are easily intercepted.
   (c) Loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed.
   (d) Information concerning movement timing, routes, and composition should be furnished on a need-to-know basis. Personnel should be briefed as late as is feasible.
   (e) Plans should include alternate routes and deception measures.
(2) **Convoy Standing Operating Procedures (SOP's).**--Detailed SOP's should be established to cover:
   
   (a) Duties of convoy and vehicle commanders.
   (b) Organization of the convoy.
   (c) Weapons and ammunition to be carried.
   (d) Preparation of the vehicles.
   (e) Immediate action drills.
   (f) Security measures.

(3) **Road Security Classification.**--The road systems may be classified as indicated below to identify the existing degree of control:

   (a) Red roads are those considered to be in the combat area and subject to ambush or interference.

   (b) Yellow roads are those where there is a very limited risk of guerrilla ambush.

   (c) Green roads are those which lie within city limits and such other roads designated by responsible headquarters as requiring no special measures concerning convoy movement.

(4) **Preparation of Vehicles.**--Personnel traveling in vehicles must have all-round observation and fields of fire and be able to throw or fire grenades without hindrance. They must be able to debark rapidly; therefore, vehicles cannot be loaded to administrative capacity. Consideration should be given to altering the configuration of vehicles. Examples of measures to prepare vehicles for counterambush action are as follows:

   (a) Canvas, bows, and wooden sideboards removed.
   (b) Windshields and tailgates down or removed.
   (c) Sandbags reinforced by scrap armorplate on the floorboards and bed of the vehicle.
   (d) Chicken wire over open windows to repel grenades.

(5) **Use of Armored Vehicles.**--Armored vehicles must be positioned within convoys where they can best react to ambushes and not be blocked by halted vehicles. An armored vehicle can be a mobile command post for the convoy commander. When large convoys move on main roads, vehicles should be divided into blocks of about five or six. When sufficient armor is available, one vehicle should be placed with each block. For vehicle convoys, the inclusion of armored vehicles has two important effects on ambush action:

   (a) Provides covering fire for the counterattack.

   (b) Provides protection in the ambush by moving into the danger area and closely engaging the enemy.
(6) Security Measure Requirements By Road Security Classification.--The special security requirements for vehicular traffic will vary dependent upon the degree of clearance existing in the area to be traveled.

(a) Red Roads

1. All personnel armed, and each military vehicle will contain at least one armed man other than the driver.

2. Night travel restricted to operational necessity.


4. Administrative convoys should be escorted by armored vehicles whenever possible.

5. Interval between vehicles should be sufficiently close to allow mutual assistance but not so close that an ambush is likely to include several vehicles.

6. Convoys should always be escorted by troops.

7. Whenever possible, helicopter or other observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance and to assist in convoy control.

(b) Yellow Roads

1. Armored escort vehicle not essential.

2. All personnel will be armed.

3. Convoys of up to 10 vehicles will move at normal interval and in blocks.

(c) Green Roads.--There are no special measures concerning the movement of convoys.

(7) Precautionary Tactics.--Troops may disembark to check any likely ambush areas before the convoy moves through. This tactic is unlikely to uncover an ambush unit, but it may cause the enemy to abandon the ambush. Examination on the ground of likely ambush positions will make the guerrilla less confident of his ability to execute an ambush without danger to himself.

b. Protection of Railroads and Trains

(1) Operation of Railroads.--Railroads may be civilian operated, military and civilian combined, or military alone. In any event, liaison and protective measures must be established.

(2) Train Guards

(a) Train guards may be military police or other troops assigned to the duty.

(b) The guard force should have communications with supporting units in the event of ambush.
(3) **Security Measures.--**Examples of security measures which may be taken for rail movements are:

(a) Trains should run on irregular schedules.

(b) Security elements should precede and follow trains.

(c) Locomotives should be preceded by two or more flat cars loaded with sand, rocks, or scrap material for protection against mines, rail cuts, and obstructions.

(d) Armored trains for patrolling track where guerrilla activity may be expected are employed.

(e) On a single-track rail division subject to guerrilla attack, use the positive-block method of operation. In this method, a following train is not permitted to enter a block until the preceding train has cleared it. This permits the train in the block, if attacked, to back up if necessary, and reinforcements can be provided to the ambushed element by rail from either direction.

(f) Critical installations such as tunnels, bridges, and stations are guarded.

(g) Vegetation surrounding possible ambush sites is cleared.

(h) Air reconnaissance may be conducted over the route to be traveled.

c. **Protection of Inland Water Movement**

(1) **Concept.--**Waterways movement of troops and supplies is planned and conducted in much the same manner as are convoy movements on land; however, special characteristics of water transportation means must be considered.

(2) **Organization.--**When a waterborne force moves, it adopts a formation similar to a ground convoy. Advance and rear guards are organized, moving in boats. Flank security may be provided by patrols moving in adjacent streams or by foot on the banks. The selection of a formation is dependent on the purpose of the movement, the enemy strength, and the width of the stream. It is based on the same considerations as those which apply to contact formations on land, to include security, flexibility, speed of reaction, observation, and fields of fire.

(3) **Operations.--**The waterway itself may be devoid of cover and concealment resulting in a situation where boats may be seen and fired on easily in daylight. This disadvantage can be reduced by night movement and by traveling close to streambanks where shadow and overhead branches may aid concealment. The disadvantage is the possibility of encountering a point-blank ambush. As convenient landing sites are often not available, transported troops should be assigned firing positions for ambush defense with the maximum number of crew served weapons positioned to fire on both banks.

(4) **Security Measures**

(a) Critical points along rivers and waterways should be guarded with points offering favorable ambush sites cleared of vegetation.
(b) Irregular scheduling of movement should be emphasized to negate establishing traffic patterns.

(c) Automatic weapons should be mounted on all craft.

(d) Armored amphibious vehicles should be used as escorts.

(e) Adequate communication means should be provided for each craft.

(f) Waterway patrols should be conducted in fast, heavily armed craft.

(g) Air patrolling of the waterways should be conducted continuously.

807. COMBINED OPERATIONS

a. General.—Combined operations are defined as operations conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. Landing force operations must be conducted in a coordinated campaign with host country, allied, and other U.S. military and civilian agencies, to defeat the insurgent forces and restore internal security. Normally, the U.S. and host country will jointly prepare a combined plan to establish objectives, priorities, expected progress, missions, and tasks. Landing force commanders must ensure that plans and operations are coordinated with counterpart host country commands down to the lowest possible action level to ensure that desired objectives are achieved.

b. Conduct and Coordination.—Commanders must constantly seek opportunities to improve the combat capability of host country forces and enhance their prestige. Plans and operations should be developed in coordination with host country forces. Commanders of the landing force should establish personal liaison with their counterparts, exchanging estimates of the situation and reviewing their own operations and those of the landing force. Commanders must constantly strive to achieve a spirit of mutual cooperation with host country forces. Examples of measures to be emphasized are as follows:

(1) Conduct of coordinated, combined small unit actions consistent with communication and interpreter limitations.

(2) Planning and delivery of landing force supporting fires in support of host country operations and area defense.

(3) Development of combined SOP's based on experience gained during operations.

(4) Development of landing force training programs for paramilitary forces within TAOR's.

(5) Conduct of cordon and search operations where the landing force assumes responsibility for the cordon and exterior patrolling while the host country forces are responsible for interior searching and screening.
808. REACTION OPERATIONS

A mobile reaction force is located at each combat base and is organized and equipped to rapidly engage reported guerrilla forces or reinforce other friendly forces. The reaction force is of any size consistent with the tactical requirements and the resources of the commander, and it is capable of rapid movement by foot or vehicle, water or air. As the guerrilla force will often use attacks on small outposts or installations as ruses to draw the reaction force into a well prepared deliberate ambush, care must be taken in selecting routes and means of transportation. The conduct of operations is as follows:

a. When a guerrilla force is located, the reaction force deploys rapidly to engage and destroy it. If the guerrilla force cannot be contained and destroyed, contact is maintained, reinforcements are requested if needed, and the guerrillas are pursued. Reaction operations will often consist primarily of a pursuit. In such cases, efforts are made to envelop and cut off the retreating guerrillas. Once the escape route has been blocked, the attack is continued to destroy the guerrilla force. The mobility required to envelop and block is provided by helicopters, vehicles, or accelerated foot movement.

b. Throughout counterguerrilla operations, commanders at all echelons continually locate possible targets at which the guerrilla might strike and prepare plans for decisive reaction. Guerrilla targets might include important road and railroad junctions, desolate stretches of road and railroad, bridges, key military and police installations, civilian communities, public utilities, public gathering places, and homes of important persons. Reaction plans for such situations are simple, prepared in detail, and rehearsed. To be effective, these plans must be based on the best possible intelligence of the area and the enemy force. Potential guerrilla targets should be carefully reconnoitered. To facilitate reaction to a guerrilla attack on such targets, each target and rendezvous point near the target are assigned a code identification. Whenever possible, helicopter landing zones or truck release points are used as rendezvous points. By use of a code designation for the potential target and rendezvous points, orders to the reaction force can be simplified.

c. Since guerrilla forces are most active during the hours of darkness, reaction forces must be prepared to operate under the same conditions.

809. SITE DEFENSE AND STATIC SECURITY

All military and population center site defense is based on the principle of mutual support. Static security posts are defined as any organized system for the protection of fixed military or civil installations and transportation facilities, such as terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. The size of static security posts depends on the mission, the size and characteristics of the guerrilla force, the attitude of the civil population, and the importance of the area being secured. Installations should be mutually supporting, assisting each other until other support or reinforcements arrive. Fire support from artillery and mortars within range of several installations and communities contribute to mutual defense.

a. Organization and Composition.—The organization of static security posts will vary with the size, mission, and distance from reinforcing units.
Reliable communications are established between security posts and combat bases. To maintain tactical integrity of landing force units, maximum use of host country forces should be made, consistent with their capability and reliability. Paramilitary forces and police may be employed in site defense. Every effort must be made to avoid the piecemeal commitment of the landing force to static security duty.

b. Special Considerations

(1) Installations and communities are organized for all-round defense. Patrols and listening posts are employed to prevent surprise.

(2) Since guerrilla attacks are usually initiated from close-in assembly areas, fire planning emphasizes coordinated short-range fires to repel the attack.

(3) Routine defensive means and individual weapon positions must be altered frequently to prevent guerrilla forces from obtaining detailed information about location, composition, and habits of the defenders.

(4) Host country personnel, other than defense forces, must be prohibited from entering defensive positions, except as absolutely required. Those living in the immediate vicinity should be screened and evacuated if necessary.

(5) As a means of countering night attacks, proper illuminating means (to include air and ground flares, artillery and mortar illuminating rounds, searchlights, and all types of improvised illumination means) must be employed in defense of installations and communities.

810. INFRASTRUCTURE ELIMINATION OPERATIONS

The insurgent forces will usually establish an infrastructure which operates in a clandestine manner among the people down to the village and hamlet level.

a. The insurgent infrastructure is attacked best through the people by agents and informants. A primary task is to set up a system which makes it possible to identify every inhabitant of an area and, if desired, keep track of his movements. National registration, which requires issuance of ID cards is the usual procedure. Further, by requiring everyone entering an area to check in and out, the security force can determine who was in the area when a subversive act was committed. Underground agents may attempt to use counterfeit ID cards, ration cards, work permits, travel permits, etc. If the government changes documentary procedures periodically, agents may be caught using out-of-date credentials.

b. Cordon and search operations provide effective assistance in infrastructure elimination operations. Landing force units should provide the exterior security while host country armed forces, police, and civil authorities perform the actual search, screening, and interrogations.

c. In addition to the military, other groups capable of combating the infrastructure include:

(1) Population.—The population can be organized to establish an information net which would provide constant surveillance of all activities
in a given area. A populace based organization such as a self-defense force provides a ready base for organizing such a net.

(2) Police.--The police should be the key force in eliminating the infrastructure. In addition to their normal law and order function, they should be involved in intelligence operations and populace and resource control.

(3) Refugees.--As they have often fled from insurgent controlled areas, refugees may have knowledge of the method of operations employed by the insurgent. They can also participate in self-defense and intelligence collection operations.

(4) Labor and Farmer Organizations.--The common interests of farmers or industrial worker unions or groups can make them a force of importance in area security. As the infrastructure will probably have attempted to contact these groups to subvert them, they could have knowledge of operating methods and specific individuals in the infrastructure.

(5) Paramilitary.--Operations of paramilitary groups commonly include reconnaissance, patrols and ambushes, and population and resource control. Their biggest advantage over conventional military forces is that they are generally natives of the area and intimately familiar with the terrain and populace. The landing force can support these units through training, fire support, and combined operations.

(6) Insurgent Defectors.--Insurgents who have changed their allegiance to the host country government can be of great value in providing information leading to identifying infrastructure members and the method of operation.

811. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

These operations include psychological warfare and, in addition, encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.

a. Psychological Warfare.--This is the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

b. Mission.--In a counterguerrilla warfare situation, the mission of psychological operations is to support combat operations and to assist military and civilian agencies in the control and administration of the area of operations.

c. Responsibilities.--Psychological operations are planned and conducted at all echelons. All personnel participating in operations against guerrillas should have an understanding of the purpose and theme of the psychological operations program supporting the operation. Commanders must maintain liaison with psychological operations agencies at higher echelons and must:

(1) Constantly seek guerrilla psychological vulnerabilities to be exploited.
(2) Plan and conduct psychological operations to provide direct support for combat operations.

(3) Plan and conduct psychological operations to facilitate civilian control, promote civic programs, and enhance the prestige of the duly constituted government.

(4) Assist in the evaluation of psychological operations programs by collecting and forwarding feedback information. Close liaison with intelligence and civic action agencies must be maintained by psychological operations personnel to accomplish this important facet of psychological operations.

(5) Ensure, when possible, that the psychological effects of military operations are favorable. These psychological effects tend to have greater impact than the effects of propaganda. Often the psychological advantage or disadvantage resulting from tactical operations may weigh more heavily on the ultimate outcome of the conflict than the tactical advantage gained or lost. Commanders should always consider the security of the people. All possible restitution should be made for unpreventable damage inflicted by combat.

d. Reference.--FM 33–5, Psychological Operations--Techniques and Procedures, provides detailed psychological operations techniques and guidance for commanders and staff officers. It discusses relationships, capabilities, tactics, and techniques of psychological operations during general, limited, and cold war operations.

e. Psychological Indications.--Psychological indications are those evidences or manifestation of attitudes, whether positive or negative, which may point to the existence of guerrilla or civilian psychological strengths and vulnerabilities capable of being exploited by propaganda. Personnel participating in combat operations against the guerrillas and those in contact with the civil populace must be alert to psychological indications. Essential elements of information (EII) may be announced to assist in the determination of indications. Indications may be vague clues, definite signs, or information pointing to the existence of psychological strengths and vulnerabilities. Examples might be hunger (or lack of hunger) in recently captured guerrillas, obvious resentment against (or respect for) their leaders among prisoners, or worry (or lack of worry) among civilians or captured guerrillas about conditions in the area.

f. Propaganda.--Propaganda is planned and employed in operations against guerrillas to achieve the following:

(1) Demoralize, divide, and disorganize the guerrilla force.

(2) Induce defection of guerrilla force members.

(3) Reduce or eliminate civilian support of the guerrilla force.

(4) Dissuade civilians from participating in covert activities on the side of the guerrilla force.

(5) Win the support of noncommitted civilians.

(6) Preserve and strengthen friendly civilian support.
(7) Win approval for the presence of the military force.

g. Target Audiences.--For purposes of planning and conducting the propaganda program, the population in the area is divided into the following target audiences:

(1) Guerrilla units.
(2) Underground elements.
(3) Civilians sympathetic to the guerrilla; those who provide information, supplies, refuge, and other assistance to the guerrillas and the underground.
(4) Uncommitted civilians.
(5) Civilians sympathetic to the forces operating against the guerrillas.

h. Propaganda Themes.--Propaganda themes are based on recognizable aspects of friendly civil programs and on the following potentially divisive characteristics of target audiences:

(1) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the guerrilla force and civil populace.
(2) Rivalries between guerrilla leaders.
(3) Danger of betrayal.
(4) Harsh living conditions of guerrilla force.
(5) Scarcity of arms and supplies.
(6) Selfish motivation of opportunists and apparent supporters of the guerrilla forces.
(7) Terror tactics and other such practices employed by guerrillas.

i. Techniques.--The use of persuasion, as opposed to direct order, is implicit in most psychological operations techniques. The aim of psychological warfare techniques should be to employ reason, logic, and emotional appeals to persuade the target audiences to adopt a course of action rather than to order it to take such a course of action. When the guerrilla force or its civilian supporters are demoralized, the authoritative approach may be effective.

j. Inducements.--The granting of amnesty and rewards may induce the guerrilla and his civilian supporters to defect from the guerrilla movement.

k. Attitude.--The conduct and attitudes of the individual participant in operations against guerrillas will have a decided psychological influence on the civilian populace and, indirectly, the guerrilla force.

l. Communication Media.--Psychological operations media is the means or channels of communication to the guerrilla force and civil populace.
Media of particular interest to the force conducting operations against guerrillas include the following:

(1) Leaflets and other printed materials are disseminated by artillery, aircraft, patrols, and agents. Depending on the character of the target audience and the purpose of the leaflet, it may be either primarily textual or primarily pictorial. A leaflet is a permanent record of the message to which the reader may refer until it has become impressed upon his mind. Weather and enemy countermeasures may reduce the effectiveness of leaflets; however, surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes have proved valuable in past operations against guerrillas.

(2) Loudspeaker sets mounted on vehicles or aircraft as well as lightweight public address equipment that can be hand carried are employed in close support missions. Loudspeaker appeals may be made from aircraft over areas known or suspected to contain guerrillas. During elimination operations, particularly when an encirclement is achieved, loudspeaker surrender appeals are made to the guerrillas. If effective, such appeals will reduce the number of casualties that would result from stubborn resistance. Loudspeaker appeals should be brief and made in simple, easily understood language. Important phrases should be repeated throughout the appeal for emphasis and clarification. Surrender appeals should always include specific instructions on how to surrender. Loudspeaker messages are particularly effective when used in conjunction with specific combat actions. For example, a message to an encircled force may be an ultimatum prefaced by an artillery barrage and concluding with a threat of redoubled barrage if the ultimatum is not obeyed. Such threats must be kept, and on schedule.

(3) Radio broadcasts beamed toward areas within the effective range of the transmitter form an effective medium to reach both guerrilla and civilian targets. The audience is limited, however, to those who have access to receiving sets of appropriate frequency and who will listen if they can.

(4) Imagination and ingenuity will produce other effective psychological operations media. Examples are: village bulletin boards, periodic newsletters, and face-to-face persuasion by personnel in contact with civilian population.

812. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

a. General.--Military civic action is defined as the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. Civic action is but one of seven activity areas under civil affairs (see NAVMC 2500/FMFM 8-6, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs). Civil affairs deals with a wide variety of functional activities in the government and operates on a larger scale than civic action. This section will deal with civic action only on the local level. For informational purposes, the seven categories of civil affairs activities are:

(1) Civil support of military operations.
(2) Support of, or exercise of, government functions.

(3) Community relations.

(4) Consolidation of psychological operations.

(5) Civic action.

(6) Population and resource control.

(7) Military support of civil defense.

b. Cooperation.--Military civic action should be carried out in cooperation with local civic authorities and agencies. Projects should complement those of other government agencies. The coordinative body delineated in paragraph 613b(5) is an ideal means of determining and coordinating these projects.

c. Criteria for Civic Action Projects.--Projects can range from the execution of individual acts to full scale unit participation in nation-building programs. Although responsibility for civic action in an area of operations is the responsibility of the commander of forces in that area, projects should be closely coordinated with national and state or province level programs. Local circumstances will impose other standards, but these principal guidelines are sound starting points for the planning of projects:

(1) The local leaders of the people are the best source of information on projects needed in their areas, and concentration of effort must be on those projects they consider required. Civic action is most effective when originated by the local people, even though another activity may seem superior to an outsider. To the villager, the choice between a dam producing hydroelectric power and a shortcut path through the fields from his village to the water well is, more often than not, a choice between that which is a dream and that which is practical.

(2) A project must have a fairly short completion time or have phases that provide frequent opportunities to evaluate its effectiveness.

(3) Results should be observable, measurable, or tangible. They should also lend themselves to publicity designed to inspire emulation by other military units and social groups.

d. Operations Related to Civic Action

(1) Modified cordon and search operations can serve a twofold purpose: first, to ferret out the insurgent in the village, and second, to gain the friendship of the people by a coordinated series of a combination of civic action and psychological operations. The basic concept requires that the landing force provide the isolation (cordon) of the village while the host country forces, civil and military, search the village and conduct a vigorous civic action and psychological operations program. This concept is designed to convince the people that the government is effective, that it has concern for the welfare of the people, and that a government victory is inevitable. A sample sequence of events for a modified cordon and search operation is as follows:

(a) Landing force units isolate (cordon) the objective village.
(b) Host country forces enter the village. All villagers are screened to determine their attitude toward the insurgents. Local government authorities request the people to identify all strangers in the village.

(c) Government administrators carefully examine individuals and family identification documents, reissuing if required. The examination is of a "census type" and includes family background information.

(d) Persons with inadequate identification papers or who are otherwise questionable are required to undergo interrogation. Landing force personnel may be available to provide assistance.

(e) After completion of screening, villagers attend psychological operations programs to include newsreels, movies, etc. Every effort is made to present this program as entertainment, thereby making the intended messages more acceptable.

(f) Villagers requiring medical assistance are treated by landing force medical officers and/or host country medical personnel.

(g) Local government officials address the people emphasizing the concern that the government has for the people, the government’s future plans, and the assistance that the people can provide.

(2) Providing medical assistance to the population creates a favorable psychological impact and can be carried out with the assets normally available in most landing force organizations. In addition to providing low-key medical assistance, it can also provide on-the-job training for potential rural health workers. In many instances, this will be the only medical service reaching the masses in rural areas. Medical assistance teams can also serve as an excellent intelligence gathering means.

(3) In addition to medical assistance, limited dental assistance should also be provided. In many underdeveloped countries, especially in rural areas, dental care has never been available. The psychological impact of this care is extremely favorable. Both medical and dental assistance programs should be high on the list of priorities in civic action planning.

e. Combined Action Program.—The host country paramilitary forces are often the only security available in many rural communities. Their effectiveness is essential in providing protection from guerrilla elements and in eliminating the infrastructure. Often, paramilitary units will be poorly trained and equipped. The host country may not have the capability to take necessary action to improve this situation. A solution to the problem is, with host country agreement, to combine and integrate landing force units with paramilitary forces into combined action units within selected villages and hamlets. This concept integrates Marine and host country paramilitary forces on a cooperative basis for an indefinite period.

(1) The objectives of combined action units are to motivate and train paramilitary force personnel, to instill pride in units at the village and hamlet level to enhance psychological operations and civic action activities, and when the above is accomplished, to eventually withdraw landing force elements with the paramilitary force performing and assuming full defense responsibilities. The mission of the combined action unit should be to provide hamlet and village security in cleared and semicleared areas. Methods of accomplishing the mission are as follows:
(a) Conducting patrols and ambushes.
(b) Training the paramilitary forces.
(c) Gathering intelligence.
(d) Conducting civic action within the village and hamlet.
(e) Maintaining law and order where no other law enforcement agency exists.

(2) The combined action unit organization should follow the paramilitary organization in which the platoon is normally the largest tactical unit on the village/hamlet level. The ratio of paramilitary personnel to Marines should be at least two to one with the Marine element consisting of a squad plus one corpsman. Command relationships within the platoon should be on a coordination and cooperation basis. The Marine squad leader does not command the paramilitary element of the platoon or vice versa. The role of the Marine in the platoon is that of an advisor. On all operations, the advisory role should be maintained whenever possible with maximum paramilitary participation encouraged.

(3) Each combined action unit must engage in a vigorous military civic action program stressing "self help" by the villages. Projects should be short term, high impact, and low cost. All projects should be coordinated with the village chief to ensure maximum utility and benefit. The assigned corpsman provides medical treatment to the people within his capabilities.

(4) The Marine combined action unit element withdrawal must be by mutual agreement with appropriate host country authorities. Factors to be considered when recommending withdrawal from a village are as follows:

(a) Military necessity and enemy threat.
(b) Combat effectiveness of the paramilitary unit to include their state of training, adequate arms, organization, motivation, loyalty, and willingness to support the host country government.
(c) Level of pacification within the village to include status of the insurgent infrastructure.

d. Examples of Civic Action Projects.--The need for many civic action projects is obvious; e.g., medical care, but other opportunities exist which are not so striking in their need. Examples of civic action projects are listed below; these should be considered to be representative and are not all inclusive:

(1) Public Health and Sanitation

(a) Civic action medical teams composed of doctors and/or corpsmen treat disease and injuries and dispense vitamins, worm pills, and other medication. Corpsmen should be used as much as possible in the civic action medical teams and doctors used only in cases requiring their degree of training. Since the training of indigenous health officials is usually and roughly equivalent to that of a corpsman, routine treatment by highly trained doctors can undermine confidence in local workers not so highly trained.
(b) Improving sanitary standards by education, construction of facilities; e.g., showers using barrels, etc., and examples of unit and personal field hygiene.

(c) Devising acceptable methods of disposing of human waste.

(d) Providing safe water supply systems.

(e) Eradicating malaria and other insect-transmitted diseases.

(f) Teaching sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid.

(2) **Agriculture and Natural Resources**

(a) Constructing simple irrigation and drainage systems.

(b) Increasing or improving production of animals, grains, or vegetable food products.

(c) Transporting agricultural produce or seeds.

(d) Clearing land for farming.

(e) Grading and bulldozing operations.

(f) Devising and constructing flood controls.

(g) Protecting harvested crops from guerrilla confiscation to include security during the harvest itself.

(3) **Industry and Communications**

(a) Assessing and developing acceptable sand and gravel resources for road work and general construction.

(b) Constructing housing and other buildings.

(c) Setting up and operating emergency communication centers in time of disaster.

(4) **Transportation**

(a) Constructing, repairing, or improving roads, trails, and bridges.

(b) Constructing, repairing, or improving inland waterways, wharves, and harbors.

(c) Removing individuals from disaster areas.

(5) **Community Development, Social Welfare, and Housing**

(a) Preparing plans, surveying, and supervising construction of houses and community buildings such as schools, civic centers, orphanages, medical centers, etc.
(b) Assisting worthy community projects such as orphanages, schools, and hospitals.

(c) Musical concerts.

813. OPERATIONS TO EXTEND AREA SECURITY

In order to extend area security, operations must be conducted against located guerrilla bases and other sanctuaries. Constant pressure must be maintained against guerrilla elements to keep them on the move, disrupt their security and organization, separate them from their source of support, destroy their morale, and deny them the opportunity to conduct operations. Once contact is made with a guerrilla unit, it is maintained until that unit is destroyed. Surprise is sought in all operations, but against well organized guerrillas, it is difficult to achieve. Surprise may be gained by attacking at night, in bad weather, or in difficult terrain; by employing small units; by varying operations in important particulars; and by unorthodox or unusual operations. Unlike normal combat operations, the capture of terrain often contributes little to the attainment of the objective since, upon departure of friendly forces, the guerrillas will return. Specific objectives are sought which will force the guerrillas to concentrate defensively in unfavorable terrain and which will facilitate the surrender, capture, or destruction of the guerrilla. Those guerrilla elements willing to fight in open battle are isolated and immediately attacked to prevent escape. Guerrilla elements that normally avoid open battle are forced into areas which permit containment. Once fixed in place, they are attacked and destroyed. Examples of combat operations which contribute to the extending of area security are discussed further in the following subparagraphs:

a. Denial (Border Control) Operations

(1) Operations to deny the guerrilla force contact with, and support by, an external sponsoring power are initiated early and conducted concurrently with other operations. Denial operations require effective measures to secure extensive border or seacoast areas and prevent communications and supply operations between a sponsoring power and the guerrilla force.

(2) Border areas are secured by the use of patrols, static security posts, ground and aerial observers, and reaction forces. Since it will not be possible to physically cover all crossing or landing sites, a priority system for those sites requiring military forces must be established. Extensive use must be made of informers and agents. When time and resources permit, wire and other obstacles, minefields, and cleared areas are established along the border. Ground surveillance devices may be used. Interdiction by various fire support means may be employed and, when appropriate, blockade operations by U.S. and host country ships and craft.

(3) The following two operational concepts for the control of extensive land borders may be considered. They are the "restricted zone" and the "friendly population buffer."

(a) Restricted Zone.--This concept involves an area of predetermined width contiguous to the border being declared a restricted zone. Appropriate proclamations are issued so that it is understood that
unidentified individuals or groups encountered in the zone are considered as unfriendly. Insofar as is practicable, the restricted zone is cleared of vegetation and other observation obstacles. On extended borders, a clearance priority is usually necessary. Maximum use is made of ground and aerial observers, electronic sensors, listening posts, patrols, mines, and obstacles. It is preferable that these activities be conducted by host country police and paramilitary forces to economize on regular armed forces which can be better employed in tactical operations.

(b) **Friendly Population Buffer.**—Under this concept, the civilian population of the area of operations is redistributed as necessary to ensure that all civilian personnel residing in the vicinity of the border are sympathetic to the host country. This provides a good potential informant net along the border, provides manpower for self-defense units to control the border area, and denies potential civilian contacts and refuge for guerrilla use in border crossing activity. The extensive relocation of portions of the civilian population is beyond the capability of the landing force and may be too much for the host country to accomplish and police. However, if the host country has the capability and activates this concept, it must be accomplished under close supervision of appropriate host country agencies and carefully planned to avoid adverse reaction of the population.

(c) **Coastal Areas and Shorelines.**—Certain special consideration is given to the surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas and shorelines and may require the use of the following measures:

1. Coordinated ground patrols of the shoreline.
2. Coordinated offshore sea patrols.
3. Observation posts in the vicinity of river mouths and accessible portions of the shoreline.
4. System of licensing and identifying all friendly civilian watercraft using offshore waters.

b. **Harassing Operations**

(1) Harassing operations are conducted night or day to prevent guerrillas from resting, conducting operations, and receiving support. Such operations will inflict casualties and gain detailed knowledge about the terrain and the enemy. Harassing operations are executed primarily by extended patrols and larger combat units. Since guerrilla troop and supply movements are generally executed during the hours of darkness and inclement weather, maximum use must be made of harassing fires, both aviation and artillery, during these periods. The use of air support radar teams to control airstrikes is very effective in supplementing artillery range limitations.

(2) Harassing operations are conducted primarily by the use of:

(a) Aerial and ground reconnaissance to locate guerrilla units, bases, and camps.

(b) Continuous aerial surveillance during daylight hours.

(c) Extensive patrols and raids against guerrilla bases, camps, outposts, and supply caches.
(d) Ambushes.

(e) Airstrikes and artillery fires, especially during the hours of darkness and inclement weather.

(f) Mining guerrilla routes of communication.

c. Elimination Operations

(1) Guerrillas not destroyed by denial, harassing, and reaction operations are often forced by such operations into situations permitting elimination operations aimed at their destruction. Detailed planning is required. Maximum use is made of deception operations to prevent premature disclosure of the operation. Elimination operations usually possess the following characteristics:

(a) A guerrilla force is definitely located. This may be accomplished during the conduct of other operations.

(b) The guerrilla force is in a reasonably vulnerable situation, susceptible of being fixed in position, or engaged by surprise attack by the counterguerrilla forces.

(c) The guerrilla force is usually an organized military or support unit or band.

(d) A force conducting elimination operations is normally much larger than the located guerrilla force. Depending on the size and location of the guerrilla force and the tactics to be employed, it will vary in size from a reinforced company to a reinforced division.

(e) As a prerequisite to destruction of the guerrilla force, every effort is made to contain it. In elimination operations, the degree of success is most often proportionate to the degree of containment. A frontal assault will rarely find an objective, because the guerrilla will seldom defend terrain; he prefers withdrawal or escape to engagement. Efforts to fix or contain the guerrilla force will include encirclement, double envelopment, blocking positions on routes of escape, use of supporting fires, or the convergence of two or more forces on the guerrilla force. If the situation does not favor or permit containment, surprise attack against the guerrilla force, followed by aggressive pursuit, may prove successful.

(f) The final steps taken to contain a guerrilla force, and all operations conducted against the guerrillas after containment, are accomplished during daylight hours. Escape is the normal guerrilla reaction to being contained, and darkness facilitates its achievement.

(g) Mobility requirements suggest the employment of helicopterborne troops whenever possible. The use of helicopterborne troops allows a greater freedom of movement, more rapid execution, and an excellent chance of achieving surprise.

(2) The encirclement of guerrilla forces offers by far the greatest possibility for fixing or containing them and achieving decisive results. The remainder of this paragraph discusses the considerations related to encirclement and the various destruction tactics used when encirclement is achieved.
(a) Troop Requirement.--The terrain, size of the guerrilla force, and troop availability will determine the troop density of the encirclement. In turn, troop density will dictate the destruction tactics following encirclement. The encirclement usually requires a high relative preponderance of friendly troops; however, fire power, aerial surveillance, and the use of helicopterborne reserves can substantially lessen the troop requirement.

(b) Timing.--The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation is aimed at sudden, complete encirclement which will completely surprise the guerrillas. Surprise and security may be achieved by conducting the movement to encirclement during the hours of darkness. The encirclement should be completed during early daylight hours to permit good visibility for the remainder of the operation.

(c) Occupation of Line of Encirclement.--Speed is emphasized throughout the early phases of the advance to the line of encirclement. Maximum use of helicopterborne troops will add speed to the early phases of the encirclement. The most critical period in the operation is the occupation of the line of encirclement. A guerrilla force may be expected to react immediately upon discovering that it is encircled. To attempt escape, the guerrillas will probe for gaps, attack weak points to force a gap, or attempt exfiltration of the encirclement, individually or by small groups. Accordingly, every effort is made to simultaneously occupy the entire line of encirclement, or if this is not possible, the most likely escape routes are covered first. In addition, upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units immediately occupy defensive positions and deployed strong patrols to their front so that early warning of attempted guerrilla breakouts may be received.

(d) Aircraft Employment.--Aviation plays an important role in operations featuring encirclement. Attack aircraft are employed in a close air support role. Observation aircraft and helicopters are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and as a command vehicle for the commander to control his forces. Helicopters are used to rapidly transport troops to the line of encirclement or to shift forces from one area to another. The armed helicopter may be used to close the encirclement in those areas that cannot be dominated by other supporting arms and to prevent the enemy from fleeing the encirclement. Additionally, helicopters equipped with loudspeakers can be used to direct movement of civilians as well as warn the indigenous population not to flee.

(e) Elimination of the Guerrilla Force.--Once the encirclement is established, the elimination of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly. This may be accomplished in any of the following ways:

1 Enticement to Surrender.--The guerrillas are enticed to surrender by psychological warfare techniques such as loudspeaker broadcasting and use of leaflets. This technique has historically proven effective.

2 Contraction of the Encirclement.--Operations may consist of a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the line is progressively shortened, more units are removed from the line and added to the reserve forces. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by progressive contraction; however, against
larger forces, it is more probable that at some point the contraction will reach a "critical mass," requiring some action other than further contraction.

3 Dividing the Area.--Another technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide the area, followed by the destruction of the guerrillas in each subarea. This technique may also be used in conjunction with contraction of the line of encirclement after "critical mass" occurs.

4 Hammer and Anvil.--Another technique, usually employed after some degree of contraction, is to have a holding force on one or more sides of the perimeter while part of the line of encirclement forces the guerrillas against the stationary force by offensive action. Either element may effect the actual destruction, but the majority of it will usually be accomplished by the attacking element, while the stationary element holds the guerrilla force in place. This technique is most effective when the blocking or stationary force is located on, or immediately in the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.

5 Variations.--Variations of the operations described above include such techniques as having forces encircle an area and await the enemy attempt to escape as he is subjected to intense saturation type indirect fire and/or attack by tactical aircraft. Flushing fires are discussed in paragraph 904.

(f) Mission Terms.--The familiar statement of missions and tasks found in operation plans and orders will not always convey a clear picture of the type of operation to be conducted in counterguerrilla warfare. Below are described three mission terms which are considered more precisely descriptive of missions or tasks likely to be assigned to the counterguerrilla force and/or its subordinate units. They are seize and occupy, search and destroy, and clear and hold.

1 Seize and Occupy.--The objective of this mission is the seizure and occupation of a designated area for development of a base to be used for subsequent operations. It is a likely initial landing force mission. This mission may be repeatedly assigned subordinate elements of the landing force as the required network of combat bases is developed.

2 Search and Destroy.--The objective of this mission is to locate the enemy and either destroy him or drive him from the area. Troop units are assigned this task when the exact location of the enemy is unknown. This mission is sometimes referred to as "search and clear," or "fix and destroy." The terms are essentially synonymous.

3 Clear and Hold.--Although similar to a "search and destroy" mission, the main emphasis of this mission is to hold the designated area. Elements of the landing force are most likely to receive a clear and hold mission when sufficient forces are available to consolidate and control the designated area; or when participating in internal defense operations, the host country military, paramilitary, or governmental agencies are prepared to follow up with measures designed to restore an area to firm, friendly government control on a permanent basis.
SECTION 9

COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

901. GENERAL

While the scope and degree of force applied in counterinsurgency operations will vary, the basic tenets of support requirements of the landing force remain relatively the same as in conventional war. The doctrine in specific manuals applies. The principal differences discussed subsequently as special considerations relate to such factors as organization of forces, support requirements, and operational techniques.

902. AIR SUPPORT

The nature of a counterinsurgency makes it reasonable to assume that the conflict will take place in an undeveloped or partially developed physical environment. This requirement, to fight in an area without an established network of roads, places an unusually heavy burden on air support which must furnish most of the transportation and much of the fire support and take a vital part in providing necessary intelligence. Marine aviation, functioning as an integral part of the air-ground team, is organized and equipped to carry out its part in any mission which may be assigned.

a. Organization and Planning.--The Marine Corps is primarily concerned with its role as an amphibious force, and the organization and planning considerations applicable to a conventional amphibious assault are generally applicable to counterinsurgency operations launched from the sea. However, it must also be recognized that Marine forces may be required to operate from shore bases either as a uni-Service force or a component of a joint force for protracted periods.

(I) Organization of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.--The MAGTF contains four major components: a command element, a ground element, an air element, and a combat service support element.
(a) The command element consists of an integrated air-
ground headquarters with the necessary control and communication facilities.

(b) The ground element is a task organization staffed and
equipped for the conduct of ground fire and maneuver.

(c) The aviation element is a task organization containing
combat units, control units, and support units provided from the resources
of a Marine aircraft wing (MAW). Air operations are conducted under cen-
tralized control at the air-ground task force level. The aviation element
commander is normally designated as tactical air commander of the force.

(d) Combat service support elements are normally combined
in one group and generally support both air and ground elements. In larger
operations, it may be necessary to form two groups.

(2) Types of Air-Ground Task Forces.--The standard types of
Marine air-ground task forces contain aviation elements as follows:

(a) Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU).--The aviation element of
the MAU is normally a composite helicopter squadron; however, in certain
instances, it may consist of an attack squadron, a helicopter squadron,
elements of an observation squadron, and small detachments of air control
and air support squadrons.

(b) Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB).--The aviation element
of the MAB is normally a Marine aircraft group (MAG). The MAG has an anti-
air warfare capability and is organized and equipped for early establishment
ashore.

(c) Marine Amphibious Force (MAF).--The aviation element of
the MAF is a Marine aircraft wing. The MAF is organized and equipped to
conduct all types of air operations in a counterinsurgency environment.

(3) Planning in the Air-Ground Task Force.--The key to successful
air-ground operations is thorough and concurrent planning. A detailed dis-
cussion is found in FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action. In a counterinsur-
gency environment, there seldom will be sufficient time to accomplish the
amount of planning that is considered desirable. For this reason, certain
time-saving techniques are necessary:

(a) Use of SOP's.

(b) Liaison at execution levels at the earliest time
possible. Air-ground planning throughout the execution of the operation
is mandatory until it is completed.

(c) Close and concurrent planning by the executing air and
ground units prior to and during execution. This is especially important
in helicopterborne operations.

b. Air Support Capabilities and Techniques.--There are certain air
support techniques which, because of the difficulties encountered in a
counterinsurgency environment, are considered applicable. Listed below are
the capabilities which are inherent in the tactics generally employed by
guerrilla forces. Listed immediately after them are some of the techniques
of air support which may be employed to counter those capabilities.
(1) The guerrilla hits and runs. He can rapidly disperse his forces after an attack. There are a variety of means by which air support can combat this capability. Some of the more effective are:

   (a) Utilizing tactical air coordinators (airborne), forward air controllers, and helicopter coordinators (airborne) as aerial extensions of the Marine air command and control system to coordinate offensive air operations against dispersed enemy targets.

   (b) Attacking known or suspected guerrilla base areas.

   (c) Utilizing the inherent mobility of helicopters in cordon operations.

   (d) Maintaining aircraft with predetermined ordnance loads on ground or airborne alert for rapid response. Included in this category of attack aircraft are those fixed-wing aircraft which have a high performance vertical or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) capability and which, therefore, offer a unique rapid response option, whether sea or land based.

(2) The guerrilla is a master of deception and camouflage. The most effective means by which air support can combat this capability is through employment of:

   (a) Helicopter inserted reconnaissance patrols.

   (b) Airborne sensors.

   (c) Aerial observers.

   (d) Air delivered sensors.

(3) The guerrilla moves and attacks at night or during periods of reduced visibility. Air support can effectively counter this capability by:

   (a) Extensive employment of flareships.

   (b) Employment of helicopter mounted searchlights.

   (c) Extensive use of airborne night vision devices.

   (d) Delivery of conventional ordnance under flares.

   (e) Delivery of conventional ordnance through the tactical RABFAC Beacon organic to tactical air control parties and through the air support radar team (ASRT).

(4) The guerrilla is dependent on an external source of supply for arms and ammunition. A TAOR will be assigned to a Marine air-ground task force commander within which he will control all supporting fires. Fires outside this TAOR would be used to reduce or stop the flow of these arms. Air support missions for this purpose would include:

   (a) Search and attack.

   (b) Armed reconnaissance.
(c) Interdiction.

   c. Assault Support.--Assault support in a counterinsurgency environment, once the ship-to-shore phase has been terminated, is concerned with the provision of air transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment under continuous threat of guerrilla contact. The assault support can be provided from both fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets.

   1 Fixed-Wing.--Transport aircraft possess the capability to operate from short unimproved airfields within the objective area. This, plus their capability for airdrop of personnel and equipment, extends the operational resources of the air-ground team commander operating in a counterinsurgency environment.

      a. Air Landed Operations.--Once the MAGTF is firmly ashore, it can be assumed that the air-ground team commander can expect to be able to operate one or more "secure" airfields capable of handling fixed-wing transport aircraft. Operations will include both tactical and administrative airlifts.

      1 Tactical planners should take full advantage of transport aircraft to lift large quantities of personnel, supplies, and equipment. The tactical mobility provided by the aircraft enables the commander to maintain effective control over large areas with a minimum of personnel.

      2 Administrative movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment with fixed-wing aircraft permits the commander to make more efficient use of his helicopter assets for tactical employment.

      b. Air Delivered Operations.--Air delivered operations, wherein the commander makes maximum use of transport aircraft for movement of personnel and airdrop of supplies and equipment, improve tactical mobility and conserve helicopter resources for employment in tactical ground operations.

   2 Rotary-Wing.--Rotary-wing aircraft provide the commander of the air-ground team with a versatile weapon in combating guerrillas. Its usefulness is limited only by the imagination of the planners and helicopter availability. Detailed information on helicopter employment is found in FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations. Information contained in this manual reiterates and amplifies the principles and techniques of helicopter employment contained in FMFM 3-3 with particular emphasis on operations in a counterinsurgency environment.

      a. To the maximum extent possible, air and ground component commanders should be collocated in command equipped helicopters during air-ground team operations. The command and control helicopter provides the air-ground team commander with an aerial command post from which he and his staff can direct operations. It is possible to position the command group wherever and whenever their presence is needed. The communications resources, together with the improved aerial observation, permit the air-ground team commander to make necessary decisions as rapidly as the situation demands. A command group would most probably include the air-ground team commander, G/S-2, G/S-3, artillery commander, or artillery liaison officer, and the air commander or air liaison officer. If the air commander flies the helicopter, he can be available to advise on air matters.
and there will be additional space for another key member of the staff. It is also considered highly desirable to provide an alternate command group in an additional helicopter. This can ensure that a command group is airborne at all times.

(b) Subparagraph 902e contains general information on reconnaissance support furnished by both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Because of their flight characteristics, helicopters are especially well suited for some special types of reconnaissance work:

1. Maintaining surveillance over areas suspected of containing guerrillas.
2. Reconnoitering proposed landing zones and patrol routes.
3. Transporting defectors or friendly civilians to identify guerrilla camps, supply caches, prisoner-of-war camps, etc.
4. Conducting flaredrop or searchlight missions and limited photography with handheld cameras.

(c) Helicopters can be used for the transport of reaction teams. These are infantry units teamed with transport and armed helicopters. They are used as an airborne or strip alert ready reserve immediately available to the commander to exploit a success or take advantage of a fleeting contact. Flights may also be employed on a daily basis to patrol suspect areas. Reconnaissance aircraft can be used to locate the enemy; the reaction team develops the situation and, if within its capability, destroys the enemy force. If the size or disposition of the enemy force renders it beyond the capability of the reaction team to destroy, the team maintains contact until reinforcements can be maneuvered to assist. During operations, a TAC(A)/AFAC and an artillery observer should be able to coordinate/control close air and artillery support as required.

(d) Armed helicopters provide the commander an effective and versatile means of fire support. Employing essentially the same tactics, armed helicopters are capable of supporting both offensive and defensive operations. Weather and darkness may significantly affect armed helicopter operations; however, these effects will not be as severe as those affecting fixed-wing air support. Other limiting factors of armed helicopter support include vulnerability to large caliber or high volume small arms fire, aircraft fire, and the fact that types of ordnance carried are not suitable for destruction of fortified positions. The following missions are typical of those assigned to armed helicopters in a counterinsurgency environment:

1. Tactical escort to include mounted or dismounted troop movements, supply movements, landing craft/small boat movements on inland waterways, and tactical deployment of troops on foot, vehicle lifted, or helicopterborne.

2. Aerial reconnaissance to include reconnaissance in force and reconnaissance by fire.

3. Aerial delivered fire support to supplement or augment organic and indirect fire.
4 Immediate reaction missions in instances where ground forces are not immediately available or their commitment is not advisable.

5 Adjustment of indirect fire, artillery, or naval gunfire.

6 Interdiction in order to restrict an enemy capability to reinforce, resupply, or withdraw.

7 Influence the movement of indigenous personnel through control of roads and canals during periods of curfew.

8 Exercise of economy of force through providing supporting fires to blocking positions and outposts.

(e) Helicopters are used for the conduct of retrograde movements.

1 Retrograde movements are preplanned operations wherein units of up to battalion size are landed and then quickly withdrawn for employment elsewhere. By use of this tactic, the commander can employ the mobility provided by the helicopter and maneuver his forces to seal off lines of retreat, pursue, delay, or insert "stay behind" forces. Retrograde movement is not to be confused with a withdrawal; a retrograde movement normally is not initiated if the unit is under enemy pressure. The planning for a retrograde movement is the same as the planning for a helicopterborne assault. The major point is that the scheme of maneuver is actually the plan for the defense of the pickup zone. If the retrograde movement is conducted in order to immediately recommit the force in another area, the plan must include provision for that phase of the operation. The amount of detail contained in the planning is determined by the size of the operation, experience of the personnel, and the time available. As a minimum, plans should include:

   a Designation of pickup zones.
   b Schedule of movement of units to the pickup zones.
   c Control instructions.
   d Fire support.

2 In the conduct of the retrograde movement, the sequence of withdrawal varies with the employment intended for the elements being extracted. Administrative personnel and heavy equipment should be moved to an intermediate secure area. If distances involved are great, the whole force should be lifted to a secure intermediate zone. They can be moved to the new operational area once it has been secured. The commander of the unit conducting the retrograde movement selects the pickup zone with the advice of the air commander. When unit integrity has been disrupted because of loading sequence, temporary attachment of separate elements to another control headquarters is advisable. Spare aircraft should be included in the last lift to ensure space for stragglers and in case of downed aircraft. Armed helicopter escorts should accompany the transport helicopters and cover the pickup zones. Fixed-wing close air support is used against preplanned targets and targets of opportunity during the extraction.
(f) Psychological operations missions.

(g) Communications (courier, retransmission, and remote relay site establishment).

(h) Riot control agent dissemination (CS gas).

(i) Fire adjustment of air, artillery, and naval gunfire.

(j) Target acquisition and damage assessment.

(k) Establishment and support of remote security outposts.

(l) Evacuation of civilians.

(m) Motor march security.

d. Helicopter Command and Control. Foremost among the problems encountered by a commander of air-ground forces is control. Effective control can best be maintained through effective organization.

(1) Organization Control. Organizational considerations in combating guerrilla forces are much the same as those encountered in preparing for an amphibious assault. Task organization is the key. There must be one responsible commander in any operation whether it be a squad sized patrol or the MAF assault landing. One of the most difficult decisions the commander of an air-ground team must make deals with the allocation of scarce helicopter assets. He may allocate them in one of two ways: decentralized control in which the commander assigns the mission and the helicopter assets with which to accomplish it, or centralized control in which the commander assigns a mission and the subordinate commander requests from him the helicopter assets which he, the subordinate commander, considers necessary. There are a number of variables which the air-ground team commander must consider when making his decision, and these are:

(a) In support of decentralized control:

1. Subordinate units should have maximum flexibility in the conduct of operations against insurgents. They must have a capability to plan and execute operations with maximum speed.

2. Maximum benefits in operations are realized when the helicopter unit commander is collocated with and always supports the same ground unit.

3. There are substantial savings realized in administrative flying time when the helicopter units and the ground units are collocated.

(b) In support of centralized control:

1. The air-ground team commander retains overall responsibility for the accomplishment of his mission. He is in the best position to coordinate the entire efforts of his command. He is responsible for assignment of mission priorities.

2. A reserve reaction force capable of rapid exploitation of tactical success is a necessity in counterinsurgency warfare. If
helicopter assets are fragmented, it may become impossible, because of time and distance factors, to mass sufficient forces at a critical time and place.

3 Piecemeal allocation aggravates security and maintenance problems which are frequently monumental in a counterinsurgency environment.

(2) Planning.--Planning of helicopter support in counterinsurgency operations should address the following considerations:

(a) Integrated air-ground planning is accomplished at the execution level and commences as soon as possible once a mission is assigned. It continues until the mission is accomplished.

(b) Efficient use of helicopters must be planned. The numbers and types of helicopters available are generally less than the demand. Good planning in the following areas can help compensate for the shortage of helicopters:

1 Are helicopters really essential to accomplishment of this mission, or can some other form of transport--truck, LVT, fixed-wing aircraft--do the job as well?

2 Have "dead-head" (i.e., flights simply to or from different points without a load) lifts been eliminated?

3 Will troops, supplies, and equipment be ready to move at scheduled times?

4 Are supplies properly packaged and is the necessary materials-handling equipment available at the pickup points? Have adequate facilities and personnel been provided for in the landing/drop zone to facilitate rapid turnaround?

(c) Selection of landing zones and alternate landing zones must be jointly considered. Plans must include procedures for deciding when alternate zones are to be used. It is desirable that the ground commander and the air commander be embarked in the same helicopter. If this is not possible or feasible, they should be in radio contact with each other and the HC(A)/TAC(A) to facilitate exchange of information and the making of decisions essential to mission accomplishment.

(d) The location of helicopter support bases must be planned for. The expeditious use of auxiliary bases, to include seaborne helicopter platforms, for refueling, rearming, and minor maintenance can reduce helicopter administrative flying time and increase availability. Security for these bases is a major consideration. Figure 3 illustrates the use of forward arming and refueling areas.

(e) Flexibility in loading plans is mandatory. Consideration must be given to weather and atmosphere conditions. These factors will affect the load carrying capability of the helicopters; therefore, a specific maximum load cannot be computed. For example, if a helicopter can lift 5,000 pounds at 0600, it may not be able to lift it at 1200. Consideration must also be given to helicopter availability. It may be necessary to substitute types or models other than those which were planned for.
(f) Consideration must be given to communication requirements. Extra communication personnel and equipment will generally be required to ensure adequate controls over long distances.

(g) Security becomes a paramount problem in counterinsurgency operations. Planners must consider security requirements in all aspects of their planning. Thorough consideration must be given to the special security requirements generated by helicopterborne operations. Some of the unique considerations are:

1 Helicopter support facilities.
2 Helicopter approach and retirement lanes.
3 Helicopter landing zones.
4 Helicopter control facilities.

(h) Counterinsurgency operations frequently require that forces be widely separated. In helicopterborne operations, wide dispersion of forces can create problems in efficient employment of helicopter assets. This is especially true if the force commander retains centralized control of his helicopter assets. Planners must make every effort to foresee these problems and be prepared to modify their task organization. An example can best illustrate this particular point. In the MAF-size operation with two divisions supported by one wing, it might become necessary to deploy
one of the divisions to a distance of 20, 30, or more miles from MAW headquarters. If centralized control of helicopters is retained by the MAF commander, the division commander who is deployed will be plagued with planning uncertainties with respect to the availability of helicopter support. Requests and allocations are dependent on communications which are not always reliable. A recommended solution to this particular problem is to provide in the task organization for a senior officer and a small staff from the Marine aircraft wing headquarters to establish a small operational headquarters adjacent to the division headquarters. This officer would have assigned to his operational control those air assault support assets made available by the MAGTF commander to support the Marine division. The effect of this arrangement would be to give the division commander ready access to the MAW spokesman who has authority to respond to his requests for assault support. At the same time, the MAF commander acting through the tactical air commander retains the necessary degree of control for him to mass all his air assets should the tactical situation so dictate.

e. Reconnaissance Support.—The most important single element in counterinsurgency operations is accurate and timely intelligence. The air-ground team commander continually attempts to find his enemy in order to fight him. One of the most dependable tools in this continuing effort to get reliable information is aerial reconnaissance. All aerial reconnaissance can be categorized into three general types—visual, multisensor imagery, and electronic. Detailed information on the subject of aerial reconnaissance is found in FMFM 5-1, Intelligence and FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation.

(1) Visual.—Trained air observers flying in light observation aircraft, either fixed-wing or rotary-wing, are most effective in providing the information needed in counterguerrilla operations. Direct communications between the reconnaissance aircraft and the tactical headquarters is essential. Commanders and key members of their staffs frequently conduct personal reconnaissance missions.

(a) Area search is best suited to open terrain and sparsely settled areas. It is used primarily for detection of change since guerrillas seldom allow themselves to be caught in the open. The same tactical air observer should be used to cover the same area whenever possible.

(b) Specific search is one conducted over a limited area in order to obtain specific information. Reconnaissance of a proposed landing zone of a suspected guerrilla location or to confirm informer information are examples of specific search missions.

(c) Route reconnaissance is conducted to maintain surveillance over suspected enemy communication routes. It can also be used to determine route conditions, as convoy security escort, and to locate enemy ambush sites. A special use of route reconnaissance is in conjunction with patrols, whereby routes are checked in advance and contact sites or pickup points are selected.

(2) Multisensor Imagery.—Multisensor imagery is the recording of information gained by a sensory device. These include cameras, airborne radars, and aerial infrared devices. Their outstanding characteristic with respect to counterinsurgency employment is their ability to subject suspect areas to day-by-day and week-by-week analysis.
(a) Photographic reconnaissance is used to provide map substitutes or supplements, to assess target damage, to confirm intelligence data obtained from other sources, and to maintain surveillance over areas suspected of containing guerrillas. Most photo missions are flown by high performance aircraft; however, the Marine observation squadron has a limited capability with observers using handheld cameras.

(b) Side looking airborne radar (SLAR) is capable of providing acceptable imagery during periods of reduced visibility. Its most valuable characteristic in a counterinsurgency role is its ability to cover large areas rapidly and to provide moving target indications. Information obtained by SLAR should be supplemented by other means to provide positive target identification. SLAR is strictly line of sight, and it can be detected, jammed, or spoofed.

(c) Infrared reconnaissance (IR) produces a black and white image of the ground. Image contrasts are produced by variances in surface temperature, but IR is not affected by incidental light. It is affected by restrictions to visibility other than darkness.

(3) Electronic.--Electronic reconnaissance is the detection, identification, evaluation, and location of foreign electromagnetic radiation emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. FMFM 2-3, Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations (U), gives a detailed description of electronic countermeasures (ECM) operations.

(4) Other

(a) Sensor implantation by air is an additional means whereby intelligence may be obtained.

(b) Aerial personnel detection (APD) can be used to detect or predict the location of concentrated guerrilla forces.

f. Logistic Support.--Forces operating against guerrillas should plan on carrying a minimum of their supplies with them. This practice enables them to retain greater mobility. It also places the responsibility for impetus of supply on support bases. For this reason, the success or failure of operations depends to a great extent on how well the flow of supplies can be maintained from the logistic support areas (LSA) to the using units. Air support, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing provides the air-ground commander with the means for rapid resupply.

(1) Transportation of Supplies.--The mobility and versatility of air transport permits the air-ground team commander to reduce time and space factors normally encountered in the movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Air transportation permits him to move logistic support rapidly across terrain obstacles and to bypass enemy held territory. As in all operations, detailed planning in which all participating agencies take an active part is essential if operations are to go smoothly. Listed are some of the more significant characteristics of air transport which planners must consider. For a more complete discussion, see FMFM 4-3, Landing Support Operations.

(a) Transport Aircraft

1 Air landed operations are employed whenever long distances are involved and it is impractical to use other transport means.
Fixed-wing transports possess the capability to land and take off from short unprepared fields. However, if sustained, large-scale operations are anticipated, prepared airfields are required. Additional personnel and equipment needed to operate and secure these fields must be planned for.

2 Air delivered operations consist of supply delivery to combat units either by parachute or by free fall. The commander requesting this type of delivery is responsible for drop zone selection. The following factors must be considered:

a. Drop zones should be reasonably free of obstacles and selected so that the aircraft can approach on a straight course without flying over known enemy locations.

b. The drop zone should be rectangular, about 725 meters by 275 meters. The prevailing wind should be along the long axis. They should be located near a prominent terrain feature to assist the pilot in location.

(b) Rotary-Wing Aircraft

1 Planning Factors.--Resupply by helicopter is frequently the most desirable method, but helicopters are not always available in the numbers desired. Planning is required, and determination of the degree of support to be furnished is based on priorities of missions and tasks. The following are factors which must be considered in making decisions:

a. Numbers and types of helicopters available.

b. Location of helicopter support bases.

c. Availability of less desirable but equally efficient means of transport.

d. Requirement for armed escort.

e. Tactical consideration. Will the availability/nonavailability of supplies to be delivered seriously affect mission accomplishment?

2 Operations.--Detailed instructions for resupply using helicopters are a matter for unit SOP's. Much valuable information needed for SOP preparation is contained in FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations, and FMFM 4-3, Landing Support Operations.

(c) All-Weather Air Delivery.--During periods of poor weather, normal resupply can be accomplished by two means:

1. Parachute delivery positioned by radar.

2. Helicopter delivery utilizing electronic guidance

(2) Evacuation of Casualties

(a) Rapid casualty evacuation is essential as it provides a means for provision of medical treatment to the wounded, thus enabling
commanders to retain their mobility and rapid reaction capability. The helicopter provides the ideal vehicle for this important mission. One of the difficult decisions faced by the air-ground team commander in planning for casualty evacuation is the manner of employing the helicopter support available to him. Casualties may be returned in one of two ways:

1 Diversion of helicopter(s) on a troop or supply transport mission to the site of the casualty(ies). This may be the most expedient means, but it has certain disadvantages. The helicopter does not have medical personnel or equipment readily available, and it is deterred from its original mission which may be vital.

2 One or more helicopters may be placed in a standby capacity to be used specifically for casualty evacuation. These helicopters are manned and equipped for their special mission, and pilots are briefed on any special requirements. These helicopters are, however, a net loss for tactical operations.

(b) The ground commander will have certain responsibilities to ensure the success of the evacuation. Some of these responsibilities are:

1 Establish the proper priority.
2 Protect the landing zone.
3 Identify the landing zone.
4 If possible, move the casualty to the best available zone.

903. COMBAT SUPPORT

Employment of combat support may be limited in counterinsurgency operations. Rugged terrain that provides the guerrilla an area for operating forbids unlimited movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles and restricts the employment of supporting weapons. The employment of artillery, naval gunfire, and mechanized units in quantity may not be possible. In planning the amount and type of combat support required, a detailed study of the terrain is conducted. Care is taken in planning the combat support to ensure that it can be effectively employed. Generally, combat support which is air transportable by certain fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter, and aerial resupply drop can provide effective support in guerrilla operations.

904. FIELD ARTILLERY

Field artillery, properly employed against guerrilla forces, provides the commander the same element of devastating firepower as in conventional warfare. In operations against guerrilla forces, modification of conventional principles, techniques, and tactics will normally be necessary. The vague enemy situation and difficult terrain will require the artillery commander to exploit every means to provide adequate and continuous fire support. Although the principle of massed artillery fires is applicable against guerrilla forces, most firing will be accurate surprise fires on temporary and fleeting guerrilla targets. In order to provide continuous artillery support to maneuver units operating in mountains, swamps, forests, and jungle areas not accessible by roads, it will be necessary to select,
develop, and occupy artillery positions in this same environment. These positions are referred to as fire support bases. For a complete discussion of artillery support, refer to FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support. The planning, composition, and employment of artillery units are based on the landing force plan of operations. The artillery plan is based on a careful study of the terrain, road nets, and the enemy situation. Support may be required for numerous patrols, ambushes, roadblocks, and similar operations.

a. Organization for Combat.—There is no standard organization for operations conducted in support of counterinsurgency combat operations. The artillery units are organized to be employed in specific terrain, to combat a certain size guerrilla force, and to support the tactics and techniques to be employed during a particular operation.

(1) Light Artillery Support.—As light artillery can be moved by helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, and on the ground, it can be delivered to areas inaccessible to other artillery.

(2) Medium Artillery Support.—Medium artillery, self-propelled and towed, provides increased accuracy and range over light artillery. Although towed howitzers are suited for helicopterborne operations and fire support base employment, both towed and self-propelled medium artillery when moved on the ground will require better roads and heavier bridging.

(3) Helicopterborne Howitzer Support.—When planning the artillery support requirements for helicopterborne operations, the 105mm howitzer towed and the 155mm howitzer towed are the prime weapons to be considered. The range and accuracy of towed howitzers dictate their employment with the helicopterborne force whenever the enemy possesses a counterfire capability that cannot be neutralized from positions within the battle area.

(4) Heavy Artillery Support.—Although restricted to good roads and strong bridging, its long range can provide support to deep patrols and widely separated units.

(5) Searchlight Support.—Searchlights can be employed to prevent infiltration, limit night movement of guerrillas, locate friendly patrols, and for patrol orientation. They can be employed to assist in night close air support.

(6) Target Acquisition Agencies.—If guerrillas employ mortars or artillery, sound, flash, and radar ranging can be utilized. Sufficient numbers of aerial observers should be available to provide constant surveillance. Because of the requirement for extensive patrolling, the number of artillery forward observers assigned to infantry units may not be sufficient to meet all forward observer needs. Therefore, small unit leaders should receive training in the rudiments of fire planning and forward observer procedures to ensure this capability is available when required.

(7) Survey Capability.—In addition to normal survey requirements, the need exists for a greater number of survey control points (SCP). This will facilitate target location, transfer of firing data, and computation of corrections to be applied to firing data. Extensive survey operations can also aid in orientation of patrols. To accomplish such extensive
surveys, additional survey teams will normally be required. In engagements of short duration where SCP's have not been established, fire will generally be directed from an observed firing chart. In these instances, artillery units can rapidly establish common direction by simultaneous astronomical observation. Helicopters can provide a valuable asset to rapid survey of the area of operations to establish a common grid.

(8) Changes, Modifications, and Additions.--Any changes, modifications, and additions that are incorporated in the artillery structure are carefully considered. Special training may be necessary if animals, new type equipment, or special procedures are employed.

b. Artillery Staff Planning.--Staff estimates are prepared for the commander to assist him in making decisions. The decision to provide artillery support in operations against guerrillas will require imagination on the part of the staff in preparing its plan.

(1) Intelligence.--The target acquisition agencies are exploited to locate targets. Rapid processing of target intelligence is vital in order to deliver fires as expeditiously as possible.

(2) Operations.--Fire planning and fire direction techniques follow the conventional methods. Fire direction should remain centralized insofar as possible; however, decentralization may often be necessary due to widely dispersed operations and special task assignments. The operations may require decentralization of mutual defensive fires, countermortar fires, harassing and interdiction fires, flushing and barrier fires, and fires to support attacks. Coordination and control of fires require detailed planning. Training of personnel should include training in guerrilla warfare and in techniques required for operating any special equipment.

(3) Logistics.--Related to the total guerrillas killed, ammunition expenditures by artillery may appear excessive. The requirement for displacement of artillery may result in greater than normal POL consumption. Position area security may require abnormal amounts of barbed wire, concertina, trip-flares, and antipersonnel mines. Other specialized equipment is considered in planning. The movement of supplies, protection of dumps, and distribution to widely dispersed units must be provided for. The resupply of artillery ammunition is a paramount consideration in planning and conducting operations against guerrillas. The relatively great distances over which ammunition must be transported, coupled with the relatively large expenditure rates and weight of ammunition, combine to create a complex logistics problem. Consideration should be given to unit distribution resupply to batteries from ammunition supply points to avoid repeated handling at forward ammunition dumps.

c. Fire Support.--In addition to the normal fire support plans, certain fires peculiar to operations against guerrilla forces must be planned. These plans are innovations or variations of fire plans utilized in conventional artillery support. Among these are:

(1) Countermortar Fires.--The normal countermortar techniques are utilized in target acquisition, target selection, and target attack. However, in operations against guerrillas, the target will be even more fleeting and temporary than in normal countermortar operations. Accordingly, rapid dissemination of countermortar target information is essential.
in order that a quick response can be made by supporting arms. Plans are prepared on active locations.

(2) Counterguerrilla Fires.--Acquisition of targets is provided by the normal target acquisition agencies and the infantry sources. Fires are planned on guerrilla installations, camp areas, communication routes, and known positions. Many of these targets may be unoccupied during firing of a program; nevertheless, effective neutralization of installations may be obtained. A program of fires can be prepared preliminary to supporting an infantry attack on guerrilla areas. Individual fires may be prepared to force the guerrilla into a particular area.

(3) Defensive Fire Plans.--Defensive fire plans are devised to protect rear area installations, to prevent infiltration in strength, and as mutual fires in defense of other installations. Defensive fire plans require careful coordination and control when planned concentrations are near friendly military installations and occupied civilian areas.

(4) Harassing Fires.--Harassing fires are designed to disturb the rest of the guerrilla, to curtail his movement, and by threat of loss, to lower his morale. Consideration should be given to the use of daylight harassing fires when circumstances warrant. Also, illumination fires can be employed as a method of harassment in areas where fires can be observed.

(5) Interdiction Fires.--Interdiction fires are fires placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using it.

(6) Reconnaissance By Fire.--Reconnaissance by fire is a method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause him to disclose his presence by movement or return fire. It is accomplished by firing on suspected target areas to produce a reaction from the guerrilla force. Because the fire may expose guerrilla installations by destroying natural cover and camouflage, aerial photographs are taken before and after the program is fired. Maximum aerial observation is used during the firing to detect and report guerrilla activity.

(7) Flushing Fires.--These fires are prepared to support infantry operations by flushing the guerrilla into an ambush. They are employed in rough and difficult terrain and in vegetation near defined paths, roads, and streams that are used as routes of communication.

(8) Barrier Fires.--Barrier fires are planned to support infantry operations by denying the guerrillas ingress or egress in the area of operations, preventing escape, and denying the guerrilla reinforcements.

(9) Deception Fires.--These fires are placed away from friendly troops and are designed to deceive the guerrilla and to cover friendly troop movements. Deception fires can be used to distract and mislead the guerrilla force while friendly troops approach from other directions.

(10) Illumination Fires.--The illumination fire plan is made to assist friendly troops, by exposing guerrilla activity and deterring infiltration. It can be utilized for orienting lost patrols.

(11) Survey By Fire.--Location of guerrilla activity can be provided from replott data. Survey by firing using center of impact (CI) and high burst (HB) techniques with high explosive (HE), white phosphorous (WP),
and illumination shells will give accurate location of targets, patrols, etc. Patrons that possess the necessary communications can determine their position or those of the enemy from adjusted coordinates provided by the artillery fire direction center (FDC).

(12) Chemical Fires.--Chemical fires may be utilized effectively against guerrilla forces to screen friendly troop movements, to confuse the enemy, and for casualty effect. WP is best suited to marking guerrilla activity for air or infantry attack. WP can also be used as a casualty agent, to burn vegetation and to destroy supplies. Other nontoxic chemical agents are ideally suited to counterguerrilla tactical operations when the guerrilla is ill-equipped or unprepared for chemical defense. Care must be exercised in employment to avoid exposing civilian elements to chemical effects.

d. Employment Considerations.--The employment of artillery in a counterinsurgency environment requires extensive movement to support the tactical scheme of maneuver. Selecting position areas in rough terrain to extend the range and support capability for infantry units operating in widely dispersed areas will require extensive reconnoitering to establish positions accessible by overland movement or by helicopter insertion. Terrain comprised of jungle, swamps, mountains, and forests which negate overland movement will necessitate the selection, development, and occupation of fire support bases. To prevent wasteful expenditure of ammunition, forward observers and air observers should be provided with target criteria. This criteria should state what comprises a counterguerrilla target and the means and intensity of artillery fires to be employed. The coordination of fires must be based on the guidance of the artillery commander when firing in rear areas and within areas occupied by local civilians.

(1) Reconnaissance, Selection, and Occupation of Position (RSOP).--RSOP will follow the normal principles. Security and all-round fire capability are emphasized. A search for easily accessible position areas is made to prevent the requirement for building extensive roads, clearing areas, and cutting access ways. This also applies in selecting position areas for helicopterborne artillery. Security measures on the march and while occupying the position are considered. A compact position area is desirable, providing there is little or no threat of enemy counterfires.

(2) Security.--Security measures against guerrilla infiltration and attack are carefully considered by the artillery commander. In addition to planning the normal local security to include patrols and listening posts furnished by artillery personnel, employment of direct fire utilizing time-fused shells, ricochet burst with delay-fused shells, and beehive rounds to defend against guerrilla attack are considered. Direct fire sectors can be assigned to each gun section as is done in antimechanized defense. Illumination of approaches into the position are planned. Illumination fires can be included in mutual defensive artillery fires. Joint installations and command posts for artillery and infantry can provide greater protection and simplify the local defense problem. Passive defense techniques are considered. The use of wire, trip-flares, and antipersonnel mines may be extensive. Emphasis is placed on security training. When organic personnel and weapons are inadequate in providing for security, the commander may obtain additional security means from the supported commander. Artillery units required to operate away from infantry protection should displace at least every 48 hours as a passive defense measure against coordinated guerrilla ground and mortar attacks. Stereotyped defensive postures should be avoided.
(3) **Movement.**—When providing support for operations conducted over a large area, artillery is frequently moved. Adequate roads and bridges are necessary for movement on land. Roads and access ways can be improved somewhat by organic means. Self-propelled artillery is particularly hampered by its size and weight when moving in rugged and undeveloped terrain. When land movement is impossible or the tactical situation dictates, helicopterborne artillery or delivery of artillery by aerial drop may be substituted.

(4) **Coordination.**—Coordinated fire lines (CFL), restrictive fire lines (RFL), fire support coordination lines (FSCL), and other control measures may change often or be implemented as a part of a counterguerrilla plan. A criteria for counterguerrilla targets should state the number of guerrillas and the size and type installations that are necessary to constitute a legitimate target for artillery. The ammunition policy of the commander states the amount of ammunition to be expended on missions based on the current ammunition and resupply situation. This guidance contributes to fire discipline and prevention of unnecessary expenditure of ammunition. Clearance to fire, as furnished by each agency concerned, must be expressed positively; silence denoting consent is not sufficient.

(5) **Observation.**—In order to provide the most effective support, it is important that a completely integrated observation plan be instituted to cover each area of operations. The following observation means should be fully integrated:

(a) **Observation Posts.**—Artillery and infantry observation posts should be established to complement each other and be fully coordinated by the intelligence officers.

(b) **Aerial Observers.**—The intelligence and operations officers coordinate infantry and artillery aerial observer surveillance of the area of operations. In addition to performing observation and photographic missions, observers relay requests of ground observers with patrols.

(c) **Electronic Surveillance.**—The ground surveillance and countermortar radars of infantry and artillery should be integrated in the observation plan. Limitations imposed by terrain and vegetation may be overcome by local or isolated area employment. Adequate protection for equipment and operators must be provided.

e. **Fire Support Base Considerations.**—A fire support base is a rapidly constructed artillery position defended by a minimum number of infantry troops. It is established to support a maneuver force operating away from fixed lines of communication for a limited period of time. The complexities of fire support base operations are similar to those experienced in any amphibious or helicopterborne operation; therefore, planning and coordination must be thorough and detailed. The fire support base is characterized by its isolation and often primary dependence upon helicopter support. The fire support base location must be closely integrated with maneuver force plans, and its development is a joint artillery, infantry, engineer, and air effort.

(1) **Commander's Consideration.**—In the development of a fire support base, the role of the maneuver force commander is dominant. While he may be advised by staff officers and supporting commanders on a variety of
matters related to site selection, requirements, priorities, construction, and occupation, the commander personally directs the planning effort.

(2) Command and Staff Planning.—Initially, the maneuver force commander and his staff must plan for the phased development of the selected site. Phase development requires the timely and orderly arrival of supplies and equipment as required and the necessary system to ensure on-site availability of each item as needed. The maneuver force commander must have continuous and positive control of all personnel and equipment to ensure that all elements are committed to projects according to predetermined priorities. The maneuver force commander must also provide for continuous security for the site to allow work to continue without interruption. The security requirement is based upon a changing enemy threat, defensibility of the site, and vulnerability of the facilities located at the site. Adequate and responsive communications are a tool of the maneuver force commander to maintain a continuously updated plan and to call for additional personnel, equipment, and supplies as needed.

(3) Artillery Planning Considerations

(a) The number of batteries, the caliber, and the range of the artillery are the major factors in the development of a fire support base. To a large extent, the distance between fire support bases and the size of each fire support base is largely dependent on how much artillery and what caliber is to be placed on one site. The mix of artillery weapons is most properly determined by the required support for the maneuver force.

(b) The maneuver force commander and the artillery commander cannot be bound by techniques of conventional artillery positioning. In conforming with the topography, an artillery unit may be compelled to follow the fngers of a ridge or be dispersed in a position other than the more usual battery positions. In any case, the artillery is positioned to optimize the primary direction of fire to support the maneuver force.

(c) In selecting positions for the howitzers, ammunition and powder bunkers, fire direction center, and other facilities, care must be taken not to place the various positions so close together that all guns cannot fire through 360 degrees because of masking, safety, or fire prevention.

(d) Use of the artillery must be considered in the defense of the fire support base. The artillery, ammunition and powder, and the fire direction center must be protected from direct fire, and as much as possible from indirect fire. Artillery personnel must be able to continue their mission of fire support while the fire support base is itself under attack. Artillerymen should not be considered in a primary role of perimeter security. However, artillery personnel and their howitzers are integrated into the defenses of the fire support base. Artillerymen are equipped and trained to defend their own positions with automatic weapons and small arms fire. Defensive concentrations and illumination from mutually supporting fire support bases are planned on avenues of approach and immediately in front of the protective wire, particularly in areas that are masked to fires from the fire support base.

(e) Where a fire support base may be exposed to low angle counterbattery fires, some flexibility may be sacrificed in order to place the artillery in a defilade position that still allows maximum fires in support of the maneuver force.
f. Execution of Artillery Operations.—Weapons such as tanks may be included in certain fire support operations. If employed, heavy and medium artillery will normally execute fire missions on distant targets while light artillery may be able to accompany the task organized forces in many operations.

(1) Artillery Support Considerations.—In providing artillery support, all problem areas need to be carefully analyzed. Range and trajectory capabilities, the cross-country mobility of self-propelled artillery, the use of helicopterborne artillery, air delivery and resupply, and the capability of artillery communications are examined. Ammunition requirements must be considered.

(2) Techniques of Support.—Forward observers with patrols, reconnaissance elements, and large or small task organizations will increase the number of guerrilla sightings and targets of opportunity. Forward observers operating in dense vegetation or rugged terrain should be capable of adjusting fire by sound. To provide for troop safety, fire for effect on initial data is placed at a greater distance from troops than in normal operations. Adjustments on checkpoints or terrain features will ensure accurate surprise fire on guerrilla activity and provide for troop safety. Aerial observers will be of particular value in adjusting fires, coordinating movements, reporting guerrilla activities, locating friendly elements, and acting as radio retransmission stations for ground elements.

(3) Local Guides.—Local guides and interpreters may be necessary in battalions and battalions to assist in movement from one position area to another. Their knowledge of the terrain and language can often preclude delay by assisting in the reconnaissance for position areas and routes.

(4) Offensive Action.—As offensive operations progress, forces are directed toward isolation, encirclement, and destruction of guerrilla units. The value of artillery increases during this period. Planning of artillery fires, target acquisition, and attack of guerrilla targets may approach conventional warfare. The use of flushing fires to force the guerrilla in a desired direction and barrier fires to seal off the possibility of withdrawal and to deny reinforcements is applicable. The destruction of guerrilla installations, the constant harassing, and the interdiction of facilities and routes of communication will hamper and destroy the morale of guerrilla forces. Artillery is positioned to support the scheme of maneuver against a fixed guerrilla force, to exploit the maximum number of weapons, and to provide massed fires.

(5) Pursuit.—Artillery is invaluable in the pursuit of escaping guerrilla elements. The demoralizing effect of artillery fires on a defeated guerrilla force should not be overlooked. Helicopterborne artillery is ideally suited to accompany the infantry pursuit of guerrilla remnants.

905. NAVAL GUNFIRE

The demoralizing effect of naval gunfire on guerrillas may justify the use of gunfire support against smaller targets than would normally be considered appropriate or when there is little probability of inflicting material damage. Naval gunfire spotters should be provided for platoon or larger size units operating within range. When assigning spotters to units of less than company size, alternate communications usually must be
provided. Spotting teams must be trained in operational techniques, preferably with the same units with which they will be employed. Maximum use should be made of air spotters. For further discussion of naval gunfire operations, see FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support.

906. MECHANIZED UNITS

a. Tanks

(1) Employment.—Advanced, coordinated planning characterized by initiative, imagination, and an understanding of combat support can largely reduce limitations placed on tank units as a result of rugged or marginal terrain. For further discussion on tank employment, see FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Antimechanized Operations. In the conduct of operations against guerrilla units, commanders can employ tanks as follows:

   (a) As a blocking force for search and destroy and clearing operations.

   (b) As a point element with or without infantry mounted on tanks in the conduct of patrols.

   (c) As rapid reaction forces.

   (d) As the nucleus of a motorized/mechanized force.

   (e) To patrol lines of communication (LOC's).

   (f) To participate in mobile defense of vital areas.

(2) Firepower.—In areas where mobility is entirely restricted by terrain, the long-range firepower of the tank can be exploited:

   (a) To support patrols and sweeps in an over-watching role, with direct fire from strongpoint positions.

   (b) To conduct indirect fire missions on targets of opportunity or harassing and interdicting fires.

(3) Battlefield Illumination.—In an environment characterized by night operations, tanks can provide immediate battlefield illumination, both visible white light for target acquisition by all weapons and infrared illumination for surveillance or target acquisition by weapons mounting infrared sighting devices.

b. Amphibious Vehicles

(1) General Employment.—The capability of amphibious vehicles to provide infantry transport, direct and indirect fire support, a command post or fire direction center, and flexible communications with ground units or air elements illustrates the support versatility of the amphibious vehicle. In areas where waterways offer the most available avenues of mobility, the amphibious vehicle is particularly valuable. Amphibious vehicle/infantry teams employed in connection with helicopterborne forces may have the requisite mobility and firepower to outmaneuver and destroy elusive guerrilla forces. For detailed discussion on the employment and capabilities of amphibious vehicles, see FMFM 9-2, Amphibious Vehicles.
(2) River Patrols and Blockades.—In areas containing numerous waterways and rivers, the use of combined amphibious vehicle and infantry teams can be effective in controlling both sides of rivers during operations against guerrillas. Size and composition of river patrols vary with the size, type, and scope of the specific operation, but should not be less than three vehicles.

907. NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

a. Nuclear Weapons.—The nature of counterinsurgency operations will usually make the use of nuclear weapons unprofitable. Guerrilla forces employ tactics that will seldom offer a target of sufficient size or of sufficient value to justify the expenditure of tactical nuclear weapons.

b. Chemical Weapons

(1) Policy.—Authorization to employ chemical weapons is promulgated by higher authority to the landing force/MAGTF commander. This will usually be the naval task force and/or unified commander who, in turn, responds to the decision of the national command authority. The Marine Corps is responsible for chemical operations related to its assigned functions, including defense against these weapons. Commanders receive directives relating to the employment of chemical weapons through command channels. The pattern and objectives for the use of chemical agents will depend upon such variables as U.S. foreign policy requirements of the military situation, host country participation, nature of the insurgent forces, and related factors. When the decision has been made to conduct chemical operations, authority to use chemical weapons usually is delegated to the lowest echelon responsible for the area within which the effects of the weapons will extend. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that riot control agents and herbicides are excluded from consideration as components of chemical warfare.

(2) Employment.—U.S. and friendly forces operating in proximity to chemical targets must have protection suitable for the agent selected for attack. It is unlikely that guerrilla forces can obtain adequate or efficient chemical defense equipment. Where guerrillas are relatively weak, they will typically be well-concealed and located in remote areas. Chemical attacks over large areas by support aircraft during carefully selected weather conditions offer optimum means of driving these forces out. Insurgents may be found close to or mingled among a noncombatant population. In this situation, nonlethal riot-control chemical agents are ideal. The period of incapacitation must be long enough so that counterguerrilla forces may move in, disarm, and imprison belligerents and seek out hidden arms. Riot control agents (CS and CN) are particularly suited for use in situations where it is desired to flush out or incapacitate the enemy. They can be effectively employed in driving guerrillas out of tunnels and caves or temporarily denying their use by guerrillas. Permanent denial can be achieved by utilizing powdered CS agents. For further discussion, see FMFM 11-3, Employment of Chemical Agents.

908. RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

a. Usually the area of operations of a counterinsurgency force will be so large that active operations will not include the entire area at any one time. Reconnaissance units with their mobility and versatile capabilities are the "eyes and ears" of the force commander and are extremely valuable for information collection.
b. The reconnaissance battalion, Marine division, has the mission of conducting reconnaissance in support of the division and/or its supporting elements. Reconnaissance personnel can be used as helicopterborne forces for deep reconnaissance, for attacking small isolated forces, for reconnoitering helicopter landing sites and drop zones, and for reconnoitering isolated areas between tactical units. Flexibility with restraint is the key to employing reconnaissance units in guerrilla environments. The capability of reconnaissance elements/units are restricted only by the task force commander's ingenuity; but a reconnaissance element's primary mission is that of reconnoitering. The force reconnaissance company has the mission of conducting deep and distant reconnaissance and, as such, is suited for reconnoitering beyond the artillery fan.

c. See FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance, for detailed discussion of missions, organization, and concept of employment of reconnaissance units.

909. ENGINEERS

a. Tasks.—Included among the engineer tasks which face the tactical unit commander are:

(1) Neutralization of guerrilla mines, boobytraps, and obstacles in tactical operations.

(2) Clearing vegetation along potential ambush sites.

(3) Destruction of facilities and/or areas of value only to the guerrilla force.

(4) The construction and/or maintenance of roads and bridges to operational areas to ensure rapid employment against guerrilla forces.

(5) Employment and operation of ferries and rafts at river-crossing sites in areas where guerrillas can readily destroy bridging.

(6) Possible construction of secure settlements for the civil population.

(7) Clearing land lines of communication daily by conducting route minesweeping operations.

(8) Providing engineer support, including contingency bridging, to convoys which may be organized to move through uncleared areas.

(9) Clearing and destruction of tunnels, caves, and other fortifications as required.

b. Field Expedients.—Field expedients should receive emphasis. All units should be proficient in simple engineer work such as erection of barbed wire fences, obstacle clearance, and field expedient bridging. To make maximum use of the civilian population, engineer personnel may be used to train and supervise laborers.

c. Mines

(1) In the insurgent environment, mines can be employed as offensive weapons. Minefields are seldom employed as obstacles because
of the ease with which these obstacles can normally be circumvented. However, nuisance mining may be carried out on a massive scale.

(2) Ingenious mine devices can be used to harass Allied operations. Until a technological breakthrough in detection occurs, the defense against enemy mines and boobytraps is effective training.

d. Civic Action.—The inherent capabilities and resources of Marine engineer units provide the tactical commander with another valuable asset to support military civic action programs. The engineer effort should be directed toward assisting in the construction or rehabilitation of transportation and communication means, schools, hospitals, churches, and utility systems.

910. NAVAL SHIPS AND CRAFT

a. Ships.—Naval ships can be employed to disrupt guerrilla supply channels maintained by local coastal or river craft, provide sea transport for rapid concentration of ground forces, attack guerrilla formations in areas close to the sea, and prevent seaward infiltration or escape of guerrilla forces.

b. Craft.—If terrain and inland waterways are suitable, small craft can aid the mobility of tactical units. Combat support may be provided through LCPV's, LCM's, and LCU's by mounting mortars, tanks, and artillery for fire support directly from the landing craft; or when infantry is available to provide protection, weapons may be landed to provide support. These and other craft can provide service support such as evacuating casualties, supplying and resupplying, operating ferries, and by providing craft with field expedient helicopter platforms where this would be the only means for landing.

c. Guerrilla Countermeasures.—Precautionary steps must be taken against guerrilla countermeasures involving ambushes employing recoilless rifles, frogmen with demolitions, or underwater mines.

911. LOGISTICS

Operations against guerrillas present special logistic problems that require detailed planning. The logistic support system must be flexible enough to provide self-sufficiency for the tactical unit, planned resupply, and prepositioned supplies and service installations. Security must be established to protect supplies against raids and ambush even in safe areas. Although some type of transportation can usually be provided, units must be prepared to man-carry supplies or utilize indigenous pack animals. Individual preventive maintenance on all equipment must be stressed. Medical requirements include mobile units with surgical capability, greater self-sufficiency of medical personnel attached to tactical units, and thorough first aid proficiency on the part of all personnel.

a. Supply

(1) Planning.—Forces operating against guerrillas should carry a minimum of supplies in order to maintain their mobility. Small units should be prepared to live off the land when necessary. The commander must determine the amount and type of supplies needed for the entire operation. After estimating the expected resupply transportation support and the supplies which will be available locally, he must decide both the supplies to
be carried with the unit and stock levels to be maintained at the resupply base(s).

(2) Types.--Generally, the major supply requirements are for subsistence and ammunition. The amount of POL supplies required will depend on the amount of automotive transportation included in the tactical organization plus the amount needed to maintain communication facilities. Necessary items of clothing should be available at prepositioned locations on an as-required basis. There may be a requirement to provide essential items of subsistence and medical supplies to civilians.

(3) Procurement.--Replenishment schedules must be planned utilizing prearranged delivery of supplies to tactical units by air, land, or water transportation. While emergency combat rations can suffice for a few days, provisions should be made to deliver standard rations periodically. Smokeless heat tablets should be provided. POL may be procured locally, but care should be taken to determine its reliability; delivery will generally be possible by 5-gallon containers only. Local procurement should not deprive the civil populace of scarce materials. On the other hand, only the necessary amounts of subsistence, medical supplies or ammunition, should be turned over to civilians unless specific authority has been granted. Water consumption rates will vary with local temperature and activity of Marines in the field. In some areas, 2 quarts per day may sustain drinking needs; in hot, humid areas, this figure may double. Native water chemically treated by the individual may be utilized.

(4) Prepositioned Supplies.--Temporary supply points should be established at static defense or security installations to replenish expended supplies.

b. Transportation.--The success of operations depends, to a large measure, on transportation support that can be maintained. This applies to tactical displacements, supply and service support, and the evacuation of casualties. Resources of the guerrilla tend to limit him to foot mobility. Forces operating against guerrillas will also frequently rely on foot mobility; wheeled vehicles will often provide such forces a decided advantage.

(1) Helicopters.--Helicopterborne forces arrive fresh and may deploy quickly. Helicopter support during combat is particularly desirable since resupply, reinforcement, and evacuation by other means are often infeasible. The use of helicopters for supply and evacuation offers a high degree of logistic support flexibility from the highest echelon down to the squad patrol.

(2) Fixed-Wing Transport.--Fixed-wing aircraft delivery is perhaps the most satisfactory means of resupply for tactical units beyond helicopter range. If electronic guidance systems are available, all-weather parachute or freedrops can be used. The chief disadvantages of this method are that the locations and sizes of the drops may give information to the opposing guerrillas as to the location and size of the receiving unit and that some supplies may drift into areas where they will be recovered by the enemy. There is also a damage risk.

(3) Landing Craft and Small Boats.--Landing craft, specially designed small boats, or native craft can be used to move troops, supplies, and surface vehicles on inland waterways. Armament can be mounted on the
landing craft for combat support. Tanks and supply laden vehicles can either be off-loaded or used while waterborne.

(4) Rail.--Existing rail facilities may offer good transportation over part of the supply route but will seldom extend to the forward areas. Since rail shipments are easily sabotaged or ambushed, security considerations may often rule out use of rails even though otherwise feasible.

(5) Land Vehicles.--Rugged terrain usually limits the types of vehicles which can be used in the forward areas. However, LVT's, track-laying prime movers, marginal terrain vehicles, and mechanical mules may provide cross-country mobility.

(6) Other Means.--When no other transportation is available, troops move on foot and supplies are man-packed. Native carriers and/or pack animals can be employed. When pack animals are used, their owners or other native handlers should be hired, if possible.

c. Service.--It will not be feasible to attach heavy maintenance support units to tactical organizations; therefore, they should be located at the bases or static defense installation closest to the combat areas. For the organization of logistic support areas, see FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. Preventive maintenance should be given a high priority. Contact repair teams may be flown to the tactical locations for unit replacement repairs or unserviceable equipment may be helicopter lifted to the support area. Movement of the tactical unit should not be delayed by lengthy maintenance operations. Inoperative vehicles which cannot be repaired or evacuated should be destroyed or cannibalized.

(1) Planning.--Service support planning must consider the complete operation, the organization of the force, and its equipment. Spare parts and replacements must be spotted at locations where they can be easily transported to the tactical areas. When extended operations are planned, it may be advisable to attach repair teams to the tactical units. Only essential combat replacement items should be stocked. Time must be allocated before and after each mission for repairs and replacements.

(2) Execution.--Emphasis is placed on replacement of component parts by helicopterborne maintenance teams. Temporary repairs and local civilian repair facilities should be used as much as possible. Requests for service support will be passed over normal command or administrative radio channels to the logistic support area commander.

(3) Security.--Maintenance personnel must be trained and equipped to protect themselves and their installations from guerrilla attack and sabotage. In addition, the commanders of the tactical units concerned must provide for their safety when they are working in their tactical areas.

d. Medical Support and Evacuation.--Medical support must be as flexible as the tactical operation it supports. In strike operations (see par. 612), the organic medical personnel of the operational units may have to be reinforced by additional medical (including surgical) and/or dental capabilities. On the other hand, in consolidation operations (see par. 613), the medical requirements of the combat forces may in fact decrease while the civic action medical requirements increase.
(1) Initial Care.--Initial emergency medical treatment is by organic hospital corpsmen. The use of small tactical units in widely dispersed areas requires that each man be trained in basic first aid measures, so that he may save his own life or that of another, because the unit may be required to hold casualties for extended periods of time before evacuation. First aid training must emphasize practical application of emergency treatment.

(2) Evacuation.--Evacuation is accomplished by the most practicable means available. These means include but are not limited to: foot, litter, motor vehicles, boat, and helicopter. Each method of evacuation has its advantages and disadvantages that must be weighed by the medical personnel and the unit commander on the scene. Helicopters should be considered as the primary means of evacuation for isolated units or long-range patrols; however, the situation, mission of the unit, terrain, and gravity of the casualty's medical condition will determine the time, place, and method of evacuation.

(3) Treatment of Civilians.--Use of military medical personnel to assist in treatment of civilians is a powerful psychological weapon to gain support of the local population. Medical personnel should assist, consistent with the priorities for treatment of Marine forces, particularly when civilian casualties are the result of guerrilla actions.

912. COMMUNICATIONS

a. General

(1) In a counterinsurgency operation, the standard mission, concept of operation, and organization for combat of tactical units may undergo modifications. In such an event, it can be expected that a reevaluation of communication requirements will be necessary. It is essential that communication personnel understand the characteristics of counterinsurgency operations so that requirements peculiar to such an environment can be anticipated and identified early in the communication planning phase.

(2) The terrain in which the guerrilla usually operates and the methods of counterguerrilla operations impose definite limitations on the normal employment of infantry communication systems. See FMFM 10-1, Communications, for further details.

b. Requirements.--The communication system must provide the commander with the capability of control and maneuver, rapid reporting of guerrilla movements, security and warning, and handling normal administrative logistic requirements. A communication system is required between military and civilian agencies and between aviation and ground combat elements of the MAGTF conducting tactical operations. A clandestine communication system is often required between intelligence agents and headquarters of higher echelons. The use of civilian police, self-defense units, and friendly irregular forces in civilian population control or small scale operations requires a communication system for coordination and control by the counterguerrilla force.

c. Communication Means

(1) Multichannel radio affords a high traffic handling capability. Single channel radio cannot provide enough channels for the total
requirements normally associated with tactical operations. Every effort must be made to continue use of multichannel communications to provide the relatively high traffic handling capacity which it offers. By taking advantage of the location of secure combat and patrol bases, it may be possible to overcome security, terrain, and distance obstacles and to extend multichannel communications to units otherwise inaccessible.

(2) Radio plays an even more important role in counterinsurgency operations than it does in other environments. This is because wire lines often cannot be installed or maintained, and it is difficult or impossible to employ ground messengers. Radio nets are principally VHF-FM. Any impact which tends to downgrade VHF-FM radio utilization is therefore critical and warrants the utmost attention of the communication officer. The communication officer is required to identify and recommend ways of eliminating or minimizing problem areas. Some problem areas which may arise are:

(a) Portable VHF and/or HF equipment augmentation required.

(b) Limited relay sites; consider airborne retransmission stations.

(c) Reduced transmission range of radios due to terrain, vegetation, etc.

(d) Need for external or lateral communications with U.S., host country, third country armed forces or civilian agencies, or para-military units of the host country. Close coordination of frequencies, call signs, and authentication will be required.

(e) Language barriers.

(f) Lack of compatibility of equipment and procedures.

(3) Wire communications are used to the maximum extent possible. Normally, the vulnerability of wire communications to guerrilla force action dictates that wire be used only in secure areas and within combat bases and installations. Helicopters may be utilized to lay wire across the jungle canopy.

(4) Motor, foot, and air messengers are considered to be a most reliable and secure means of delivery in other environments. However, their use in active counterinsurgency operations will require reevaluation. The usefulness of motor messengers is significantly downgraded by this environment. Messengers are highly vulnerable to ambush, sniper fire, emplaced mines, and other roadblocking tactics. For this reason, their employment normally should be limited to well-secured areas. The use of foot messengers is extremely limited in many environments. When required to use foot messengers, it is advisable to employ them in pairs, especially at night. Because of the limitations placed on ground messengers, the bulk of the messenger traffic will be handled by air. Economy of resources suggests exploitation of otherwise existing flights for messenger traffic whenever feasible, but a single scheduled, daily messenger flight will probably prove an essential minimum.
(5) Visual and sound communications have special importance because of the numerous restrictions placed on other means normally available to tactical units. This requires effective and timely coordination with all friendly armed forces and appropriate civilian agencies in the area. When prescribing pyrotechnic signals, care must be taken to ensure they include only those pyrotechnic types and colors currently available in supply channels. Care must also be exercised to ensure that the use of pyrotechnics is restricted to the plan issued by the senior headquarters. The necessity for this has its basis in the fact that pyrotechnics may be seen over great distances and pyrotechnic signalling can be duplicated by the enemy. Visual signals are an excellent means for transmitting brief orders and information as well as emergency requests for air support. The basic communication plan should include the employment of hand signals, flags, pyrotechnics, and panels. Sound communications are more limited in use than visual communications. However, whistles and horns can be used to good advantage to maintain control between small units in proximity. Sirens may be useful at larger installations for various warnings.
1001. GENERAL

a. The establishment of a separate and distinct training program for preparing personnel and units for counterinsurgency operations is not necessary nor desirable. However, there is a necessity that training for operations against guerrilla forces be effectively integrated into all phases of the prescribed training program for all units so that individuals and units will be prepared for short notice commitment to areas infected with subversive insurgency, as well as general or limited war environments. Success in counterinsurgency operations necessitates the combining of required individual skills, unit capabilities, and sound planning to meet the problem areas.

b. Individual training objectives for counterinsurgency operations are generally the same as for general or limited war operations; however, the degree of proficiency required is greater because of the increased reliance on individual and small-unit actions. The individual must be trained to react instantly to orders and oriented to act in the absence of orders.

c. Unit training objectives are to develop unit capabilities through training the individual to operate within and between units, and to provide an understanding of the specific characteristics and requirements of counterinsurgency operations revolving around the major activities of tactical, intelligence, psychological, populace and resource control, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations.

d. Prior to commitment, personnel should be indoctrinated to ensure an understanding of the concepts, habits, skills, and institutions of the host government. In addition, emphasis should be placed on why Marines are committed to the support of the legally constituted government of the
country. The indoctrination phase should be concentrated shortly before personnel actively engage in counterinsurgency operations and reemphasized periodically. Success of operations against the subversive infrastructure and guerrilla forces is greatly affected by the attitude of the host country's populace. It is important that personnel are well oriented on the cultural aspects of the host country and use diplomacy in relation with the populace. A friendly, courteous, and considerate attitude toward the population as a whole by individuals and units will induce civil agencies and the civil populace to willingly assist in the detection and elimination of the insurgent infrastructure and guerrilla elements.

1002. CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

a. Fundamental Considerations.—Winning the willing support of the population to the side of the threatened government is one of the principal goals of countering an insurgent situation. There is not a more certain method of eliminating the guerrilla and the infrastructure than by turning the civilians against them. The insurgent has employed tactics designed to create doubts, bitterness, grievances, and unrest in the populace toward their government. He has been changing and modifying the attitudes of the civilian about his government in an effort to establish a suitable environment for guerrilla growth. The government must counter by establishing new faith and loyalty, and persuading the people to back their own government against the insurgents. The words and actions of all representatives of the government, whether they are members of civil agencies, of the host country's armed forces, or U.S. Marines, must be complimentary and directed toward winning the people. Preparing personnel to operate in an insurgency environment not only requires the development of an aggressive spirit, but a sense of diplomacy and understanding. This implies a need for a serious study of the people and their culture. The political, religious, social, and intellectual development of the nation must be understood. From this study, particular methods of handling the populace can be derived. The methods and extent of application will vary widely with the situation; however, some of the fundamental considerations are:

(1) Be patient.

(2) Be friendly and courteous while maintaining military decorum. Respect the dignity of individuals in general, particularly the elderly.

(3) Do not make promises to individuals or groups unless they can be kept.

(4) Refrain from displays of military arrogance.

(5) Avoid the use of unnecessarily harsh or repressive measures in controlling the population; never take hostages or conduct reprisals.

(6) Exercise care not to expose civilians or their property to undue danger or damage when it can be avoided.

(7) Refrain from impressing civilians to perform unauthorized labor.

(8) Observe local laws and customs to the extent feasible. Be particularly careful to avoid interfering with religious matters and trespassing on or defacing religious property such as shrines, temples, cemeteries, idols, or monuments.
(9) Obtain authorization before using private property for military use. The quartering of personnel in private homes should be avoided.

(10) Honor patriotic symbols such as the host country's national flag and anthem.

(11) Political affiliations or the appearance of political favoritism should be avoided; while a thorough knowledge of the political situation is essential, a strict neutrality should be observed.

(12) Treat suspect insurgents and prisoners fairly but firmly.

(13) Be frugal in authorized economic dealings with the populace. An understanding of the bases of the local economy, and the economic status of the various segments of the local population is vital to an intelligent appreciation of the attitudes of the population toward the operation.

b. Understanding.--In training, it must be emphasized that societies differ greatly in their customs, traditions, intellectual level, and beliefs. If Marines are to operate effectively in a foreign social environment, they must understand the differences between their own and the environment into which they are to be committed. With a knowledge of the social aspects of a nation, Marines will be able to gain the cooperation of the populace without offending the people.

c. Judging Others.--Inhabitants of countries with a high rate of illiteracy may induce the impression that they are juvenile in their actions or have habits that are repugnant when compared to our own standards. It is manifestly unjust to judge such people by our standards, and if such judgment is translated into words or actions, the goal of winning the support of the people will be lost. In an insurgent environment, the people have to be treated with respect, tolerance, kindness, and understanding. These are the keynotes of the attitude that will win the hearts and minds of the people to the side of the host government.

d. Communications.--The ability to communicate with the people of a country in their own language is a great asset in every association with the populace. Formal training for those with language ability should take place in the United States. When Marines are committed to counterinsurgency operations, schools can be established in the country to increase the number of language-qualified personnel. In addition, every society has a means of communication without speaking. Understanding gestures and motions of a society can prevent embarrassing situations and can aid in establishing friendships. Training must emphasize that, even though we may not be talking to people, we are continuously communicating with them through actions, facial expressions, and gestures.

e. Area Information.--Inseparable from an understanding of the people of a host country is a knowledge of the overall makeup of the area of operations. Information contained in area studies should be disseminated to all personnel. See section 7 for details concerning area studies.

1003. TRAINING FOR COMMANDERS, STAFFS, AND SMALL UNIT LEADERS

a. Command and Staff Personnel.--Prior to commitment in counterinsurgency operations, command and staff personnel should receive instruction in activities and operations peculiar to counterguerrilla operations, to include:
(1) Tactical operations against forces that usually have little interest in seizing and holding terrain.

(2) Familiarization with modifying organization and equipment requirements to provide the best possible combination for success in counter-guerrilla operations.

(3) Command, control, communication, logistic, and medical problems associated with conducting operations over large areas.

(4) Understanding and support of clandestine intelligence and communication nets and cooperation with other intelligence agencies, both U.S. and host country.

(5) Conduct of military civic action.

(6) Employment of civil affairs support and psychological operations.

(7) Employment of unit resources in local advisory assistance.

(8) Employment of units in populace and resource control operations.

(9) Area orientation, to include national characteristics, customs, and religious, economic, and political aspects of the host country or area.

(10) Orientation on the terrain, climate, and unusual health hazards.

(11) Integration of staff augmentation elements, such as intelligence, imagery interpreters, civil affairs, and psychological operations personnel, into unit staffs.

(12) Use of feints, deception, and dummy positions.

(13) Use of interpreters.

b. Small Unit Leaders.—Small unit leader development must be emphasized. During the conduct of decentralized counterguerrilla operations, the small unit leader must be able to plan and execute operations with little or no assistance from higher headquarters. Training should be conducted in depth as casualties will necessitate that juniors effectively and efficiently perform the duties of their seniors in the event that a senior becomes a casualty. Small unit leaders should be trained in the procedures for requesting and adjusting mortar and artillery fires and requesting air support.

1004. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Individual training for all personnel subject to commitment in counterinsurgency operations emphasizes physical and mental conditioning, acclimatization to the area of operations (if possible), the characteristics of the proposed country or area of employment, and techniques used for analyzing the assigned sector as the basis for counterguerrilla operational plans. This includes tactics and techniques of counterguerrilla tactical
operations and orientation on the nature of the motivations, operations, and objectives of resistance or insurgent movements, to include counterpsychological training and orientation on the need to engage in counter-guerrilla operations.

a. Counterguerrilla Environment.--Personnel must be trained in both active and passive measures which they can employ for their own safety and for effectively countering the guerrilla force. Since there are no front-lines nor rear areas as defined in conventional operations, combat support and combat service support personnel must be constantly alert to the possibility of attack in their installations. On extremely short notice, combat service support personnel may find themselves engaged in tactical operations. Similarly, all personnel should be familiar with control measures imposed upon the populace which may require extensive troop effort through the operation.

b. Cross-Training.--Because counterguerrilla operations habitually require the employment of small, widely separated, and self-sufficient units, it is required that personnel be cross-trained in the use of communication equipment and all individual and crew-served weapons. The loss of a segment of a unit should not cause such equipment or essential skills to be unused because of a lack of training of personnel.

c. Physical Conditioning.--An intensive training effort is required to ensure physical conditioning of personnel that will permit the counter-guerrilla force not only to match the foot mobility and endurance of the guerrilla, but to exceed it. Training exercises are planned and conducted to enhance the endurance of unit personnel. This conditions the troops to mentally accept the concept of continuous offensive operations to the limits of physical stamina. Emphasis should be placed on forced marches to include speed marches, physical training drills, hand-to-hand combat drills, survival, escape and evasion training, and confidence tests.

d. Marksmanship Training.--Marksmanship training should emphasize accurate, intense small arms fire, to include quick-fire techniques. The fleeting nature of most guerrilla contacts combined with terrain that usually provides maximum concealment necessitates that all personnel be knowledgeable and possess the skill to rapidly take the adversary under killing fires.

1005. INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT TRAINING

In addition to the above considerations, normal individual and small unit training should include:

a. Tactics and techniques for combat in built-up areas, deserts, swamps, mountains, and jungles.

b. Long-range combat patrolling.

c. Techniques of raids, ambushes, and ruses, and techniques to counter these operations.

d. Night operations.

e. Aerial resupply techniques.
f. Riot control.
g. Police-type patrolling and operations of roadblocks.
h. Techniques of search and seizure operations.
i. Survival techniques.
j. Target identification.
k. Close combat fire discipline.
l. Use of animal transport.
m. Convoy escort and security.
n. Use and detection of mines, demolitions, and boobytraps.
o. Intelligence gathering methods.
p. Counterintelligence and interrogation.
q. Fieldcraft and improvisation.
r. Tracking and land navigation.
s. Advanced first aid and preventive medicine measures.
t. Silent movement.
u. Observation.
v. Boat handling.
w. River-crossing procedures and expedients.
x. Map and compass training.
y. Casualty evacuation techniques.
z. Navigation without the aid of landmarks.
   aa. Installation and operation of portable radios used in a rifle company.
   bb. Basic voice radio procedure.
   cc. Request and adjust artillery and naval gunfire.
APPENDIX A

AREA STUDY

1. PHYSICAL FEATURES
   a. General topography.
   b. Hydrography and water supply.
   c. Climate.
   d. Major lines of communication.
   e. Major natural resources.

2. SOCIOLOGY
   a. Historical background.
   b. Culture and customs.
   c. Ethnic characteristics and distribution.
   d. Language.
   e. Population distribution.
   f. Local (village) society.
   g. Land ownership and tenure.

3. GOVERNMENT
   a. Form and development of government, organization and method of operation.
      b. Head of state, political leaders.
      c. Analysis of political parties.
      d. Political subdivisions.
      e. Regional and social differences.
      f. Foreign policy, relations with neighboring states, membership in international bodies, treaty obligations.
      g. Public administration and local government.
      h. Corruption, despotism, social injustices.

4. LEGAL
   a. Basic legal system.
b. Local claims system and procedures.
c. Real property rights.

5. EDUCATION
   a. Basic system of education.
   b. Advanced education.
   c. Technical training.
   d. Major educational installations.
   e. Student groups.

6. FINANCE
   b. Currency system.
   c. Banking system.
   d. Financial status.

7. PUBLIC SAFETY
   a. Police system.
      (1) National.
      (2) Local.
   b. Identification and record system.
   c. Organized crime.
   d. Type, frequency, and trend of offenses.
   e. Civil defense system.
   f. Fire-fighting system.
   g. Confinement facilities.
   h. Paramilitary organizations.

8. PUBLIC HEALTH
   a. Public health system.
   b. Availability of trained medical personnel.
   c. Hospital and dispensary facilities.
   d. Endemic and epidemic diseases.
e. Sanitation, water supply, waste disposal.
f. Preventive medicine.
g. Availability of drugs, vaccines, and medical equipment.

9. PUBLIC WELFARE
   a. Emergency shelter and feeding facilities.
   b. Orphanages, homes for aged, handicapped care, and child care centers.
   c. Private relief agencies in country.
   d. Farmer or fishermen's co-ops.
   e. Political orientation of organized labor.
   f. Wage and manpower scales and controls.

10. ECONOMICS
   a. Economic development.
   b. Production capacity.
      (1) Agriculture.
      (2) Minerals.
      (3) Manufactured goods.
      (4) Shipbuilding and repair.
      (5) Auto and aircraft construction or assembly.
   c. Foreign trade.
      (1) Exports.
      (2) Imports.
   d. Flow of material and distribution.
   e. Food or fuel shortages.
   f. Housing.
   g. Undistributable surpluses.
   h. Extent of foreign interests.
   i. Economy of local social units (villages).
   j. Essential areas.
   k. Price controls and rationing.
11. AGRICULTURE
   a. Principal agricultural resources.
      (1) Animal husbandry.
      (2) Fishing.
      (3) Grains.
      (4) Fruits and vegetables.
      (5) Forest products.
      (6) Agriculture for industrial use.
   b. Availability of land.
      (1) Cultivated.
      (2) Uncultivated.
   c. Fertilizer use and production.
   d. Irrigation and drainage.
   e. Insect and rodent control.
   f. Principal harvest seasons.
   g. Flood and drought areas.
   h. Control of agricultural assets.
   i. Public or institutional land holdings.
   j. Distribution of food resources.

12. PUBLIC FACILITIES
   a. Public works and utilities.
   b. Public telecommunications.
      (1) Telephone.
      (2) Telegraph.
      (3) Cables.
      (4) Radio.
   c. Public transportation.
      (1) Roads and bus service.
      (2) Railroads.
(3) Inland waterways.
(4) Coastal shipping.
(5) Commercial air service and facilities.
   d. Ownership of public facilities.

13. RELIGION
   a. Principal religions, origins, and basic philosophies.
   b. Minority religions, origins, and basic philosophies.
   c. Religious group interactions.
   d. Major religious installations.
   e. Sacred places.
   f. Religious restrictions.

14. ARTS, MONUMENTS, AND ARCHIVES
   a. Significant cultural or historical objects.
   b. Archive repositories.

15. PUBLIC MEDIA
   a. Newspapers.
   b. Major magazines.
   c. Radio and television.
   d. Motion picture industry.
   e. Ownership and control of public media.

NOTE: A more detailed outline and instructions as to how to write and where to find the information for the area study can be found in appendix J of FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.
LIST OF REFERENCES

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JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces
NAVMC 2509-A/PM 10-63, Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operations

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FMFM 2-1, Intelligence
FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance
FMFM 2-3, Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations (U)
FMFM 2-4, Counterintelligence
FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations
FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
FMFM 4-3, Landing Support Operations
FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation
FMFM 6-1, Marine Division
FMFM 6-2, Marine Infantry Regiment
FMFM 6-3, Marine Infantry Battalion
FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon
FMFM 6-5, Marine Rifle Squad
FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support
FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support
FMFM 8-1, Special Operations
FMFM 8-4, Doctrine for Navy/Marine Corps Joint Riverine Operations
FMFM 8-6, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs
FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Amphibious Operations
FMFM 9-2, Amphibious Vehicles
FMFM 10-1, Communications
FMFM 11-3, Employment of Chemical Agents

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FM 21-50, Ranger Training and Ranger Operations
FM 21-75, Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling
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FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations
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